Public pension and debt policies in general equilibrium by Buyse, Tim
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC PENSION AND DEBT POLICIES 
IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TIM BUYSE 
 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR:  
PROF. DR. FREDDY HEYLEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED AT GHENT UNIVERSITY, TO THE FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 
IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR IN ECONOMICS 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public pension and debt policies 
in general equilibrium 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Tim Buyse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 DOCTORAL COMMITTEE 
 
 
Prof. dr. Marc De Clercq 
(Ghent University, Dean) 
 
Prof. dr. Patrick Van Kenhove 
(Ghent University, Academic Secretary) 
 
Prof. dr. Freddy Heylen 
(Ghent University, Supervisor) 
 
Prof. dr. André Decoster 
(KU Leuven) 
 
Prof. dr. David de la Croix 
(Université catholique de Louvain) 
 
Prof. dr. Glenn Rayp 
(Ghent University) 
 
Prof. dr. Dirk Van de gaer 
(Ghent University) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
Acknowledgements  
 
 
This dissertation is the product of almost four years of hard work. It is the result of a long journey 
characterised by excitement, doubt, exhaustion, euphoria, disappointment and inspiration. In every 
way, the journey itself has been as important as the destination. I feel fortunate to have had a great 
Ph.D. experience, with the freedom to undertake creative research and the opportunity to share my 
research outcomes with peers at international conferences around the world. Yet, writing this 
doctoral thesis would not have been possible without the continuing help and support of my family, 
friends and colleagues. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to express my utmost gratitude 
towards all of them. 
 
First of all, I am very grateful to my supervisor prof. dr. Freddy Heylen for giving me the opportunity 
to undertake this challenging Ph.D. project. Not only do I admire his passion for (macro)economics; 
his advice, support and friendship have been invaluable for me, at both an academic and a personal 
level. Freddy, from the very beginning, you believed in me and encouraged me to aim for the best in 
economic research. For this, I am extremely grateful. Your office door was always open to discuss 
both professional and personal issues. Your genuine willingness to help and support me and other 
starting doctoral students, and transfer your passion for discovering, researching, writing and 
sharing, has been inspiring. Your enthusiasm and inexhaustible stream of energy (and perhaps also 
your lack of time management) are remarkable. Thank you Freddy. 
 
I would also like to express my gratitude towards the other members of my doctoral advisory 
committee, prof. dr. Dirk Van de gaer (Ghent University) and prof. dr. David de la Croix (UCLouvain), 
for taking a keen interest in my work. Their readings of the various chapters in this dissertation and 
the resulting comments have undoubtfully improved the quality of this work. Thanks also to prof. dr. 
Gerdie Everaert (Ghent University) for his comments on the fourth study of this dissertation and to 
the other members of my doctoral committee, prof. dr. Glenn Rayp (Ghent University) and prof. dr. 
André Decoster (KULeuven), for their constructive comments and advice during the final stage of my 
Ph.D. Financially, I acknowledge support of the National Bank of Belgium, the European 
Commission’s DG ECFIN and, especially, the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO). I wouldn't have 
had nearly as much freedom without the FWO-fellowship that has funded my research since 2011. 
Moreover, I would also like to thank the Flanders Social and Economic Council (SERV) for giving me 
the opportunity to finish my thesis during the first months at my new job. 
 
A heartfelt thanks goes out to the many other colleagues at the department and faculty. In 
particular, I would like to thank Renaat Van de Kerckhove, who is also co-author of two of my papers. 
Already during my master’s thesis, he initiated me in the fascinating world of OLG-modeling in 
Dynare. He turned out to be of crucial importance for the development of the first parts of this 
dissertation and he was a major support in times of worries. I feel very lucky to have had the 
opportunity to work with him. Thanks also to my office-mate Ewoud for the many constructive 
discussions but also for the daily lunches and the much-needed distraction throughout the workday. 
(I think in particular of the various ‘Movie-of-the-Day’-moments). Ruben and Brecht, thanks also to 
you for adding to the nice atmosphere in the department.  
A big-hearted thank goes out to Annelies, Karolien and Waldo, three friends who perfectly 
understand what it means to undertake a Ph.D. project and to oscillate between highs and lows, 
between euphoria and disappointment. Thanks for your support when I needed it. I hope my 
completing this Ph.D. may also be encouraging for you. I would also like to thank Erna and Nathalie. 
Thanks, not only for your help with all the practical and administrative issues, but above all for the 
regular talks, coffee breaks and the many memorable moments we shared. 
 
My utmost gratitude goes out to my parents. They have given me their unequivocal support 
throughout, as always, for which my mere expression of thanks likewise does not suffice. I hope I 
have made them proud. In the same breath, I would also like to thank my grandmother, Norva, for 
her care and concern and for always being there for me. Above all, I would like to thank my wife and 
best friend Kelly, to whom I would like to dedicate this dissertation. Thank you for your love, support 
and great patience at all time. Thank you for dealing with my worries and stress attacks when I 
encountered yet another Ph.D.-existential crisis. Thank you for always standing by my side.  
 
 
Tim Buyse 
Ghent, June 2014  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
 
 
De beleidsmakers in de meeste OESO-landen staan voor enorme uitdagingen. Eerst en vooral worden 
de gezondheids- en pensioengerelateerde uitgaven verwacht sterk te stijgen door de vergrijzing. 
Hierdoor is de bezorgdheid omtrent de betaalbaarheid op lange termijn van het publieke 
pensioensysteem sterk toegenomen. Hervorming van het bestaande systeem is noodzakelijk en 
onvermijdelijk. De verhoogde uitgavendruk inzake pensioenen komt bovendien op een moment dat 
vele landen gedwongen worden hun budgettaire situatie aan te zuiveren na de recente crisis. De 
financiële crisis van 2007-2008 heeft namelijk tot op vandaag diepgaande gevolgen voor de 
economieën van vele OESO-landen en voor hun overheidsfinanciën. Ook budgettaire sanering staat 
vandaag dus centraal in het economisch en politieke debat. De nood aan effectieve maatregelen om 
de overheidsschulden te verminderen, staat gegeven de potentieel nefaste invloed van hoge schuld 
op toekomstige groei en welvaart buiten discussie. 
 
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift (hoofdstukken 2-4) focussen we op de macro-economische 
effecten van pensioenhervormingen. Mede onder druk van de vergrijzing en gegeven de nood aan 
budgettaire sanering dringen hervormingen zich op. In de wetenschappelijke literatuur is er 
eensgezindheid dat, om de pensioenuitdaging aan te pakken, er in de eerste plaats nood is aan (i) 
een hogere werkgelegenheid, vooral onder 50-plussers en (ii) een sterkere per capita economische 
groei (productiviteitsgroei). Vanuit deze overtuiging werden ook heel wat voorstellen geformuleerd 
tot hervorming van de bestaande publieke pensioensystemen. Verschillende economen hebben 
onderzocht hoe het pensioensysteem de individuele incentives tot werken kan beïnvloeden. Anderen 
tonen aan dat de aard van het pensioensysteem invloed heeft op de vorming van menselijk kapitaal 
via scholing en zo de economische groei kan bepalen. Ondanks tal van bijdragen, heeft de 
academische literatuur echter nog geen consensus bereikt over welke hervormingen het meest 
bijdragen tot hogere werkgelegenheid, sterkere productiviteitsgroei en welvaart. De gangbare 
beleidsaanbevelingen variëren sterk, gaande van hervormingen binnen het bestaande ‘pay-as-you-
go’ repartitiesysteem tot een geleidelijke overgang naar een actuarieel neutraal kapitalisatiesysteem. 
De hoofdstukken 2-4 van dit proefschrift bestuderen daarom het verband tussen enerzijds 
het publieke pensioensysteem en anderzijds de werkgelegenheid in drie leeftijdsgroepen, tertiaire 
scholing, de leeftijd waarop mensen daadwerkelijk op pensioen gaan (de effectieve pensioenleeftijd), 
en de economische groei. We doen dit op basis van een endogeen groeimodel met overlappende 
generaties. Op elk moment leven vier generaties gezinnen: drie actieve generaties (jong, middelbare 
leeftijd, ouder) en een gepensioneerde generatie. Jonge individuen zijn tussen 20 en 34, individuen 
op middelbare leeftijd tussen 35 en 49, en oudere individuen tussen 50 en 64. Gepensioneerden zijn 
65+. Terwijl ouderen en individuen op middelbare leeftijd beslissen hoeveel en hoe lang ze werken, 
kunnen jongeren (naast werken) ook een deel van hun tijd studeren om extra menselijk kapitaal en 
kennis op te bouwen. De overheid heft belastingen op arbeid, kapitaal en consumptie. Ze gebruikt 
deze inkomsten ter financiering van productieve uitgaven (vooral voor scholing), consumptie, 
transfers aan niet-werkenden (waaronder ook uitkeringen aan wie vervroegd met pensioen gaat) en 
reguliere pensioenen. Het pensioensysteem is van het pay-as-you-go type waarbij iemands pensioen 
berekend wordt als fractie (de vervangingsratio) van het verdiende eigen arbeidsinkomen over diens 
actieve periode. De financiering van de pensioenen gebeurt via bijdragen door alle actieven. 
 
Ons model onderscheidt zich op verscheidene vlakken van andere studies over pensioenhervorming. 
Ten eerste worden alle bovenvermelde variabelen endogeen verklaard binnen het model. Op die 
manier nemen we alle wederzijdse relaties tussen de variabelen in rekening, wat van belang kan zijn 
voor de richting en omvang van beleidseffecten. Bijvoorbeeld, als de werkgelegenheid toeneemt, zal 
fysisch kapitaal rendabeler kunnen ingezet worden, met gunstige gevolgen voor de investeringen en 
de groei. Bovendien, wanneer mensen langer werken en hun (vervroegd) pensioen uitstellen, laten 
ze hun opgebouwd menselijk kapitaal langer renderen. Een hoger rendement voor studie bevordert 
scholing en zo ook de productiviteit en de groei. Omgekeerd zullen hervormingen die studeren 
stimuleren, mensen ook aanzetten tot langer werken om langer de vruchten van hun studie te 
plukken. De uiteindelijke effecten van pensioenhervormingen, zijn afhankelijk van al deze interacties. 
Ten tweede bevat ons model een realistische beschrijving van de transitie van werk naar 
pensioen. Ook met de mogelijkheid van vervroegde uittreding uit de arbeidsmarkt houden we 
rekening. Deze mogelijkheid speelt namelijk een belangrijke rol in vele landen. Daarom 
onderscheiden we expliciet de effectieve pensioenleeftijd, die wordt gekozen door oudere 
werknemers, en de officiële pensioenleeftijd, die exogeen gegeven is op 65 jaar. Terwijl gunstige 
uitkeringen voor vervroegd pensioen werken relatief onaantrekkelijker maken, is dit niet direct het 
geval voor normale ouderdomspensioenen. In de literatuur wordt dit onderscheid vaak niet gemaakt. 
Daarnaast houden we expliciet rekening met de link tussen individuele bijdragen en het 
latere pensioen. De pensioenuitkering is in ons repartitiesysteem namelijk afhankelijk van het 
geaccumuleerd individuele arbeidsinkomen en dus de geleverde bijdragen. Hoe meer een individu 
werkt, en hoe meer hij bijdraagt, hoe groter het pensioen is dat hij zal verkrijgen (al kan deze relatie 
in de praktijk wel verzwakt worden, bijvoorbeeld door een plafond aan de hoogte van het pensioen). 
Meerdere onderzoekers negeren evenwel deze link, waardoor ze wel de kost (bijdrage) van het 
systeem in rekening nemen, maar niet het individuele voordeel hiervan. 
Ten slotte veronderstellen we in ons model een open economie. Pensioenhervormingen 
kunnen uitgesproken effecten hebben op de nationale besparingen. In een open economie hoeven 
deze gewijzigde besparingen niet noodzakelijk door te stromen in binnenlandse investeringen, ze 
kunnen ook in het buitenland belegd worden. Wijzigingen in binnenlandse lonen en rentevoeten 
zullen dan beperkter zijn dan in een gesloten economie. Dit alles heeft implicaties voor de effecten 
op de werkgelegenheid en de vorming van menselijk kapitaal. 
 
De belangrijkste tekortkoming van het model zoals voorgesteld in hoofdstuk 2 is dat er geen 
onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen individuen naargelang hun studiebekwaamheid. We gaan 
 namelijk voorbij aan het gegeven dat een nauwe band tussen het pensioen en het eigen 
arbeidsinkomen ook sterk ongelijkheid verhogend kan werken. Laaggeschoolden die een lager loon 
verdienen zullen in dit model ook een laag pensioen ontvangen en kunnen op oudere leeftijd in 
armoede belanden. Om deze problematiek en optimaal beleid dienaangaande te onderzoeken, 
maken we in hoofdstuk 3 het model realistischer door de individuen op te splitsen in drie specifieke 
bekwaamheidsgroepen. Meer bepaald onderscheiden we in elke generatie drie specifieke groepen 
met verschillende aangeboren studiebekwaamheid: laag, gemiddeld en hoog. De eerste groep neemt 
veeleer weinig van de bestaande kennis op wanneer ze jong zijn. Deze groep studeert ook niet 
verder. De tweede en de derde groep assimileren meer bestaande kennis, en zijn ook productiever in 
het opbouwen van nieuwe kennis door studie. De groep met de hoogste studiebekwaamheid 
studeert het langst en bouwt het meeste menselijk kapitaal op.  
 
Alvorens in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 de effecten van een aantal pensioenhervormingen te simuleren, 
gaan we de empirische waarde van ons model na. We doen dit voor 13 landen en gaan als volgt te 
werk. Eerst leggen we gelijke (via kalibratie bepaalde) technologie- en preferentieparameters op 
voor alle landen, maar landspecifieke kenmerken van het begrotingsbeleid en het pensioensysteem. 
Vervolgens vergelijken we de voorspellingen van ons theoretisch model voor elk land met de feiten. 
Deze feiten betreffen de geobserveerde werkgelegenheid (in uren) in drie leeftijdsgroepen (20-34, 
35-49, 50-64), de deelname aan hoger onderwijs van de jongeren (20-34), de effectieve 
pensioenleeftijd, en de per capita economische groei sinds 1995. De set van landen die we bekijken 
omvat de Verenigde Staten, de kernlanden van de eurozone, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Canada en de 
Scandinavische landen. In de meeste van deze landen lopen de voorspellingen van ons theoretisch 
model gelijk met de feiten. De verklaringskracht van ons model is ook hoog.  
 
Vervolgens kunnen we de effecten van verschillende pensioensystemen en pensioenhervormingen 
(repartitiesysteem, eigen kapitalisatie, basispensioen, …) op werkgelegenheid, scholing, economische 
groei en ongelijkheid in kaart brengen. Zowel in hoofdstuk 2 als 3 vinden we de sterkste positieve 
effecten op de werkgelegenheid, de groei en de geaggregeerde welvaart in een repartitiestelsel 
wanneer het verband tussen het pensioen en de individueel verdiende arbeidsinkomens hoog is en 
wanneer bij de berekening van de pensioenbasis veel gewicht wordt toegekend aan de inkomsten uit 
arbeid als oudere werknemer. Zo blijkt bovendien dat een dergelijk goed geconstrueerd 
repartitiestelsel beter kan presteren dan een kapitalisatiestelsel. Hoofdstuk 3 toont echter eveneens 
aan dat dit repartitiesysteem, wanneer het niet verder gecorrigeerd wordt, een sterke toename van 
de ongelijkheid impliceert, en een laag inkomen op de oude dag voor iedereen met lagere 
studiebekwaamheid en scholing. De meest efficiënte manier om deze ongelijkheid te verminderen, is 
de directe koppeling tussen het individueel arbeidsinkomen en het pensioen te handhaven, ook voor 
lage inkomensgroepen, maar anderzijds voor deze inkomensgroepen de vervangingsratio aanzienlijk 
te verhogen. De financiële haalbaarheid van deze correctie vereist wel solidariteit van de hogere 
inkomensgroepen.  
 
Gebruik makend van het model ontwikkeld in vorige hoofdstukken, onderzoeken we in hoofdstuk 4 
of de pensioenhervormingen die we eerder analyseerden, ook bevorderlijk kunnen zijn voor de 
fertiliteit in een land. Vertrekpunt voor deze vraag is de bijkomende observatie dat vele OESO-landen 
geconfronteerd worden met een dalende geboortegraad en bevolkingsgroei. Door de resulterende 
daling in de bevolking op beroepsactieve leeftijd wordt de pensioenproblematiek nog versterkt. Een 
grote literatuur onderzoekt de interactie tussen publieke pensioenen en fertiliteit. Algemeen is de 
idee dat het pensioensysteem op zich een belangrijke verklaring vormt voor de dalende 
geboortegraad. Een belangrijke reden is dat een pensioensysteem het belang van kinderen als 
verzekering op oudere leeftijd doet dalen. Vaak gehoorde hervormingen betreffen dan een 
drastische omschakeling naar een kapitalisatiesysteem omdat dit stabiel blijft bij demografische 
veranderingen of het koppelen van een deel van het pensioen aan het aantal kinderen. In hoofdstuk 
4 nemen we echter het bestaande repartitiestelsel waar vele OESO-landen op steunen, als gegeven. 
We breiden hiervoor ons model uit met een endogene fertiliteitskeuze. We vinden dat de 
eenvoudige parametrische aanpassing van het bestaande systeem, zoals naar voor gebracht in 
voorgaande hoofdstukken, eveneens de fertiliteit kan stimuleren. 
 
Op basis van bovenstaande resultaten kunnen enkele voorzichtige beleidsconclusies worden 
getrokken. Rekening houdend met de huidige vroege uittredeleeftijd en lage werkgelegenheid van 
ouderen lijkt het ons in landen als België aangewezen om de link te versterken tussen enerzijds het 
toekomstige pensioen en anderzijds het verdiende arbeidsinkomen (vooral het arbeidsinkomen in 
het tweede deel van de loopbaan). Onze resultaten tonen aan hoe dit kan gerealiseerd worden. 
Daarnaast is het eveneens belangrijk dat huidige en toekomstige generaties weten hoe hun pensioen 
wordt berekend en wat de specifieke kenmerken zijn van het in werking zijnde pensioensysteem. 
Enkel zo zullen de gedragsmechanismen die in het model worden geïntegreerd, ook in realiteit volop 
spelen. De overheid heeft dus een belangrijke informatieve rol te spelen. 
 
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift (hoofdstukken 5 en 6) focust op de tweede uitdaging voor 
hedendaagse economieën: de sanering van de overheidsfinanciën. We doen dit onderzoek op twee 
vlakken. In hoofdstuk 5 slaan we een andere methodologische weg in en gebruiken we empirische 
(econometrische) methodes gebaseerd op data over saneringsperiodes uit het verleden om 
conclusies te trekken over het succes of falen van verschillende strategieën van saneringsbeleid. In 
hoofdstuk 6 gaan we verder op de theoretische weg die ook in de eerdere hoofdstukken aan de basis 
lag.  
In hoofdstuk 5 voeren we een empirisch onderzoek naar de determinanten van succesvolle 
schuldreductie. We bestuderen de evolutie van de publieke schuldratio gedurende 132 periodes, 
waarvan 40 saneringsperiodes, in 21 OESO-landen in de periode 1981-2008. Om deze periodes te 
definiëren gebruiken we data over de evolutie van het zogenaamd onderliggend cyclisch gezuiverd 
(of structureel) primair begrotingssaldo om vertekeningen uitgelokt door de conjunctuur en door 
éénmalige maatregelen te vermijden. Als belangrijkste nieuwe bijdrage levert dit hoofdstuk bewijs 
voor het belang van efficiëntie in de publieke sector als drijfkracht van succesvolle budgettaire 
 sanering. Eerst en vooral bevestigt ons onderzoek dat een saneringsprogramma op termijn tot 
sterkere dalingen in de schuldratio leidt als dit programma vooral gebaseerd is op 
uitgavenbeperkingen (met uitzondering van publieke investeringen). Reducties in de publieke 
loonmassa (zij het door het inkrimpen van de publieke tewerkstelling of het verlagen van de publieke 
lonen), kunnen zeer effectief zijn, maar enkel in landen met de minst efficiënte overheden. 
Daarnaast blijkt dat een gegeven saneringsprogramma effectiever zal zijn in het terugdringen van de 
schuld indien dit programma wordt uitgevoerd door een efficiëntere overheid. Bovendien blijken 
efficiënte overheden eveneens een beter samengesteld saneringsbeleid te voeren. Wat betreft de 
overige institutionele kenmerken, blijkt dat saneringsbeleid succesvoller is als dit beleid simultaan 
wordt uitgevoerd met productmarktderegulering en wanneer ze wordt geïmplementeerd door 
overheden uit het linkse politieke spectrum. Daarentegen blijkt simultane arbeidsmarktderegulering 
contraproductief te werken ten aanzien van de kansen op effectieve schuldafbouw. In hoofdstuk 5 
gaan we dieper in op de potentiële verklaring van deze effecten. 
Ook het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 6, ten slotte, draagt bij tot de discussie over de effecten van 
budgettaire sanering op de output en de welvaart van een land. We bestuderen deze effecten 
binnen een 30-periode overlappend generatie model. De basiskenmerken van dit model zijn 
gelijkaardig aan de modellen gebruikt in vorige hoofdstukken. Een belangrijke uitbreiding betreft de 
introductie van publieke tewerkstelling en productie. Terwijl de meeste theoretische macromodellen 
de rol van de overheid aan de uitgavenzijde reduceren tot het aankopen van goederen en het 
betalen van transfers, besteden wij speciale aandacht aan het modelleren van publieke 
tewerkstelling en productie in drie subsectoren (publieke consumptiegoederen, onderwijs, publieke 
infrastructuur). Gegeven de empirische discussie omtrent de rol van reducties in publieke lonen en 
tewerkstelling voor het succes van budgettaire sanering, zoals eerder aangehaald, is deze uitbreiding 
en verfijning van cruciaal belang. Dit hoofdstuk haalt aldus enkele belangrijke theoretische kanalen 
aan waarlangs publieke tewerkstelling een belangrijke bijdrage kan leveren aan het 
ontwikkelingsniveau van een land. Niet alleen bevorderen publieke goederen rechtstreeks de 
welvaart van een land, door investeringen in scholing, regelgeving en infrastructuur kan ook 
onrechtstreeks het (langetermijn) outputpotentieel van een land gestimuleerd worden.  
Het is belangrijk om ook de tekortkomingen van deze laatste studie aan te duiden. Zo maken 
we een aantal simplifiërende veronderstellingen, die aandacht verdienen in verder onderzoek. We 
veronderstellen bijvoorbeeld dat de overheid geen optimaliserend gedrag vertoont; ze kiest m.a.w. 
geen optimale combinatie van inputfactoren om haar gewenste output zo efficiënt mogelijk te 
produceren. Bovendien veronderstellen we dat alle overheidssectoren gekenmerkt worden door 
eenzelfde productiefunctie, eenzelfde verhouding van laag- en hooggeschoolde werknemers, 
perfecte substitueerbaarheid tussen publieke productie en input van goederen gekocht op de markt 
etc. Tenslotte krijgen werknemers in de publieke sector eenzelfde loon als hun private tegenhangers, 
ook al is hun bijdrage in de economie verschillend. Toch is deze studie zeker waardevol, niet in het 
minst om de aandacht voor de modellering van publieke tewerkstelling en productie in theoretische 
macromodellen te vergroten. 
De resultaten van deze studie kunnen in enkele punten worden samengevat. Wat betreft de 
effecten op het outputpotentieel, bevestigen onze simulaties het belang van sanering gebaseerd op 
uitgavenreductie (met uitzondering van publieke investeringen). Reducties in publieke tewerkstelling 
zijn te verkiezen boven belastingverhogingen op arbeid of kapitaal, maar niet boven verhogingen van 
de consumptiebelastingen. Wat de welvaartseffecten betreft, blijkt opnieuw dat uitgavenreductie 
minder nefast is dan belastingverhogingen, althans voor die generaties die de saneringsperiode 
volop meemaken. Voor toekomstige generaties geldt dit resultaat echter niet. Deze generaties 
winnen bij een budgettaire sanering nu, maar de positieve effecten blijken kleiner te zijn bij 
programma’s die vooral gebaseerd zijn op reducties in uitgaven voor scholing, investeringen en 
publieke tewerkstelling dan bij programma’s die gebruik maken van (om het even welke) 
belastingverhogingen. 
 
Op basis van de resultaten uit hoofdstukken 5 en 6 kunnen opnieuw enkele voorzichtige 
beleidsconclusies worden getrokken. Eerst en vooral blijkt dat overheidsefficiëntie een belangrijke 
factor is om de effecten van budgettaire sanering te verklaren. Een verlaging van de publieke 
loonmassa is volgens onze resultaten in hoofdstuk 5 enkel effectief in landen met de minst efficiënte 
overheden. Een gegeven saneringsprogramma is daarnaast effectiever in het terugdringen van de 
schuld indien dit programma wordt uitgevoerd door een efficiëntere overheid. Tenslotte blijken 
efficiënte overheden eveneens een beter samengesteld saneringsbeleid te voeren. Hoofdstuk 6 leert 
bovendien dat het inkrimpen van de publieke tewerkstelling als deel van een saneringsprogramma 
misschien wel te verkiezen is boven belastingverhogingen op arbeid of kapitaal, maar niet als deze 
reductie resulteert in minder publieke investeringen of uitgaven voor scholing. Het is dus ook 
belangrijk om de economische bijdrage van het overheidspersoneel en de publieke sector in rekening 
te brengen. 
Ons onderzoek geeft dus twee mogelijke verklaringen voor de bestaande onzekerheid in de 
empirische literatuur omtrent de effecten van reducties in de publieke loonmassa: enerzijds 
overheidsefficiëntie en anderzijds de specifieke subsector waarin deze reducties plaatsvinden. Een 
belangrijke taak is dus weggelegd voor verder onderzoek over de efficiëntie en productiviteit van de 
publieke sector, alsook over de relatie tussen publieke en private werkgelegenheid en lonen. 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. General context and motivation 
The sharp increase in public debt ratios and growing concern about the sustainability of public 
finances since the banking crisis and the deep recession in 2008–09 have imposed the need for 
credible debt reduction strategies in most OECD countries. Moreover, over the next several decades, 
there will be significant changes in the age structure of OECD populations, which will put greater 
pressure on healthcare, public pensions and general government finances. These concerns have put 
public pension reform and fiscal consolidation high on the agenda of both policy makers and 
researchers. Unfortunately, debt reduction and pension reform are also among the most 
complicated public policy problems. As a result, there is still no consensus on either of these issues. 
 
First, as to the debate on pension reform, there seems to be general agreement on the need for 
higher employment, especially among older individuals, and higher productivity growth. Consensus 
on what pension reform would serve the goals of higher employment, productivity growth, and 
welfare best, has however not been reached. The results in some papers support parametric 
adjustments in the pay-as-you-go system that most countries rely on (see for instance Diamond, 
2004 and Cigno, 2010). Other papers prefer a gradual move to an actuarially neutral fully funded 
private system (Feldstein, 2005; Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2010). Often, differences in the particular 
specification of the model economy that is used for the analysis may explain the differences in 
results. 
Second, a huge (and mostly empirical) literature has studied the economic effects of fiscal 
consolidation. Most of these studies analyze growth or output effects and try to discover the 
determinants of success or failure of fiscal adjustment. Most economists agree on the fact that 
spending-based fiscal consolidation hurts output less than tax-based consolidation, at least so in the 
longer run. However, much less agreement exists on (i) the possibility of expansionary output effects 
in the short run, (ii) the impact of fiscal adjustments on welfare and (ii) the role of institutional 
characteristics in shaping the outcome of a consolidation program. Furthermore, a fourth important 
aspect on which general consensus is missing concerns the impact and importance of cuts in public 
employment and the public wage bill for fiscal austerity.  Some authors expect expansionary output 
effects, also in the short run, if the government tackles social spending and public employment or the 
public wage bill (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). According to these authors, 
public wage bill cuts should therefore have a prominent role in consolidation programs. Others 
however are more pessimistic. Perotti (2011) expects short-run output losses after spending cuts. 
Heylen and Everaert (2000), Tagkalakis (2009) and Larch and Turrini (2011) do not find that fiscal 
consolidation is more successful when it mainly relies on government wage bill cuts. The discussion 
has become particularly lively in the most recent years, as shown for example by the many 
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contributions to the debate initiated by Corsetti (2012). Strong positions are being taken varying 
from ‘austerity will increase confidence and encourage recovery’ to ‘austerity kills’ (Krugman and 
Layard, 2012). 
 
With this dissertation, we hope to add new insights on the road to better reform options and to 
make clear policy conclusions and recommendations. For this, we conduct five separate, but related 
studies. While chapters 2, 3 and 4 focus on the issue of pension reform, we turn our attention to 
fiscal consolidation policies in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
2. Research questions, contribution and results 
In chapter 2, we build and parameterize a four-period OLG model for an open economy to study 
hours of work among young, middle-aged and older workers, education of the young, the effective 
retirement age of older workers, and aggregate per capita growth, within one coherent framework. 
We explain these endogenous variables as functions of various tax rates, various kinds of 
government expenditures, and key characteristics of the public PAYG pension system. Old-age 
pensions in our model are related to earned labor income over the three periods of active life, but 
the link between pension benefits and earlier labor income (and contributions) may be tight or loose. 
The government can also decide on the weight attached to each of the three active periods in the 
pension assessment base. Finally, we pay particular attention to a realistic modeling of the transition 
from work to retirement. Workers can optimally choose their effective retirement age, and receive 
early retirement benefits. However, the statutory retirement age, after which old-age pensions are 
being paid, is exogenous. We find that our model explains the facts remarkably well for many OECD 
countries. We then use the model to investigate the effects of various reforms of the pension 
system. Studying pension reform in a model where employment by age, education and human 
capital, and growth are all endogenous, is the main contribution of this paper. 
Our simulation results prefer an intelligent PAYG pension system above a fully funded private 
system. Key elements of such an intelligent system include: (1) a close link between old-age 
pensions, and individual labor earnings and contributions, via a high pension replacement rate, and 
(2) a high weight of labor income (i.e. hours worked and human capital) earned as an older worker in 
the pension assessment base. Pension reform in this direction encourages young individuals to study 
and build human capital, which promotes long-run growth. Furthermore, it encourages older 
individuals to work and postpone retirement. Strengthening the link between one’s future old-age 
pension, on the one hand, and one’s human capital and labor supply when older, on the other, 
introduces strong financial incentives which may bring about important changes in behavior. Policy 
reforms in this direction may also raise welfare levels of current and (especially) future generations. 
Furthermore, our results confirm that the partial abolishment of various early retirement regimes, 
through a reduction in the generosity of early retirement benefits or the introduction of more strict 
eligibility criteria for early retirement, substantially stimulates employment of older workers along 
both the intensive and extensive margin. 
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Our conclusion is in line with some recent literature. First, our findings support analytical 
results by Jaag et al. (2010) and Fisher and Keuschnigg (2010) among others that a strong link 
between own contributions and the pension strengthens incentives to work (see also Lindbeck and 
Persson, 2003 and Cigno, 2010). Flat pension regimes imply lower overall employment. Second, our 
findings also support the positive effects on the effective retirement age and the labor supply of 
older workers from letting the pension rise in labor income and contributions paid as an older worker, 
as emphasized by Sheshinski (1978), Gruber and Wise (2002), and Lindbeck and Persson (2003). 
 
Our main innovation in chapter 3 is to introduce heterogeneous abilities in the previous model. 
Welfare effects from the policy measures discussed in the previous chapter may be very different for 
high and low ability (wage income) individuals. This may affect policy evaluation. Therefore, we make 
the assumption in chapter 3 that within each generation three ability groups exist. These groups 
differ both in the degree to which they (when young) assimilate existing knowledge, i.e. inherit 
human capital from the middle-aged generation, and in their productivity of schooling when they 
spend time studying. One group has low ability. They inherit relatively little human capital from the 
middle-aged generation, and will never engage in tertiary education. They will only work or have 
‘leisure’. A second group has medium ability, a third group high ability. These groups inherit higher 
fractions of existing human capital, and do allocate time to tertiary education. Given the variation 
between them in the productivity of schooling, this amount of time will differ, however. 
Recognizing realistic differences across people in the ability to learn and to build human 
capital, we find that the ‘intelligent’ PAYG system put forward in the chapter 2 implies significant 
welfare losses for current generations of low-ability individuals, who cannot study and who work at 
low wages. We therefore study various alternatives to maintain the aggregate efficiency gains of an 
intelligent PAYG system, while at the same time contributing to higher income at old-age and welfare 
for all individuals. Most promising is to maintain the tight link between individual labor income and 
the pension also for low-ability individuals, but to strongly raise their replacement rate. Such a 
system performs much better economically, and may expect to receive much more support 
politically, than basic or minimum pension components to promote the income of low-ability 
individuals. A tight link between individual labor income and the pension, combined with a high 
replacement rate, is a very effective way to promote labor supply. Basic and minimum pension 
models by contrast have strong negative effects on labor supply of low-ability individuals. A second 
welfare increasing adjustment would be to maintain equal weights in the pension assessment base 
for low-ability individuals. Since these individuals cannot study at the tertiary level, it is not optimal 
to give a lower weight to the labor income they earn when young. 
 
Chapter 4 builds on the knowledge from the previous chapters and investigates a relatively simple 
issue. That is, we study whether the reform options put forward in the previous chapter also 
influence fertility in a positive way. Starting point for this study is the observed decline in fertility 
rates in many OECD countries, which raises the old-age dependency ratio and raises additional 
concern for the long-run viability of public pension systems. A large literature has studied the 
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interaction between public pensions and the fertility rate. Some authors see the pay-as-you-go 
pension system as one of the reasons for the decline in fertility rates (e.g. Zhang, 1995; Cigno and 
Rosato, 1996; Sinn, 2004 and Boldrin et al., 2005). The general idea is that the introduction of a 
public pension system diminishes the necessity to raise children as a source of old-age income 
support. As such, public pensions reduce transfers within the family and hence distort demand for 
children. With respect to the issue of declining fertility, some economists are in favor of a switch to a 
fully-funded system since such a system is stable in case of demographic changes. Others advocate 
the idea of relating the pension benefit (partly) to the number of children raised by the pensioner 
(e.g. Voigtländer, 2004 and Sinn, 2005, Fenge and Meier, 2005). In this chapter, and in contrast to 
studies which analyze how pensions benefits can be related directly to the number of offspring (see 
e.g. Fenge and Meier, 2005), we take the existing PAYG pension system that most OECD countries 
rely on as given. 
We first extend our model by giving individuals the endogenous choice of the number of 
offspring. We then check whether the simple parametric adjustment of this system, as proposed in 
chapters 2 and 3, may also enhance fertility. Our simulation results prefer an intelligent pay-as-you-
go system above a fully-funded private system not only when it comes to employment and growth, 
but also for fertility. The higher (lower) marginal utility from work when older (young) following such 
a reform makes it interesting to shift work from the first period of active life to the third. Part of the 
available time that arises during youth is spent on education. Another part can be spent on raising 
offspring. Again, even when fertility is endogenous, positive effects on employment and growth are 
the strongest when the pay-as-you-go system includes a tight link between individual labor income 
and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor income earned as an older worker to 
compute the pension assessment base. By contrast, shifting to a fully-funded system might even 
reduce fertility. 
 
Different from the previous chapters, the studies presented in chapters 5 and 6 focus on the issue of 
fiscal consolidation. In chapter 5, we use an empirical approach to identify the drivers of the success 
or failure of fiscal consolidation. Analysis of the effects of fiscal consolidation has been high on the 
agenda of many researchers since seminal works by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and 
Perotti (1995). Most of these researchers have tried to explain the probability of success in debt or 
deficit reduction (e.g. Afonso and Jalles, 2012; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Ardagna, 2004; Guichard 
et al., 2007; Larch and Turrini, 2011; McDermott and Wescott, 1996; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009; 
Tagkalakis, 2009). Others focus on the evolution of economic growth, private consumption, or 
private investment during and after consolidation periods (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 2012; Alesina et 
al., 2002; Ardagna, 2004; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996; Hjelm, 2002; IMF, 2010a). The paper presented 
in chapter 5 contributes to this literature by studying directly the evolution of the ratio of public debt 
to GDP during and after fiscal consolidations. We embed this study in an empirical analysis of 132 
fiscal episodes in 21 OECD countries in 1981–2008. Only one study has focused directly on the 
evolution of the debt to GDP ratio before (see Heylen and Everaert, 2000). To define these periods 
 Chapter 1 
 7 
we use data on the evolution of the underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance, and as such avoid 
biases that may be induced by one-off budgetary measures (see IMF, 2010a). 
Our main contribution may be in the new evidence that we obtain on the role of public 
sector efficiency and a number of other institutional variables for the success of consolidation 
policies. The role of public sector efficiency has not yet been studied before in the context of fiscal 
consolidation. As to other institutions, we study the effects of labor and product market 
characteristics and reform, and the role of the political ideology of the government. Rising pressure 
on governments, especially in Europe, to reform labor and product markets, and a growing 
ideological divide, show the importance of the topic. However, the existing evidence in the literature 
on the effects of these institutions and of institutional reform during fiscal consolidation is highly 
ambiguous (see e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 2012, and Tagkalakis, 2009). 
Our main results from chapter 5 are the following. First, we confirm that consolidation 
programs imply a stronger reduction of the public debt ratio when they rely mainly on spending cuts, 
except public investment. Government wage bill cuts, however, only contribute to lower public debt 
ratios when public sector efficiency is low. Second, we find that a given consolidation program will be 
more effective in bringing down debt when it is adopted by a more efficient government apparatus. 
Third, more efficient governments adopt consolidation programs of better composition. As to other 
institutions, consolidation policies are more successful when they are accompanied by product 
market deregulation, and when left-wing governments adopt them. By contrast, simultaneous labor 
market deregulation may be counterproductive during consolidation periods. 
 
In the final part of this dissertation, we propose a general equilibrium analysis to study the economic 
effects of fiscal consolidation. Here, we also take into account the reality of different public 
subsectors. More precisely, we study fiscal adjustment within a theoretical overlapping generations 
model with 30 generations. By explicitly modeling the behavior of all relevant actors and their 
interaction on different markets in the short and the long-run, a well-structured and disciplined 
analysis of the economic and welfare implications of fiscal consolidation becomes possible.  
The main innovation in the model presented in chapter 6 concerns our modeling of the 
public sector. Whereas most theoretical macro models reduce the role of the government at the 
expenditure side to purchasing goods and paying transfers, we pay particular attention to also 
modeling public employment and production. Given the empirical discussion on the role of public 
wage bill cuts for the success of fiscal consolidation, as illustrated in the previous chapter, this was 
important to do. We distinguish public employees in the production of investment goods, in 
education, and in the production of useful public consumption goods. As such, public sector output 
contributes to the construction of public capital and the accumulation of human capital, which both 
raise private sector output and productivity, and to the provision of direct utility. Although the 
modeling of a detailed public sector of production and employment is novel, there are still some 
important simplifications that deserve attention in future research. For instance, the government in 
our model does not optimally choose its inputs to efficiently produce the desired output, i.e. the 
input shares are exogenously pinned down. As a result, the relative share of high versus low-skilled 
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workers in all public sectors is identical and not optimally chosen. Moreover, the output in each 
sector is not chosen in an optimal way. Furthermore, the production function in all public sectors is 
identical and simplified. Finally, all public workers receive the same wage (per unit of effective labor), 
although their economic contribution is different. We stress that if the implicit assumption of an 
inefficient government were to generate artificial efficiency-improvements from downsizing the 
public sector, implementing a strong theoretic foundation for the public sector would be of prime 
importance. However, the results presented in this chapter tell a different story. That is, even though 
we have assumed an inefficient government, we do not find support that downsizing the public 
sector leads to unambiguous efficiency improvements, quite on the contrary. Intuitively, although 
the public sector does not exhibit efficient behavior, its production does result in added value for the 
general economy (through utility gains, more human capital accumulation or public capital). Despite 
the simplifications we have made in this chapter, we believe that the contribution of this study is still 
very significant, not at least in the way that it brings to the attention the modeling of public 
employment and production in theoretical macro-models. 
Our analysis allows an assessment of the macroeconomic impact of reducing public 
employment as a means of debt reduction and thus allows assessing the claim that public 
employment cuts raise the effectiveness of consolidation programs. Moreover, it allows comparing 
these results to those adopting other consolidation instruments, such as other government 
expenditures or taxes on labor or consumption. The analysis is not limited to the implications for 
employment, private output and GDP, however. We will also study welfare effects on both current 
and future generations of individuals with different innate ability. 
As mentioned before, the empirical consolidation literature has focused on a few key 
hypotheses. A strong one is that tax based fiscal consolidation is contractionary, whereas spending 
based adjustment induces expansionary output effects, also in the short-run. Expansionary effects 
could, according to some economists, occur when social transfers or public employment and the 
public wage bill are diminished. A weaker hypothesis is that the output effects of spending based 
consolidations are better (less negative) than those of tax based consolidations. Our simulations of 
output effects generally confirm the weaker hypothesis. Expenditure based consolidation is better 
than labor or capital tax based consolidation (at least when spending cuts do not concern public 
investment). This conclusion applies to both the short-run and the long-run. Consolidation via 
consumption tax increases also hurts the economy in the short-run, but is generally one of the more 
efficient policies in the longer run. Confirmation of the stronger hypothesis, however, is much more 
difficult to find. Truly expansionary output effects after spending cuts are much harder to document. 
Cutting public employment is not expansionary for GDP in the short and medium run. It may be 
expansionary for GDP in the longer run, but only if public employment is reduced in public 
consumption goods production. 
When it comes to welfare effects, we observe much bigger differences between different age 
groups than between different ability types of the same age. Here we confirm Jensen and 
Rutherford’s (2002) conclusion that intergenerational heterogeneity is the most important obstacle 
for fiscal tightening. Our results for welfare bring even more nuance on the possibility of 
 Chapter 1 
 9 
expansionary fiscal consolidation. When aggregated over all generations that are alive at the time 
consolidation is started, the net welfare effect of most consolidation strategies is negative. We still 
observe that spending based adjustments (except investment cuts) are better than tax based ones, 
as they imply smaller losses for the aggregate of current generations. However, things are different 
when we focus on the youngest and future generations. For these generations, welfare effects from 
consolidation are positive rather than negative. Most interestingly, these positive effects are smaller 
under spending based adjustments in the area of education, investment, and overall public 
employment, than under tax-based adjustments. Robustness tests by changing key assumptions of 
our model never imply changes of these conclusions, quite on the contrary. 
 
3. Policy conclusions 
Our findings from chapters 2-4 tend to support recent pension reforms in countries like Sweden and 
Finland. Sweden moved from a quite non-actuarial PAYG system to a quasi-actuarial system with 
individual notional accounts (Lindbeck and Persson 2003; OECD 2005). These accounts establish a 
close relationship between working hours, labor earnings and contributions on the one hand, and 
future pensions on the other, as in the case of a high earnings-related replacement rate in our 
model. Finland introduced a system where the pension accrual rate rises with age, which 
corresponds to the case of a rising weight in the calculation of the pension base, as workers get older 
in our model (OECD 2005). There is no support in our model for policy changes that imply an 
extension of the pension assessment base to those years when young people may optimally be 
studying. Our results in chapter 3 further support this policy, except for individuals with low capacity 
to study at the tertiary level. An important assumption in these models is that current and future 
generations have perfect knowledge on the specific characteristics of the pension system. This is 
required to ensure that the behavioral mechanisms that are integrated in the model, will also work in 
reality. The government thus has an important informative role to play. 
In chapter 4, we add evidence that intelligent adjustments to the current pension scheme 
that have been shown to have beneficial effects on employment and growth, may also serve the goal 
of increasing fertility. We believe this idea can be seen as complementary to proposals implying the 
introduction of a child-related pension benefit. As such, we adhere to the recent idea of Cigno (2010) 
to develop a pension system consisting of two parallel schemes: a part being Bismarckian and a part 
being child-related, i.e. related to having and raising children.  
An important assumption throughout most chapters in this dissertation is the assumption of 
constant demography. Only in chapter 4 population is endogenous. It is important to stress that none 
of the chapters argue that the ‘intelligent’ pension reform that is proposed, is a panacea for the issue 
of ageing. The only statement we want to make based on the results put forward in this dissertation 
is that this reform is capable of relieving some of the pressure on the pension budget that arises due 
to an ageing population. The crucial element in this reasoning is that investment in education, 
employment at older age,  per capita growth and the fertility rate all rise after the reform. 
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Concerning the final two chapters, we can formulate the following policy conclusions. From chapter 5 
we conclude that government efficiency plays an important role in the effects of fiscal consolidation. 
For instance, it seems that government wage bill cuts only contribute to lower public debt ratios 
when public sector efficiency is low. Moreover, we also find that a given consolidation program will 
be more effective in bringing down debt when it is adopted by a more efficient government 
apparatus. Finally, more efficient governments adopt consolidation programs of better composition. 
From chapter 6, we conclude that general cuts in public employment are to be preferred above labor 
or capital tax increases, but not to consumption tax increases. We further find that public 
employment cuts are not helpful as a means of fiscal consolidation when they imply cuts in public 
investment or are concentrated in the public education sector. Overall, our study stresses the 
importance of taking into account the contribution of public employees for the economy. 
Interestingly, our results provide two reasons for the inconsistency in the empirical literature 
on the effects of downsizing the public sector as a means of successful fiscal adjustment. Different 
levels of government efficiency, on the one hand, and the specific public sector in which cuts are 
imposed, on the other, may explain the ambiguous findings. Therefore, future research has an 
important role to shed more light on the efficiency and productivity of the public sector and on the 
relationship between public and private employment and wages. 
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1. Introduction 
Concern for the long-run financial viability of public pension systems has put pension reform high on 
the agenda of policy makers and researchers. The past two decades have seen a wave of reforms in 
many countries (Whitehouse et al., 2009). At the same time the literature on pension economics has 
grown rapidly (see e.g. Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Fenge and Pestieau, 2005; Barr, 2006; and many 
recent papers that we refer to below).  
To face the pension challenge, there seems to be general agreement on the need for higher 
employment, especially among older individuals, and higher productivity growth. Many studies have 
documented how the pension system may affect the incentives of individuals of different ages to 
work (e.g. Auerbach et al., 1989; Gruber and Wise, 2002; Cremer et al., 2008; Sánchez Martín, 2010; 
Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; Jaag et al., 2010; de la Croix et al., 
2010). Others have investigated the relationship between the pension system and investment in 
human capital formation, as a major determinant of productivity growth (e.g. Zhang, 1995; Kemnitz 
and Wigger, 2000; Docquier and Paddison, 2003; Zhang and Zhang, 2003; Kaganovich and Meier, 
2008; Hachon, 2010; Le Garrec, 2012). Still others have demonstrated the crucial role of human 
capital formation to counteract the negative effects of population ageing on per capita output (e.g. 
Docquier and Michel, 1999; Fougère et al., 2009; Ludwig et al., 2011). Consensus on what pension 
reform would serve the goals of higher employment, productivity growth, and welfare best, has 
however not been reached. The results in some papers support parametric adjustments in the pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) system that most countries rely on. Other papers prefer a gradual move to an 
actuarially neutral fully-funded private system. Often, differences in the particular specification of 
the model economy that is used for the analysis may explain the differences in results. 
In this paper we construct and parameterize a general equilibrium four-period OLG model for an 
open economy. The model explains hours of work of young, middle-aged and older individuals, 
education and human capital formation of the young, the retirement decision of the older 
generation, and aggregate per capita growth. It includes a public PAYG old-age pension system which 
pays out pensions to a fourth generation of retired. The statutory retirement age in our model is 65 
and exogenous. Old-age pensions are paid from this age onwards. Individuals, however, may 
optimally choose a lower effective (early) retirement age. The government in the model sets tax 
rates on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its revenue to productive expenditures (mainly 
for education), consumption, ‘non-employment’ benefits (including early retirement benefits) and 
old-age pension benefits. Our aim is to investigate the effects of various parametric adjustments in 
the early retirement regime and in the old-age PAYG pension system. These parametric adjustments 
include changes in benefit levels, changes in the link between benefits and individual contributions, 
and changes in the weights of the three active periods in the computation of the old-age pension 
assessment base, i.e. earned labor income used to calculate pension benefits. We also consider the 
effects of moving to full private capital funding.    
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Our main contribution in this paper is to study the impact of pension systems on employment by age, 
the effective retirement decision, education and growth, and the welfare of current and future 
generations within one coherent framework, where all these variables are endogenous. Here we 
differ from the existing literature. The above-mentioned studies either investigate incentives to work 
in a model with exogenous human capital and growth, or investigate human capital and growth while 
ignoring the labor-leisure choice and the endogeneity of labor supply1. Our approach allows to fully 
take into account the mutual relationships between all variables, which will matter for the size and 
possibly the direction of policy effects. Various channels exist in our model whereby the effects of 
changes in employment and changes in capital formation reinforce each other. For example, if 
employment rises, so will the marginal productivity of physical capital and the incentive to invest. 
Also, if people postpone retirement and work longer, the return to investment in education will rise, 
and so may human capital and growth. Conversely, policies that promote education will encourage 
people to work longer since they will then get a higher return from their investment. Our model also 
contains channels where employment and growth will move in opposite directions. One channel 
follows from the possible tradeoff between employment of the young and education. Pension 
reform which discourages employment of the young may still be positive if this contributes to 
education and growth. As we show in this paper, the final effects of pension reform depend on all 
these interactions. It will be important to have a realistic estimate of key parameters, for example in 
the specification of the human capital production function, or in labor supply by age.   
Next to the endogeneity of all key variables, our model contains a number of other features 
which matter for the analysis of the effects of pension reform, but which are often ignored in the 
literature. The most important of these is a realistic modeling of the transition from work to 
retirement, and the role of early retirement regimes. These regimes play an important role in many 
countries. We explicitly distinguish the effective (early) retirement age, which is optimally chosen, 
and the statutory retirement age, which is exogenous (see also Heijdra and Romp, 2009; de la Croix 
et al., 2010). Old-age pensions in our model are paid only from the statutory retirement age onwards. 
A key implication is that old-age pensions do not directly raise the opportunity cost of working in our 
model. Early retirement benefits do. In the literature this distinction is often not made (e.g. Hu, 1979; 
Börsch-Supan et al., 2006; Jaag et al., 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010). It may obviously affect the 
evaluation of old-age pension reform. As a second feature, we allow individual pension benefits in 
the PAYG system to depend on accumulated individual labor income and contributions, rather than 
on average per capita labor income. Many countries have initiated reforms that strengthen this 
individual contributions - benefit link. Lindbeck and Persson (2003), Zhang and Zhang (2003) and Jaag 
et al. (2010) demonstrate the importance of taking this link into account. Others however ignore it 
when modeling a PAYG system, which may overstate the distortion induced by this system (e.g. 
                                                        
1
 Fougère et al. (2009) and Ludwig et al. (2011) also develop a model with endogenous employment by age and  
human capital, but they have exogenous growth. Moreover, Fougère et al. (2009) do not study pension reform. 
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Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2010; Ludwig et al., 2011)2. Another feature which affects our results, is 
the assumption of an open economy. It has been shown that pension reform may have profound 
effects on international capital flows (e.g. Börsch-Supan et al., 2006). In an open economy, changes 
in national savings need not feed through into investment in the domestic economy. Factor price 
changes may be much weaker than presumed in closed economy models. Clearly, this may affect 
employment and human capital formation. As a final feature, we assume that demography and 
population are constant in our model. Although ageing is obviously a crucial factor behind pension 
reform in many countries, this assumption need not be a limitation to disentangle behavioral effects 
from pension reform (see also Jaag et al., 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010).  
 
To study the effects of pension reform we parameterize, numerically solve, and simulate our model.  
Before we do that, however, we test its empirical validity for a group of 13 OECD countries. The 
countries that we consider include the US, the core countries of the euro area, the UK, Canada and 
the Nordic countries. Our main motivation for this test goes back to Stokey and Rebelo (1995), who 
find extreme variation in the predictions of existing calibrated models investigating the effects of 
public policy in the literature.  Before using a parameterized theoretical model for policy simulations, 
we would therefore like to get at least some minimal evidence that the model’s predictions are 
within reliable bands. Our procedure is as follows. We impose common technology and preference 
parameters on all countries, but country-specific fiscal policy and pension system parameters. 
Simulating the model for each country we find that its predictions match the main facts in most 
countries. These facts concern observed hours of work in three age groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64), 
education of the young (20-34), the effective retirement age, and per capita growth since 1995. We 
conclude that our model translates observable policy differences into performance differences, 
which are roughly in line with observations in the data. 
Having established its empirical reliability, we then use the model for policy simulations. Our 
simulations assess to what extent pension reform may contribute to employment, growth and 
welfare. Our results speak in favor of an intelligent PAYG system. This system contains a close link 
between old-age pensions and individual labor earnings (and contributions) via a high pension 
replacement rate. Even more important is a high weight of labor income (i.e. hours worked and 
human capital) earned as an older worker in the pension assessment base. Pension reform in this 
direction encourages young individuals to study and build human capital, which promotes long-run 
growth. Furthermore, it encourages older workers to postpone retirement. Strengthening the link 
between one’s future old-age pension, on the one hand, and one’s human capital and labor supply 
when older, on the other, introduces strong financial incentives which may bring about important 
changes in behavior. Positive effects on employment, the effective retirement age, and growth, raise 
the government’s resources, which makes it possible to finance a larger pension burden. Our results 
                                                        
2
 Long ago, Sheshinski (1978) already showed in a model that a pension system can encourage work and late 
retirement if pension benefits increase in the retirement date. This idea has been picked up also by Gruber and 
Wise (2002).    
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prefer a reform of the PAYG system along these lines above a movement to a fully-funded private 
system, both from the perspective of employment and growth and welfare. We show that a number 
of particular and realistic features of our model, which we have emphasized above, are important for 
this conclusion. Finally, whereas our results show that old-age pension benefits may rise in an 
intelligent PAYG system, early retirement benefits must be reduced.   
This paper confirms that the pension system can be a valuable policy instrument in its own right, as 
recently emphasized also by Cigno (2010). When it comes to employment, our results are in line with 
arguments for a change of the rules in actuarial direction as explained by Gruber and Wise (2002), 
Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Cigno (2010) among others. Furthermore, our results demonstrate 
the importance of also taking into account possible effects on education, human capital and growth.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we document differences in employment by age, 
education of the young, the effective retirement age, and per capita growth across 13 OECD 
countries since 1995. Section 3 sets out our model. In Section 4 we calibrate the model on actual 
data and confront its predictions with the facts described in Section 2. Section 5 includes the results 
of a range of model simulations. We investigate the steady state effects of various reforms of the 
pension system. We also study transitional dynamics, and the welfare effects per generation. Section 
6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Cross-country differences in employment by age, tertiary education and per capita growth 
Table 1 contains key data on employment, education and growth in 13 OECD countries in 1995-2007. 
One would like a reliable model to match the main cross-country differences reported here. The 
employment rate in hours (n) indicates the fraction of potential hours that are actually being worked 
by the average person in one of three age groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64). Potential hours are 2080 per 
person per year (52 weeks times 40 hours per week). The observed employment rate rises if more 
people in an age group have a job, and if the employed work more hours. The employment rate in 
the age group of 50 to 64 is also affected by the average age at which older workers withdraw from 
the labor force. We also include the effective retirement age in Table 1. In most countries, this age is 
well below the official age to receive old-age pensions (65 in most countries, 60 in France). The 
education rate (e) is our proxy for the fraction of time spent studying by the average person of age 
20-34. It has been calculated as the total number of students in full-time equivalents, divided by total 
population in this age group. Our data for (average annual) real per capita growth concern real 
potential GDP per person of working age. We refer to Appendix 1 for further details on the 
calculation of all our data, and on the assumptions that we have to make.  
As is well-known, middle-aged individuals work most hours, followed by the young. The older 
generation works the lowest number of hours. Average employment rates over all countries in these 
three age groups are 55.0%, 63.7% and 43.6% respectively. Furthermore, the data reveal strong 
cross-country differences. We observe the highest employment rates in each age group in the US. 
Employment rates are much lower in the core countries of the euro area. The Nordic countries take 
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intermediate positions, although they are close to the core euro area for the younger generation. 
The latter, however, seems to be related to education. Young people’s participation in education is 
by far the highest in the Nordic countries. These countries also show the highest potential per capita 
growth rates. On average, growth in the core euro area and the US was more than 0.5 percentage 
points lower in the period under consideration. The US and the other Anglo-Saxon countries tend to 
have the lowest participation in education among people of age 20 to 34. Finally, we note that the 
effective retirement age also varies across countries. The retirement age is quite low in Belgium (57.9) 
and France (58.8). By contrast, individuals in the Nordic and the Anglo-Saxon countries participate 
longer. Unsurprisingly, correlation between the effective retirement age and the employment rate 
among older workers (n3) is very high (0.89).   
 
Table 1  
Employment rate in hours (n), effective retirement age, education rate (e) and per capita growth in 
OECD countries  (1995-2006/7)  
 
n1 
(20-34) 
n2 
(35-49) 
n3 
(50-64) 
effective 
retirement 
age 
 
e 
annual real per 
capita growth 
       
Austria 59.9 64.3 34.7 59.5 12.5 2.06 
Belgium 51.1 56.8 29.3 57.9 14.1 1.77 
France 48.7 60.3 38.0 58.8 14.9 1.54 
Germany 49.7 55.2 34.9 61.1 17.2 1.56 
Italy 50.1 61.9 33.8 60.1 12.6 1.30 
Netherlands 50.8 54.6 34.2 60.0 14.7 2.20 
Core euro 
area average 
 
51.7 58.8 34.2 59.6 14.3 1.74 
Denmark 56.2 66.7 49.6 62.2 21.7 1.81 
Finland 55.6 69.0 47.3 60.2 23.1 2.72 
Norway 51.9 60.9 50.6 63.1 18.1 2.29 
Sweden 53.6 66.1 55.4 63.4 17.7 2.18 
Nordic 
average 
 
54.3 65.6 50.7 62.2 20.2 2.25 
US 65.6 74.2 59.6 64.2 12.8 1.54 
       
UK 60.8 68.4 49.4 62.0 12.3 2.13 
Canada 60.9 69.5 50.4 62.1 13.6 1.68 
       
All country 
average 
55.0 63.7 43.6 61.1 
 
15.8 1.91 
Data sources: OECD (see Appendix 1); data description: see main text and Appendix 1. The data for 
employment and growth concern 1995-2007, those for education 1995-2006. The effective retirement age is 
an average for 1995-2006. All data are in percent, except the retirement age. 
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3. The model 
Our analytical framework consists of a computable four-period OLG model for a small open 
economy. We assume perfect international mobility of physical capital but immobile labor and 
human capital. Seminal work in the OLG tradition has been done by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond 
(1965). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) initiated the study of public finance shocks in a computable 
OLG model. Buiter and Kletzer (1993) developed an open economy version of the model with 
endogenous growth, putting human capital at the centre. As we have documented in Section 1, a 
huge literature has used OLG models to study the behavioral effects of the pension system, either on 
employment, assuming exogenous growth, or on human capital and growth, assuming exogenous 
employment. New in our model is that employment by age, education and human capital, and 
growth, are jointly endogenous. 
We consider three active adult generations, the young, the middle-aged and the older, and one 
generation of retired agents. All generations are of equal size, normalized to 1. Population is 
constant. Within each generation agents are homogeneous. Individuals enter the model at age 20. 
Each period is modeled to last for 15 years. Young people can choose either to work and generate 
labor income, to study and build human capital, or to devote time to ‘leisure’ (including other non-
market activities). Middle-aged and older workers do not study anymore, they only work or have 
‘leisure’. The statutory old-age retirement age is 65. Individuals may however optimally choose to 
leave the labor force sooner in a regime of early retirement. Domestic firms act competitively and 
employ physical capital together with existing technology and effective labor provided by the three 
active generations. A final important assumption is that education generates a positive externality in 
the sense of Azariadis and Drazen (1990). The average level of human capital of a middle-aged 
generation is inherited by the next young generation. 
In what follows, we concentrate on the core elements of the model: the optimizing behavior of 
individuals, the production of effective human capital, the behavior of domestic firms and the 
determination of aggregate output and growth, capital and wages.    
 
3.1. Individuals 
An individual reaching age 20 in t maximizes an intertemporal utility function of the form: 
 
    ∑     (    
    
  
    
   
)                 (1) 
 
with j >0,  >0 ( 
 1) and where: 
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Lifetime utility (1) depends on consumption (cj) and enjoyed ‘leisure’ (ℓj) in each period of life.  
Superscript t indicates the period of youth, when the individual comes into the model. Subscript j 
refers to the jth period of life. Furthermore,  is the discount factor (0<<1). The intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption is 1, the intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 1/. 
Finally,  specifies the relative value of ‘leisure’ versus consumption. Note that  may be different in 
each period of life. Except for the latter assumption, our specification of the instantaneous utility 
function is quite common in the macro literature (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Rogerson, 2007).  
 
Figure 1 shows the life-cycle of an individual reaching age 20 in t. Individuals choose time devoted to 
work (nj) in the three active periods and education time (e1) when young. Since individuals only 
allocate time to education in their first period, we drop the subscript 1 in what follows. Time 
endowment is normalized to 1 in each period. The determination of early retirement is part of 
individuals’ optimal choice of ‘leisure’ time in the third period of life (50-65). Individuals choose R 
which relates to the optimal effective retirement age and which is defined as the fraction of time 
between age 50 and 65 that the individual participates in the labor market; (1-R) is then time in early 
retirement. We use n3 to denote the fraction of time devoted to work between 50 and 65, and  ̃  as 
the fraction of time devoted to work before early retirement, but after 50. As labor market exit is 
irreversible and post-retirement employment is not allowed in our model, the relationship between 
n3 and  ̃  is as follows: n3 =    ̃ . 
               In the first two periods of active life, ‘leisure’ falls in labor supply and in education time 
(Equations 2 and 3). In the third period, ‘leisure’ time consists of two parts: non-employment time 
before the effective retirement age ( (   ̃ )), and time in early retirement after it (1-R). Equation 
(4) then describes composite enjoyed ‘leisure’ of an older worker as a CES-function of both parts. We 
assume imperfect substitutability between the two leisure types. The idea here is that ‘leisure’ time 
after and between periods of work is not the same as ‘leisure’ time in periods when individuals are 
not economically active anymore3. Equation (4) expresses that individuals prefer to have a balanced 
combination of both rather than an ‘extreme’ amount of one of them (and very little of the other). In 
this equation ρ is the constant elasticity of substitution, π is a usual share parameter and Ω is added 
as a normalization constant such that the magnitude of ℓ3 corresponds to the magnitude of total 
leisure time 1-n3.
 4  The latter assumption allows to interpret 3 as the relative value of ‘leisure’ 
versus consumption in the third period, comparable to 1 and 2.  
 
                                                        
3
 The former may be particularly valuable from the perspective of relaxation and time to spend on personal 
activities of short duration. The latter may be valuable to enjoy activities which take more time and ask for 
longer term commitment (e.g. long journeys, non-market activity as a volunteer).  
4
 The main results in this paper are not in any way influenced by the magnitude of π, Ω or ρ. 
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Figure 1. Life-cycle of an individual of generation t 
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Individuals will choose consumption, labor supply, education, and their effective retirement age to 
maximize Equation (1), subject to Equations (2)-(4) and the constraints described in (5)-(12).  
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The LHS of Equations (5)-(8) shows that individuals allocate their disposable income to consumption 
(including consumption taxes, c) and the accumulation of non-human wealth a. We denote by   
  
the stock of wealth that an individual who enters the model at time t holds at the end of his jth 
period of life. During the three periods of active life disposable income at the RHS includes after-tax 
labor income, non-employment benefits, interest income and lump sum transfers. In each equation, 
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wk stands for the real wage per unit of effective labor at time k, rk is the exogenous (world) real 
interest rate at time k, and zk is the lump sum transfer that the government pays out to all individuals 
at time k. Effective labor of an individual depends on hours worked (  
 ) and effective human capital 
(  
 ).  Since young individuals allocate a fraction   
  of their time to work, and pay a tax rate on labor 
income 1, they earn an after-tax real wage equal to 1 1 11
t t
tw h n ( ) . After-tax labor income of 
middle-aged and older workers in equations (6) and (7) is determined similarly. A young worker 
inherits his effective human capital from the middle-aged generation, as shown in Equation (9). 
During the second and third period, workers supply more units of effective human capital. It is our 
assumption in Equation (10) that h rises in education time when young (e), productive government 
spending in percent of GDP (gy, mainly education) and the quality of education (q). We specify and 
discuss the effective human capital production function in Section 3.2. Individuals take gy and q as 
exogenous. We also assume in Equation (10) that human capital remains unchanged between the 
second and third period. We have in mind that learning by doing in work counteracts depreciation.  
For the fraction of time that young, middle-aged and older individuals are inactive, they receive a 
non-employment benefit from the government. Older workers may be eligible to two kinds of 
benefits: standard non-employment benefits (analogous to what young and middle-aged workers 
receive) as long as they are on the labor market, and early retirement benefits after having 
withdrawn from the labor market. All benefits are defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a 
full-time worker. The replacement rate for standard non-employment benefits is bj with j=1,2,3a, for 
early retirement benefits it is b3b.
5 After the statutory retirement age (65) individuals have no labor 
income and no non-employment benefits anymore. They then receive an old-age pension benefit (pp) 
and the lump sum transfer. Equation (11) describes the old-age pension. We assume a public PAYG 
pension system in which pensions in period k are financed by contributions (labor taxes) from the 
active generations in that period k (see below). Individual net pension benefits consist of two 
components. A first one is related to the individual’s earlier net labor income. It is a fraction of his so-
called pension base, i.e. a weighted average of revalued net labor income in each of the three active 
periods of life. The net replacement rate is b4a. The parameters p1, p2 and p3 represent the weights 
attached to each period. This part of the pension rises in the individual’s hours of work  
  and his 
human capital   
 . It will be lower when the individual retires early (lower Rt). Thanks to revaluation, 
this part of the net pension is adjusted to increases in the overall standard of living between the time 
that workers build their pension entitlements and the time that they receive the pension. We 
assume that past earnings are revalued in line with economy-wide wage growth x and hence follow 
                                                        
5 Our approach to model early retirement benefits as a function of a worker’s last labor income, similar to 
standard non-employment benefits, reflects regulation and/or common practice in many countries. In some 
countries (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands) workers can enter the early retirement regime only from 
employment, with their benefits being linked to the last wage. In other countries (e.g. Denmark) there is only 
access from unemployment, with the early retirement benefit being linked to the unemployment benefit 
(Salomäki, 2003). As to common practice, Duval (2003) confirms that in many countries, unemployment-
related or disability benefits can be used de facto to bridge the time between the effective retirement age and 
old-age pension eligibility. Again there is a link between benefits and former wages.  
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practice in many OECD countries (OECD, 2005; Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006).6 The second 
component of the pension is a flat-rate or basic pension. Every retiree receives the same amount 
related to average net labor income in the economy at the time of retirement. This assumption 
assures that also basic pensions rise in line with productivity. Here, the net replacement rate is b4b. 
Fourth generation individuals consume their pension and the lump sum transfer, as well as their 
accumulated wealth from the third period plus interest (Equation 8). They leave no debts, nor 
bequests. 
Substituting Equations (2)-(4) for   
  and (5)-(8) for   
  into Equation (1), and maximizing with respect 
to   
    
    
    
    
   ̃ 
     and 
t
R , yields eight first order conditions for the optimal behavior of an 
agent entering the model at time t. Equation (13) expresses the law of motion of optimal 
consumption over time. Equations (14.a), (14.b) and (14.c) describe the optimal labor-leisure choice 
in each period of active live. In each period, individuals supply labor up to the point where the 
marginal utility of leisure equals the marginal utility gain from work. The latter  consists of two parts. 
Working more hours in a particular period raises additional resources for consumption both in that 
period and when retired. The marginal utility gain from work is higher when initial consumption is 
lower, and when an extra hour of work yields more extra consumption. Higher human capital (and its 
underlying determinants), lower taxes on labor, lower taxes on consumption and lower non-
employment benefits contribute to the gain from work. Extra consumption during retirement rises in 
the own-income-related pension replacement rate (b4a), in the weight attached to the relevant 
period when computing the pension base (pj), and in the revaluation parameters.  
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Equations (14.a)-(14.c) highlight positive substitution effects from the pension replacement rate b4a. 
To the extent that higher replacement rates raise individuals’ consumption possibilities (cj), they also 
cause adverse income effects on labor supply. Basic pensions (b4b) do not directly occur in Equations 
(14), but they do affect employment via this income effect. 
Equation (15) describes the first order condition for the optimal effective retirement age. The 
LHS represents the utility loss from postponing retirement. Later retirement reduces enjoyed leisure 
                                                        
6
 We explain economy-wide wage growth in Section 3.3. Individuals take it as exogenous. 
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as early retiree, but raises enjoyed leisure in between periods of work for given work time  ̃3. The 
RHS shows the marginal utility gain from postponing retirement. This marginal gain follows from 
consuming the extra labor income (vis-à-vis the early retirement benefit) in the third period, and the 
higher future old-age pension after 65. The latter effect rises in b4a and p3. 
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Finally, equation (16) imposes that the marginal utility loss from investing in human capital when 
young equals the total discounted marginal utility gain in later periods from having more human 
capital. Individuals will study more the higher future versus current after-tax real wages and the 
higher the marginal return of education to human capital ( / e )  . Labor taxes during youth 
therefore encourage individuals to study, whereas labor taxes in later periods of active life 
discourage them. Notice also that high benefit replacement rates in later periods (b2, b3a, b3b) and a 
high income-related pension replacement rate (b4a), combined with high weights p2 and p3, will 
encourage young individuals to study. The reason is that any future benefits and the future pension 
rise in future labor income, and therefore human capital. A final interesting result is that young 
people study more – all other things equal – if they expect to work harder in later periods (n2, 
n3=R. ̃3). 
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It will be obvious from the above discussion that (for a given way of financing) the specific 
organization of pension benefits may have strong effects on behavior in earlier periods of life. Both 
income and substitution effects occur. The latter are particularly rich when pensions are linked to 
individuals’ own labor income. A higher replacement rate b4a raises the return to working (n) and 
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building human capital (e, h) in earlier periods. Changes in the particular weight attached to these 
earlier periods may modify these incentive effects. The return to education will rise in p2 and p3, but 
fall in p1. The return to working in the third period will rise in p3, etc. Policy makers may change all 
these parameters. We investigate the effects of policy interventions in Section 5.  
 
3.2. Production of effective human capital 
The specification and parameterization of the human capital production function is often a problem 
in numerical endogenous growth models. In contrast to goods production functions, there is not 
much empirical evidence and no consensus about the determinants of human capital growth, nor 
about the underlying functional form and parameter values (Bouzahzah et al, 2002, Arcalean and 
Schiopu, 2010). The literature shows a variety of functions, typically including one or two of the 
following inputs: individual time allocated to education, private expenditures on education by 
individuals themselves or by their parents, and government expenditures on education (e.g. Lucas, 
1988, Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Docquier and Michel, 1999, Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; 
Bouzahzah et al., 2002; Fougère et al., 2009; Arcalean and Schiopu, 2010). In case of two inputs, the 
adopted functional form is very often Cobb-Douglas (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Kaganovich 
and Zilcha, 1999; Docquier and Michel, 1999).  
Our specification also includes education time of young individuals and education expenditures by 
the government. We see these variables as indicators for the quantity of invested private and public 
resources. However, our specification is broader than this. First, we take recent empirical evidence 
seriously that the quality of education and the schooling system is very important (Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2009). Better quality implies higher cognitive skills for the same allocation of resources. 
As a proxy for quality we will use OECD PISA science scores (see Section 4.2 for further discussion). As 
a second extension, our definition of relevant (productive) government  expenditures includes more 
than education. It also includes active labor market expenditures, public R&D expenditures and 
public fixed investment. This approach goes back to our use of the broader concept of effective 
human capital. As in Dhont and Heylen (2009), effective human capital (and worker productivity) rise 
not only in accumulated schooling or training, but also in the productive efficiency of accumulated 
schooling. Education and active labor market expenditures directly contribute to more human capital 
being accumulated, public R&D and fixed investment expenditures will mainly raise the productive 
efficiency of accumulated human capital. The hypothesis that public investment and infrastructure 
services may also matter for aggregate human capital, next to education expenditures, has been 
developed recently by Agénor (2008). 
Equation (17) shows our specification for the growth rate of effective human capital. We adopt a 
flexible CES-specification in education time when young (e) and productive government expenditures 
in % of output (gy). In steady state both determinants are constant, which will imply constant steady 
state growth. We add the quality of education (q) in a multiplicative way. We allow q to vary across 
countries in later sections. Next to q we introduce (constant, common) technical parameters:   is a 
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positive efficiency parameter,  a scale parameter, v is a share parameter and   the elasticity of 
substitution. These parameters will be calibrated.  
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)
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        (17) 
Lack of existing empirical evidence makes an ex-ante assessment of our specification very difficult. In 
previous work, however, we have been able to verify that this specification performs better than 
alternative specifications without quality, with a narrower definition of government expenditures or 
with a different functional form (Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010). In Section 4 we show that our 
model’s predictions for education and per capita growth, which rely on (17), are fairly close to reality 
for most countries. 
 
3.3. Domestic firms, output and factor prices 
Firms act competitively on output and input markets and maximize profits. All firms are identical. 
Total domestic output is given by the production function (18). Technology exhibits constant returns 
to scale in aggregate physical capital (Kt) and effective labor (Ht), so that profits are zero in 
equilibrium. Equation (19) describes total effective labor supplied by young, middle-aged and older 
workers. Note our assumptions that each generation has size 1 and that young workers inherit the 
human capital of the middle-aged (  
    
   ).  
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    and where we use Equations (9) and (10).  
 
Competitive behavior implies in Equation (20) that firms carry physical capital to the point where its 
after-tax marginal product net of depreciation equals the world real interest rate (see also Backus et 
al., 2008). Physical capital depreciates at rate δk. Capital taxes are source-based: the tax rate k 
applies to the country in which the capital is used, regardless of who owns it. The real interest rate 
being given, firms will install more capital when the amount of effective labor increases or the capital 
tax rate falls. In that case the net return to investment in the home country rises above the world 
interest rate, and capital flows in. Furthermore, perfect competition implies equality between the 
real wage and the marginal product of effective labor (Equation 21). Higher real wages follow from 
an increase in physical capital per unit of effective labor. Taking into account (20), real wages per unit 
of effective labor will therefore fall in the world real interest rate and in domestic capital tax rates. 
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Substituting (19) for Ht and (20) for Kt/Ht, we can rewrite (18) as  
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If we finally recognize that in steady state r, k, x, e, and nj are constant, we obtain the long-run (per 
capita) growth rate of the economy as 
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In line with earlier models (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Buiter and Kletzer, 1993), 
the long-run (per capita) growth rate is positively related to the quality of schooling (q) and to the 
fraction of time that young people allocate to education (e). It is also positively related to the share 
of productive government expenditures (gy), like in Barro (1990).  
 
3.4. Government 
Equation (23) describes the government’s budget constraint. Productive expenditures Gyt, 
consumption Gct, benefits related to non-employment Bt (including early retirement benefits), old-
age pension benefits PPt, lump sum transfers Zt, and interest payments rtDt at time t are financed by 
taxes on labor Tnt, taxes on capital Tkt, and taxes on consumption Tct, and/or by new debt Dt+1. We 
define Dt as outstanding public debt at beginning of period t. 
         Following Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009), we assume that the government 
claims given fractions gy and gc of output for productive expenditures and consumption. Non-
employment benefits Bt are an unconditional source of income support related to inactivity (‘leisure’) 
and non-market household activities. Although it may seem strange to have such transfers in a 
model without involuntary unemployment, one can of course analyse their employment and growth 
effects as a theoretical benchmark case (see also Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2009). 
Moreover, there is also clear practical relevance. Unconditional or quasi unconditional benefits to 
structurally non-employed people are a fact of life in many European countries. Note also our 
assumption that the pension system is fully integrated into government accounts. We do not impose 
a specific financing of the PAYG pension plan, the government can use resources from the general 
budget to finance pensions. Finally, as we have mentioned before, the government pays the same 
lump sum transfer zt  to all individuals living at time t.  
 
                                                              (23)   
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3.5. Aggregate equilibrium and the current account 
Optimal behavior by firms and households, and government spending for productive and 
consumption purposes, underlie aggregate domestic demand for consumption and investment goods 
in the economy. Our assumption that the economy is open implies that aggregate domestic demand 
may differ from supply and income, which generates international capital flows and imbalance on 
the current account. Equation (24) describes aggregate equilibrium as it can be derived from 
Equations (5)-(8), defined for all generations living at time t, Equations (18)-(21) and Equation (23)7. 
In Equation (24), Ft  stands for net foreign assets at the beginning of t. The aggregate stock of wealth 
At accumulates wealth held by individuals who entered the model in t-1, t-2 and t-3. 
                                       (24)  
with:                
                                  
                 
 
4. Parameterization and empirical relevance of the model  
The economic environment described above allows us to simulate the transitory and steady state 
growth and employment effects of various changes in fiscal policy and the pension system. This 
                                                        
7
 Domestic output and net factor income from abroad at the LHS of Equation (24) constitute national income. 
Since in our model there are no unilateral transfers between a country and the rest of the world, we have that 
CAt = NXt + rtFt , with NXt  representing net exports of goods and services. It is then easy to see that Equation 
(24) can also be written in a maybe more common way as
 
Yt = Ct + It + Gct + Gyt + NXt. 
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simulation exercise requires us first to parameterize and solve the model. In Section 4.1 we discuss 
our choice of preference and technology parameters. Starting from actual cross-country policy data 
in Section 4.2, we compare in Section 4.3 our model’s predictions with the employment and growth 
differences that we have reported in Table 1. This comparison provides a first and simple test of our 
model’s empirical relevance. In Section 5 we consider both long-run equilibrium effects and 
transitional dynamics of policy changes. To solve the model and to perform our simulations, we 
choose an algorithm that preserves the non-linear nature of our model. We follow the methodology 
basically proposed by Boucekkine (1995) and implemented by Juillard (1996) in the program Dynare.  
 
4.1. Preference and technology parameters 
Table 2 contains an overview of all parameters. We set the rate of time preference equal to 1.5% per 
year. Considering that periods in our model consist of 15 years, this choice implies a discount factor  
equal to 0.8. In the production function we assume a capital share coefficient   equal to 0.285. Our 
values for the rate of time preference and the capital share are well within the range of values 
imposed in the literature (e.g. Docquier and Michel, 1999; Altig et al., 2001; Heijdra and Romp, 2009). 
There is more controversy about the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure 
(1/). Micro studies often reveal very low elasticities. However, given our macro focus, these studies 
may not be the most relevant ones. Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) show that micro and macro 
elasticities may be unrelated. Rogerson (2007) also adopts a macro framework. He puts forward a 
reasonable range for   from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, p. 12). In line with this, we impose  to be equal 
to 2. The world real interest rate is assumed constant in steady state and equal to 4.5% per year. 
Considering a period of 15 years, this implies that r = 0.935. Finally, we set the physical capital 
depreciation rate to 8% per year, which implies δk=0.714. These values are also within the range of 
existing studies (see e.g. Heijdra and Romp, 2009).  
 
Table 2 Preference and technology parameters  
Production parameters (output) 0.285   
Effective human capital production 4 9 1 03 0 125 0 375. , . , v . , .       
Preference parameters 
1 2 3,  ,  0.8 2 0.074,  0.131,  0.176          
 ,  0.5 1.52,  2      
World real interest rate 0 935r .  
Physical capital depreciation rate 0 714k .   
 
A second series of parameters have been determined by calibration: three taste for leisure 
parameters (1, 2, 3), two parameters in the human capital production function (the efficiency 
parameter  and the scale parameter ), and the elasticity of substitution () in the composite leisure 
function in Equation (4). We have calibrated these parameters to Belgium. We choose this country 
since in Belgium the calculation of pension benefits fits exactly within the way we model it. Public 
pensions are proportional to average annual labor income earned over a period of 45 years, with 
equal weights to all years. There is no basic pension (OECD, 2005). In our model this comes down to 
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b4a>0, b4b=0 and p1=p2=p3=1/3. The parameters 1, 2, 3, ,  and  have been determined such that 
with observed levels of the policy variables (tax rates, benefit replacement rates, pension 
replacement rate, etc.) and the observed level of schooling quality (q)8 in Belgium, the model 
correctly predicts Belgium’s employment rates (n1, n2, n3), per capita growth rate, education rate (e) 
and effective retirement age (R) in 1995-2007. Underlying performance and policy data are reported 
in Tables 1, 3 and 4. We find that the taste for leisure rises with age (1=0.074, 2=0.131, 3=0.176). 
Furthermore, we observe quasi constant returns in human capital production ( ≈ 1), and a stronger 
degree of substitutability than in the Cobb-Douglas case between the two types of leisure for older 
workers (ρ = 1.52). 
We had no ex ante indication on two parameters in the human capital production function: the share 
parameter v and the elasticity of substitution parameter . We could assign sensible values to these 
parameters thanks to a sensitivity analysis on the results that we report in the next section. There we 
evaluate the capacity of our model to explain six important macro variables in 13 OECD countries. 
Although the influence of v and  on the explanatory power of our model is very limited, our 
guideline to pin down specific values for these parameters (within a sensible range) was to minimize 
the deviation of our model’s predictions from the true data9. This procedure implied v=0.125 and = 
0.375. The result for  reveals a higher degree of complementarity between private education time 
and government expenditures than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The result for v demonstrates 
relatively high importance for human capital formation of private education time versus productive 
public expenditures. Neither did we have an ex ante indication on the remaining parameters in the 
composite leisure function in Equation (4). We impose equal weight for both leisure types (π=0.5). 
The normalisation parameter Ω equals 2. The size of this parameter has no impact at all on our 
country predictions or simulation results. 
 
4.2. Fiscal policy, pensions and education quality 
Tables 3 and 4 describe key characteristics of fiscal policy and the pension system in 1995-2001/2004. 
Reported data are averages of the available annual data in that period, unless indicated otherwise. 
Our description of the data here is short. For some variables we provide more detail in Appendix 1. 
Our proxy for the tax rate on labor income concerns the total tax wedge, for which we report the 
marginal rate in %. The data cover personal income taxes, employee and employer social security 
contributions payable on wage earnings and payroll taxes. The OECD publishes these tax data for 
several family and income situations. Considering that workers typically earn less when they are 
                                                        
8
 And with the values of two parameters in the human capital production function (v, ) that we discuss below 
(see also footnote 9). 
9
 From our model’s predictions and the true data for 13 countries we computed for each variable (n1, n2, n3, e, R, 
growth) the root mean squared error normalized to the mean. We minimized the average normalized RMSE 
over all six variables. More precisely, we adopted the following iterative procedure. We chose values for v and 
 and then calibrated the efficiency parameter  and the scale parameter . The values for v and  had no 
influence on the calibration results for j and . Given the obtained values for  and , we computed the 
average normalized RMSE over all six variables. We then checked whether changes in v and , and a 
recalibration of  and  , could further reduce this statistic. We did this until no further reduction was possible. 
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young (and have lower human capital) than when they are middle-aged, we calculated our 1 for 
each country as an average of marginal tax rates for lower to middle income families. Tax rates for 
middle-aged and older workers were computed from OECD data for middle to higher income families.  
 
Table 3 Fiscal policy (tax rates and government debt) 
 
tax rate on labor 
income when 
young 
(%) 
tax rate on 
labor income 
when 
middle age and 
older (in %) 
consumption 
tax rate 
(%) 
tax rate on 
capital 
income 
(%) 
Government 
debt  
(% of GDP) 
Proxy for: 1 2,3 c k D/Y 
Austria 56.5 53.0 13.2 17.3 69.6 
Belgium  66.6 67.6 13.4 27.1 111.7 
France 52.4 53.3 17.1 21.7 68.9 
Germany 62.5 60.0 11.1 34.4 63.1 
Italy 54.7 57.1 14.7 14.9 122.1 
Netherlands 52.3 51.6 12.2 24.3 68.2 
Denmark 46.4 51.2 18.9 22.5 60.3 
Finland 55.6 57.9 15.2 17.2 54.1 
Norway 49.6 52.6 16.4 22.1 40.4 
Sweden 54.5 58.1 17.9 16.1 67.2 
UK 39.8 41.6 14.5 21.2 46.6 
US 34.2 36.9 7.2 23.6 61.9 
Canada 46.8 47.6 14.5 24.8 83.8 
Average 51.7 52.9 14.3 22.1 70.6 
Note:  Labor tax rates are data for the total tax wedge, marginal rate (OECD, Taxing Wages). Data for 2000-04. 
For details on the calculation of tax rates by age group, see Appendix 1. Capital tax rates are effective marginal 
corporate tax rates (Institute for Fiscal Studies, their EMTR; data for 1995-2001, see also Devereux et al., 2002).  
Consumption tax rate: see Dhont and Heylen (2009). Data for 1995-2001. Government debt concerns general 
government gross financial liabilities in percent of GDP (OECD, Economic Outlook, data for 1995-2007). 
 
As one can see in Table 3, however, differences within countries between 1 on the one hand and 2  
and 3 on the other, are very small. Cross-country differences are much bigger. Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden and Finland have marginal labor tax rates above 55% or even 60%. The US and the UK have 
marginal labor tax rates below, or close to, 40%. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax 
rates reported by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (their EMTR, base case). Germany and Belgium have 
the highest rates. In contrast to labor (and consumption), capital is taxed relatively little in the Nordic 
countries. As to consumption taxes, we follow Dhont and Heylen (2009) in computing them as the 
ratio of government indirect tax receipts (net of subsidies paid) to total domestic demand net of 
indirect taxes and subsidies. Our simplifying assumption is that consumption tax rates correspond to 
aggregate indirect tax rates. The Nordic countries stand out with the highest consumption tax rates, 
the US with the lowest. The utter right column in Table 3 shows the average ratio of gross 
government debt to GDP in the period that we study. The data range from less than 50% in Norway 
and the UK to more than 100% in Belgium and Italy.  
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Table 4 summarizes our data for the expenditure side of fiscal policy. A first variable is our proxy for 
the net non-employment benefit replacement rate bj (j = 1,2,3a). Since in our model non-
employment is a structural or equilibrium phenomenon, the data that we use concern net transfers 
received by structurally or long-term unemployed people. They include social assistance, family 
benefits and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also include unemployment 
insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, i.e. if workers can be 
structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit eligibility10. The data are 
expressed in percent of after-tax wages. In line with our approach to determine labor tax rates by 
age group, we are again guided by the same family and income cases to determine b1, b2 and b3a (see 
Appendix 1). Overall, the euro area countries and the Nordic countries pay the highest net benefits 
on average. Transfers to structurally non-employed people are by far the lowest in the US. A related 
variable is our proxy for the net early retirement benefit replacement rate b3b.The data are again 
expressed in percent of after-tax final wages. To assess the generosity of early retirement we 
integrate the information available via b3a and data for the implicit tax rate on continued work in the 
early retirement route as provided by Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. (2005).  For details, see 
Appendix 1. We observe a very generous early retirement regime in Belgium and Finland, whereas 
net early retirement benefits in Anglo-Saxon countries are much lower. 
 Our data for productive government expenditures in Table 4 include education, active labor 
market expenditures, government financed R&D and public investment. Governments in the Nordic 
countries allocate by far the highest fractions of output to productive expenditures. Productive 
expenditures in percent of GDP are the lowest in the UK. The US and most core countries of the euro 
area take intermediate positions. Government consumption in percent of GDP is the highest also in 
the Nordic countries, followed at close distance by several countries of the core euro area11. In the 
US, government consumption is (much) lower.  
Our data for the net pension replacement rates (b4a, b4b) concern an individual with mean 
earnings before retirement. The data include only (quasi-)mandatory pension programs, and are 
expressed as a percentage of this individual’s average lifetime labor income (OECD, 2005)12. In the 
majority of countries individuals with mean earnings only receive earnings-related pensions (b4a>0, 
b4b=0). The overall average net replacement rate in these countries is around 57%, but there are 
strong cross-country differences. We observe the highest b4a in Austria and Italy, and low rates in the 
US and Belgium. Differences exist also in the precise organization of the earnings-related system. 
Some countries have pure defined-benefit systems (e.g. Belgium, Finland, US), others have so-called 
                                                        
10
 This is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, and the UK. Workers cannot be structurally 
non-employed and still receive unemployment benefits in the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Norway and the US 
(OECD, 2004, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Benefits and Wages, country specific files).  
11 Note that we calculate government consumption as total government consumption in % of GDP, diminished 
with the fraction of public education outlays going to wages and working-expenses. The latter are included in 
productive expenditures.  
12
 In most countries mandatory programs are public. For Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden the data also 
include benefits from mandatory private systems. These benefits are earnings-related. Voluntary, occupational 
pensions are not included in our data. 
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point systems (Germany) or notional-account systems (Italy, Sweden).  Although these three systems 
can appear very different, OECD (2005) shows that they are all similar variants of earnings-related 
pension schemes. A smaller group of countries combine earnings-related and (variants of) basic 
pension systems. Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have the strongest non-earnings related 
components13. As a final important remark, we emphasize that the straightforward way in which the 
OECD computes the pension replacement rates, in percent of an individual’s average lifetime labor 
income, comes down to assuming in our model that the weights p1, p2 and p3 are all equal to 1/3. For 
reasons of consistency we will therefore make this assumption for all individual countries when we 
derive our model’s predictions. We are aware however that equal weights do not fully match 
practice in all countries. Some deviate from this prototype, to varying degrees. When we compare 
our model’s predictions for these countries to the facts in the next section, we should take this into 
account 14. Assuming equal weights may slightly bias our predictions. 
As a final variable in Table 4 we include PISA science scores. We use these data as a proxy for 
the quality of schooling (q) in the human capital production function (17). We concentrate on science 
scores given their expected closer link to growth. Although available PISA scores relate to secondary 
education, we do not see this as a weakness. PISA scores may be very informative about the quality 
with which young people enter tertiary education. Quality at entrance should have a positive 
influence on people’s capacity to learn and to raise human capital during tertiary education. 
Furthermore, PISA scores have been found empirically significant for growth (Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2009). Finally, these scores are easily available for all countries, which is not obvious for 
‘better’ quality indicators. Finland scores best, followed by the Netherlands, Canada and the UK. 
Note that there is no correlation in Table 4 between productive government expenditures and the 
PISA score. Correlation is -0.04. There is no correlation either if we restrict productive expenditures 
to education only. Both variables seem to tell different stories (see also Woessmann, 2003).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13
 For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that our proxy for b4b also includes targeted and 
minimum pensions if they are relevant for a worker with mean income. Basic pensions pay the same amount to 
every retiree. Targeted plans pay a higher benefit to poorer pensioners and reduced benefits to better-off ones. 
Minimum pensions are similar to targeted plans. Their main aim is to prevent pensions from falling below a 
certain level (OECD, 2005, p. 22-23). Our main motivation to merge these three categories in our proxy for b4b 
is that they are not (or even inversely) linked to earnings. 
14
 In Austria, Norway and France earnings-related pensions are not calculated from average lifetime income but 
from average income during the final working years or a number of years with the highest earnings. Ideally, 
one would impose different weights p1, p2 and p3. However, the pension replacement rate reported by the 
OECD would then no longer be reliable since it is based on the assumption of equal weights. 
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Table 4  Fiscal policy (net transfer replacement rates, government consumption, productive  
               expenditures), pension system, and PISA education score   
 
Non-
employment 
benefit, 
young (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
 Non-
employment 
benefit, 
middle-aged 
and older 
(net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
Early 
retirement 
benefits 
(net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
 
Pension 
benefit 
(net 
replace- 
ment 
rate, %) 
 
Basic 
pension 
(% of net 
average 
earnings) 
Governm-
ent 
Consump-
tion  
 (% of 
GDP) 
Governm-
ent 
productive 
expenditu-
re  
 (% of 
GDP) 
PISA – 
science 
(divided 
by 
1000) 
Proxy for: b1 b2, b3a b3b b4a 
(a) b4b 
(a) 
gc gy q 
         
Austria 60.8 50.9 69.9 88.9 0 14.6 9.1 0.507 
Belgium 65.1 51.7 75.1 63.1 0 16.9 8.9 0.505 
France 52.3 38.3 59.9 68.8 0 18.3 11.0 0.502 
Germany 65.4 59.7 68.3 71.8 0 15.3 8.6 0.502 
Italy 18.5 15.3 54.9 88.8 0 14.3 8.0 0.480 
Netherlands 62.5 46.6 63.9 48.8 35.3 18.4 10.3 0.525 
Denmark 67.8 55.4 40.0 19.5 34.6 18.4 12.5 0.484 
Finland 68.4 54.4 70.4 78.8 0 16.0 11.4 0.550 
Norway 64.8 49.4 36.2 46.2 18.9 14.7 12.1 0.490 
Sweden 62.8 47.8 35.2 65.9 2.3 20.0 14.0 0.507 
UK 57.8 44.4 36.0 13.8 33.8 14.4 7.3 0.523 
US 34.3 26.6 16.3 51.0 0 10.3 9.3 0.493 
Canada 49.7 39.5 24.6 39.4 17.7 14.7 9.3 0.527 
         
Average 56.2 44.6 49.9 57.3 11.0 15.9 10.1 0.507 
 Notes: A description of all variables is given in the main text. For more details, see Appendix 1. The data for 
net non-employment benefit replacement rates are an average for 2001 and 2004 (earlier data are not 
available). The data for government consumption and productive expenditures concern 1995-2001. The 
PISA science scores are an average for 2000, 2003 and 2006. The pension replacement rates concern 2002 
(source OECD, 2005, p. 52). To split up the OECD data into our b4a and b4b in countries where b4b >0, we 
have used the information in OECD (2005, part II, Country studies). We derive b4b from the fraction of the 
total net replacement rate that goes to basic, minimum or targeted pensions (see also our footnote 13).  
(a) The weights pj to compute the pension base (with j=1,
 
2,
 
3) are in all countries assumed equal to 1/3 (see 
motivation in the main text). 
 
4.3. Predicted versus actual employment by age, education of young and growth in the OECD  
Can our model match the facts that we have reported in Table 1? In this section we confront our 
model’s predictions with the true data for 1995-2006/2007. Clearly, one should be aware of the 
serious limitations of such an exercise. First of all, our model is highly stylized and may (obviously) 
miss potential determinants of growth or employment. Second, even if we compute the true data in 
Table 1 as averages over a longer period, these averages need not be equal to the steady state. 
Countries may still be moving towards their steady state. Also, the policy variables that we report in 
Tables 3 and 4 may have been affected by transitory factors. Third, this exercise only concerns the 
last 15 years. Lack of data – especially with respect to marginal labor tax rates and non-employment 
transfers in the early 1990s – makes it impossible for us to execute the maybe most convincing test, 
 Chapter 2 
   37 
which is to relate changes in growth and employment to changes in policy within countries over 
longer time periods. In spite of all this, if one considers the extreme variation in the predictions of 
existing calibrated models investigating the effects of fiscal policy in the literature (see Stokey and 
Rebelo, 1995), even a minimal test of the ‘goodness of fit’ of our model is informative.  
Our calibration implies that our model’s prediction matches employment rates by age, the 
effective retirement age of older workers, education, and per capita growth in Belgium. A test of the 
model’s validity is whether it can also match the data for the other countries, and the cross-country 
differences. Before one uses a model for policy analysis, one would like to see for example that the 
model does not overestimate, nor underestimate the performance differences related to observed 
cross-country policy differences. Our test is tough since we impose the same preference and 
technology parameters, reported in the upper part of Table 2, on all countries15. Only the fiscal policy 
variables, the pension replacement rates and education quality differ. Moreover, assuming perfect 
competition, we disregard differences in labor and product market institutions which some authors 
consider of crucial importance (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2005). Still, we find 
that the model matches the facts remarkably well for a large majority of countries. Basically, we here 
confirm earlier findings by e.g. Ohanian et al. (2008) and Dhont and Heylen (2008) that once one 
controls for fiscal policy differences, variation in taste for leisure or different market rigidities are not 
critical to explain cross-country variation in labor market performance.  
As a part of fiscal policy, lump sum transfers also differ across countries. Underlying our model’s 
predictions for each country, is the assumption of a constant debt to GDP ratio at the level reported 
for that country in Table 3. Lump sum transfers adjust endogenously in Equation (23) to obtain this 
equilibrium debt to GDP ratio.   
 
Figures 2 to 4 relate our model’s predictions for three employment rates to actual observations for 
all countries. We add the 45°-line to assess the absolute differences between predictions and facts, 
as well as the coefficient of correlation between predictions and facts. Our model performs quite 
well. In each age group, it correctly predicts high employment rates in the US and Canada and low 
employment in Germany. For young workers it also correctly predicts relatively low employment in 
most other countries of the core euro area, and in the Nordic countries. For older workers it has 
relatively high employment right in the Nordic countries and the UK. Overall correlation between the 
model’s predictions and the actual data in Figure 2 is 0.32. If we drop Italy, for which there are good 
reasons16, this rises to 0.70. Correlation in Figure 3 is 0.41, in Figure 4 it is 0.76. Moreover, in each 
                                                        
15
 We also assume TFP to be the same in all countries. Note, however, that this assumption is not crucial. The 
utility function being separable and logarithmic in consumption, and goods production being Cobb-Douglas, 
the level of TFP does not matter for employment or growth rates. Also, differences across countries in TFP have 
no effect on cross-country performance differences in our model, at least if these TPF differences are constant. 
16
 A major element behind the deviation for this country seems to be underestimation of the fallback income 
position for structurally non-employed young workers. OECD data show very low replacement rates in Italy. 
However, as shown by Reyneri (1994), the gap between Italy and other European countries is much smaller 
than it seems. Reyneri (1994) points to the importance of family support as an alternative to unemployment 
benefits. Fernández Cordón (2001) shows that in Italy young people live much longer with their parents than in 
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figure - again after dropping Italy from Figure 2 - the regression line (not shown) is close to the 45°-
line, which suggests that our model correctly assesses the size of the employment effects of policy 
differences across countries. Next to Italy, there are a few other countries, where our model 
somewhat over- or underpredicts. The model’s employment predictions tend to be too high for 
France, Italy and (except in Figure 2) the Netherlands. They tend to be too low in general for 
Denmark and Finland.  
 
Figure 2. Employment rate in hours of young individuals (n1), in %, 1995-2007 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.32. 
Excluding Italy, correlation rises to 0.70. 
 
Figure 3. Employment rate in hours of middle-aged individuals (n2), in %, 1995-2007 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.41.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
other countries. In 1995 for example about 56% of people aged 25-29 were still living with their parents in Italy. 
In about all other countries this fraction was below 23%. Of all non-working males aged 25-29 in Italy more 
than 80% were living with their parents. In France or Germany the corresponding numbers were close to 40%.   
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Figure 5 relates our model’s predictions to the facts for the effective retirement age. The model 
again captures the large differences between countries. It predicts the highest retirement age in the 
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries and a much lower retirement age in core euro area countries. 
Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91.  
 
Figure 4.  Employment rate in hours of older individuals (n3), in %, 1995-2007 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.76.  
 
Figure 5. Effective retirement age, 1995-2006  
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91.  
 
In Figures 6 and 7 we relate our model’s predictions to the facts for education and growth. For 
education, the model correctly captures key differences between the Nordic countries on the one 
hand and countries like the UK, Italy and Belgium on the other. Predictions for education are quite 
close to the 45°-line for all individual countries except Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands.  The 
model also has important cross-country differences right for growth. The model has difficulty 
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however to explain observed growth for France and the UK. Correlation between the model’s 
predictions and the true data is 0.64 for education and 0.69 for growth. Finally, in Figure 8, we relate 
our model’s predictions to the facts for the annual current account balance (in % of GDP). Note that 
we have not done any calibration on these data. Our model predicts current account balances of 
about the right size (between -6 and +5% of GDP). It matches cross-country differences fairly well.  
 
Figure 6. Tertiary education rate (e), in %, 1995-2006  
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.64. 
 
Figure 7. Annual per capita potential GDP growth, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.69. 
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Figure 8. Annual current account balance, in % of GDP, 1995-2007 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. We have excluded Norway from this figure as Norway is a clear outlier in 
the current account data (10.7% of GDP). Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.65. 
When we include Norway, correlation drops to 0.42.  
 
 
5. Public pension reform 
Having established the empirical relevance of our model, we now simulate a series of policy shocks. 
Our aim is to discover the (relative) effectiveness of various reforms of the pension system for the 
employment rate of three age groups, aggregate employment, education of the young, the effective 
retirement age, and growth. In Section 5.1 we consider steady state effects, in Section 5.2 
transitional dynamics and welfare effects per generation. The particular pattern of transitory effects 
implies that subsequent generations’ welfare may be affected differently. The benchmark from 
which we start, and against which all policy shocks are evaluated, is the average of the six core euro 
area countries in our sample. Throughout all our policy simulations we assume that the government 
maintains a constant debt to GDP ratio in each period. To reach this goal, it adjusts lump sum 
transfers. The change in lump sum transfers is spread equally among all living generations. 
 
5.1. Numerical steady state effects. 
The main part of Table 5 shows the steady state effects of six changes in key features of the pension 
system. Changes in lump sum transfers to maintain a constant debt to GDP ratio are indicated at the 
bottom of the table. Policy 1 raises the earnings-related net benefit replacement rate b4a from 72% in 
the benchmark to 77%. This policy intervention is equivalent to an ex ante increase in pension 
expenditures by 0.5% of GDP. The policy implies a slight increase in employment, especially among 
older workers. It has only minor positive effects on education and a quasi negligible impact on 
growth. All in all, behavioral effects are small17. Financial effects are somewhat stronger. A rise in the 
                                                        
17
 Effects are even (about 50%) smaller if labor taxes are adjusted to maintain a constant debt to GDP ratio. 
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replacement rate induces an increase in the pension burden and a (limited) deterioration of the 
government’s financial balance. To keep its debt to GDP ratio constant, the government has to 
reduce lump sum transfers by 0.38% of output. Policies 2 and 3 alter the calculation of the pension 
base, such that more weight is given to the net labor income of workers when they are ‘older’. These 
policies involve an increase in p3, and a fall in p1. We assume that these reforms do not hold for the 
current generation of retirees as they are no longer able to adapt their behavior to these new 
pension weights. The higher (lower) marginal utility from work when older (young) makes it 
interesting to shift work from the first period of active life to the third, and to postpone effective 
retirement. Furthermore, young individuals are encouraged to study because the lifetime rate of 
return to building human capital rises. This follows first from the reduction of the opportunity cost of 
studying when young, second from the perspective of working longer, and third from the greater 
importance of effective human capital when old in the pension calculation. Extra schooling 
contributes to steady-state growth. Interestingly, the government budget does not deteriorate. For 
instance, policy 3 implies an improvement in the budget balance by 1.20% of GDP18. All in all, simple 
reforms like policies 2 and 3 succeed in strongly increasing the employment rate among older 
workers (+4.14%-points and +7.73%-points respectively) and their effective retirement age (up to 
almost +1 year in policy 3). The effect on the aggregate employment rate is limited due to the 
significant drop in employment of the young. Fortunately, more than half of the latter is substituted 
into tertiary education. We observe a substantial increase in the per capita growth rate (+0.23%-
points in policy 3).  
Policy 4 combines policies 1 and 3. We find that complementing the alternative calculation of the 
pension base proposed in policy 3, by an increase in the replacement rate, provokes the strongest 
rise in employment, education and growth. An increase in the pension burden notwithstanding, net 
effects on the government budget are positive (as lump sum transfers do not decline). An important 
element is that a higher pension replacement rate raises the return to working when middle-aged 
and older, and to building human capital when young. Policy 5 shows the effects of a shift from 
individual earnings-related pensions to ‘basic’ pensions. The ex ante budgetary effect of this shift is 
zero. As can be seen, overall employment, education and growth effects are negative. A key element 
is the fall in the return to working and studying when the pension replacement rate b4a  is reduced. 
Ex post effects on the government budget are also negative. Lump sum transfers have to fall. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18
 More precisely, to keep the debt to GDP ratio constant, the government can raise lump sum transfers by 1.20% 
of output. 
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Table 5. Effects of pension reform – Effects for a benchmark of 6 core euro area countries  
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). 
Initial 
values: 
P1=1/3 
P2=1/3 
P3=1/3 
b4a=0.72 
b4b=0.06 
 
Policy 1 
b4a=0.77 
Policy 2 
P1=1/6 
P2=1/3 
P3=3/6 
 
Policy 3 
P1=0 
P2=1/3 
P3=2/3 
 
Policy 4 
P1=0 
P2=1/3 
P3=2/3 
b4a=0.77 
Policy 5 
b4a=0.52 
b4b=0.26 
 
 
Policy 6 
Fully 
Funded 
 
 
 
Policy 
4b 
(= policy 
4, with e 
exoge-
nous) 
Policy 
6b (f) 
 
 
 
   
Policy 7 
b3b 
=-0.281 
 
 
 
Effect (a):          
n1 0.07 -2.76 -5.84 -6.14 -0.12   0.64 -2.60 3.99 0.13 
n2  0.23 0.15 0.41 0.69 -0.65 -0.71 -0.05 0.88 -0.61 
n3 0.61 4.14 7.73 8.58 -2.20 -6.78 7.48 0.32 6.43 
R (c) 0.08 0.52 0.94 1.04 -0.30 -1.07 0.93 0.17 1.86 
   0.08 1.48 3.09 3.37 -0.26 -0.66 0.00 -1.65 -0.52 
          
n (a, b) 0.29 0.32 0.41 0.66 -0.92 -2.01 1.27 1.78 1.68 
N/N (d) 0.53 0.59 0.75 1.21 -1.70 -3.70 2.33 3.27 3.10 
annual 
growth 
rate (a) 
0.01 0.12 0.23 0.25 -0.02 -0.06 
 
0.00 -0.14 -0.04 
Z ex post 
(e) -0.38 0.79 1.20 0.82 -0.50 -3.61 0.83 1.53 2.03 
Notes:    (a) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark, except ∆N/N and R. 
(b) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours, change in percentage points. 
(c) change in optimal effective retirement age in years 
(d) change in volume of employment in hours, in %.  
(e) change in lump sum transfer (as a fraction of output) to keep the debt to GDP ratio constant at the  
level of the benchmark, in %-points. 
(f) policy 6b is identical to policy 6 but it keeps net non-employment benefits constant (see main text). 
 
Policy 6 is a gradual shift from the PAYG system in the benchmark to a system with full private capital 
funding. This policy completely abolishes old-age pension benefits (b4a , b4b). For the government it 
implies a drastic cut in pension expenditures. We assume that this drop in expenditures feeds 
through into lower social security contributions for all workers such that, ex ante, the decline in total 
labor tax receipts in % of GDP is exactly the same as the drop in pension expenditures.19 We observe 
that this transition to a private fully-funded pension scheme is not beneficial for employment. The 
aggregate employment rate drops by 2%-points. An important element here is that a fully-funded 
system breaks the direct positive link between individual labor income and the pension, which exists 
in the PAYG system as we have modeled it. Growth decreases (-0.06%-points) as tertiary education is 
                                                        
19
 In particular, the gradual decline in b4a and b4b is announced at time t=1 and implemented as follows. 
Pensions benefits are not reduced for retirees at the moment of policy implementation (t=1), since retirees are 
not able to react to a pension reduction. In t=2 and t=3 the replacement rates are respectively reduced to 2/3 
and 1/3 of their initial rates. From t=4 onwards, b4a and b4b are zero. At each moment, overall labor tax rates 
are reduced to ex ante compensate for the decline in pension expenditures. 
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discouraged both by the fall in the pension replacement rate b4a, and by the cut in labor taxes when 
young. The labor tax cut when middle-aged and older cannot neutralize the negative effect. Smaller 
accumulation of human capital also discourages work when older. As a final result, we also observe 
that a shift to a fully-funded system affects the government balance negatively (as lump sum 
transfers decline by 3.61% of GDP). The latter is due to the decline in the tax base as hours of work 
decrease. Another element is that, although we also find that moving to a system with private capital 
funding encourages national savings (see e.g. Feldstein, 1974, 2005), this need not imply an increase 
in domestic physical capital formation, and capital taxes. If effective labor supply and employment 
fall, this reduces the marginal product of physical capital, and causes savings to be invested abroad 
(see below, current account). 
 
Our main result in Table 5 is that an intelligent PAYG system may have positive effects on both 
employment, the effective retirement age, and growth. It may perform (much) better than a system 
with a strong basic pension component, or a system with full private funding. A key element is to 
have a tight link between individuals’ own labor income (and therefore hours worked and human 
capital) in later years of the career and the pension. Such a policy stimulates labor supply when 
middle-aged and older, and education when young. Positive effects on human capital formation 
promote future productivity and earnings capacity, also for future generations.  
Our conclusion is in line with some recent literature, but goes against other. Additional 
results may explain part of the differences. First, our findings support analytical results by Jaag et al. 
(2010) and Fisher and Keuschnigg (2010) among others that a strong link between own contributions 
and the pension strengthens incentives to work (see also Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Cigno, 2010). 
Flat pension regimes imply lower overall employment. This is clear from policy 5, which establishes a 
stronger link between a retiree’s pension and the average net labor income of working generations 
at the time of his retirement (and a weaker link with his own labor income). Second, our findings 
from policies 3 and 4 also support the positive effects on the effective retirement age and the labor 
supply of older workers from letting the pension rise in labor income and contributions paid as an 
older worker, as emphasized by Sheshinski (1978), Gruber and Wise (2002), and Lindbeck and 
Persson (2003). Highly similar effects on n3 and R follow from reducing the net replacement rate in 
the early retirement regime (b3b). Policy 7 brings down b3b by 28%-points, i.e. a reduction from 65% 
in the euro area benchmark to 37%, the average for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Note however 
that this policy reduces the return to education and human capital formation, since early retirement 
benefits rise in human capital. This result illustrates, as a third observation, the importance of taking 
into account the endogeneity of education and growth in an analysis of pension reform.  
The role of endogenous education also qualifies the importance of labor supply effects for 
young workers. We also find, like Jaag et al. (2010), that a higher weight attached to labor income as 
an older worker (p3) may reduce labor supply of the young. In our model, however, this may have 
positive effects due to the endogeneity of human capital and growth. The endogeneity of human 
capital is crucial also in the comparison of a PAYG system with a fully-funded private capital system 
when it comes to growth. Our results are in line with findings by Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) and 
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Kaganovich and Meier (2008) that a PAYG system can raise growth compared to a fully-funded 
scheme because it strengthens incentives to invest in education. A key element is that a PAYG system 
allows individuals to partially internalize the positive externalities of human capital formation. In 
Kemnitz and Wigger (2000), as in our approach, a PAYG system raises the return to education 
because of the close link between an individual’s pension benefit and his/her own accumulated 
human capital. Kaganovich and Meier (2008) show higher growth in a flat pension system. Here, 
individuals will invest more in their children’s education because their children’s productivity 
determines their future pension. Policy 4b in Table 5 revisits policy 4 under the assumption of 
exogenous education and growth. Overall employment rises more than in policy 4, mainly thanks to 
a smaller shift from employment into education by young workers. Unlike the relatively limited 
effects here, we will see below much stronger welfare effects, especially for future generations.  
 
Our results also go against some of the literature. Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010) and Ludwig et al. 
(2011) among others tend to find that economies are better able to face ageing with a fully-funded 
system. Furthermore, despite positive effects on employment from an intelligently designed PAYG 
system, many studies find the highest employment in a fully-funded system (e.g. Fisher and 
Keuschnigg, 2010). We learn from our simulations that the specific setup of the pension system in 
these papers may explain the difference. Some studies compare the fully-funded system with a flat 
PAYG system. Clearly, this approach is crucial for the results. If we reinforce the shift to a flat pension 
in our policy 5 by bringing b4a to zero and by simultaneously raising b4b, employment effects are 
indeed worse than in policy 6 (n in this extreme version of policy 5 would be -4 percentage points). 
Other studies neglect the difference between early retirement and old-age pension systems. 
Workers in these studies are free to choose the age at which they step from work into old-age 
retirement. A PAYG pension then directly raises the opportunity cost of working. Clearly, this setup is 
not very realistic. In most countries early retirement benefits raise the opportunity cost of work, old-
age pensions don’t. It is hard to quantify in our model the effects of moving from such a system 
(where workers optimally choose the age to go from work directly into old-age pensions) to a fully-
funded system. Since such a PAYG system does not exist in most countries, it cannot establish a 
reliable benchmark. However, when we quantify the effects of (i) moving from our current 
benchmark to such a PAYG system, and (ii) moving from our current benchmark to a fully-funded 
system without an early retirement regime, we find that the movement to a fully-funded system 
yields indeed better performance and welfare. This is in line with the literature, but - again - not a 
realistic setup or exercise.  
Policy 6b highlights a third possible reason for why one may find in the literature that moving 
to a fully-funded system is better than an (intelligent) PAYG system. In this policy we treat non-
employment benefits differently than in policy 6. More precisely, if moving to a fully-funded system 
implies a cut in taxes on labor, this may also raise net non-employment benefits, when these are  
proportional to net wages. The gain from work versus non-employment then remains unaffected. 
This is what happens in policy 6. In policy 6b, by contrast, we keep net non-employment benefits 
unchanged, such that the labor tax cut raises the relative gain from work. This setup is much more in 
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line with the literature, where non-employment benefits are often disregarded. As one can see in 
Table 5, moving to a fully-funded system now implies a strong increase in aggregate employment. All 
age groups work more. It should be clear, however, that the main element here is not the shift in the 
pension regime, but the relative reduction in non-employment benefits. In Heylen and Van de 
Kerckhove (2010) we report highly similar employment effects from an absolute cut in non-
employment benefits (bj, with j=1,2,3a) for unchanged labor taxes, and a constant pension system. 
Moreover, the employment success of policy 6b also comes at a cost. The strong rise in the 
employment rate of the young runs parallel with a strong reduction in education, and the largest fall 
in steady state growth.   
 
5.2. Transitional dynamics and welfare effects per generation. 
We now describe the transitory adjustment path of key variables, including welfare, after the main 
pension reforms discussed in Table 5 (we omit Policy 1 in all figures). Figure 9 shows the evolution of 
aggregate output, Figure 10 the evolution of the aggregate employment rate. Policy changes are 
introduced in period 1. We assume that these policy changes are unanticipated and permanent. In 
the ‘short-run’ we observe small output losses after most policies, except policies 7 and 4b. The 
latter two policies are the only  ones that succeed in raising aggregate employment in the ‘short-run’. 
Policies 5, 6 and 6b show the worst short-run output evolution, which is again mainly driven by the 
evolution of employment. In the long-run, differences between policies are much more pronounced. 
Rather than employment, the evolution of education and human capital is now crucial. (Remember 
that human capital also attracts physical capital in our model). The strongest ‘long-run’ output 
effects follow from policy 4 (+20.1% after 6 periods), followed by policies 3 and 2. These are also the 
policies that encourage education most. Note that under the assumption of constant participation in 
education (policy 4b), output effects in Figure 10 are much more limited. We also observe strong 
output growth during periods 2, 3 and 4 under policies 6 and 6b, but this growth is not 
persistent 20 .                                           .     
Figure 11 shows the welfare effects of these policy changes for current and future generations. We 
report on the vertical axis the welfare effect on the generation born in t+k, where k is indicated on 
the horizontal axis, and where t is the period when the (permanent, unanticipated) policy change is 
introduced. Our welfare measure is the (constant) percentage change in benchmark consumption in 
each period of remaining life that individuals should get to attain the same lifetime utility as after the 
policy shock (see also King and Rebelo, 1990). To compute this percentage change we keep 
employment rates at the benchmark. For example, concentrating on policy 3, a shift in the weights 
underlying the pension base in favor of the third period (p3) implies a welfare gain for the current 
young (k=0), equal to 1.52% of benchmark consumption. The gain for the current middle-aged and 
                                                        
20
 The announcement of the transition to a fully-funded system, and the perspective of a gradual fall in labor 
taxes during periods 2, 3 and 4, as described in footnote 19, makes individuals work less when young (and work 
more in later periods – at lower tax rates). Young individuals therefore study more, which is good for the 
evolution of human capital, and output. As we report in Table 5, however, this positive education effect is not 
permanent (on the contrary).  
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retired (k = -1, -3) is slightly positive, whereas the current old slightly lose welfare (-0.59% of 
benchmark consumption). All future generations (k>0) gain. For the generation that is young in 
period t+2, for example, policy 3 implies a welfare gain of about 9% of benchmark consumption. 
 
Figure 9. Output level evolution after permanent policy shocks introduced in period 1  
                 (index, benchmark period=0, benchmark output level =1)  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Aggregate employment rate in % after permanent policy shocks introduced in period 1 
(benchmark period=0)  
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Our most interesting findings concern the overall welfare gain for current and (especially) future 
generations following the adoption of policy 4. An increase in the pension replacement rate, 
combined with a higher weight p3 in the computation of the pension base, does not only have 
significant beneficial effects on employment and growth, but also on welfare. This reform results in 
the largest welfare gains when compared to our other policy measures. A comparison of welfare 
effects from policies 4 and 4b reveals, however, the crucial role of policy 4’s strong positive effects 
on growth. This observation is important: neglecting possible effects of pension reform on human 
capital and growth may yield very different conclusions about welfare. The important role of 
endogenous human capital has recently been shown also by Ludwig et al. (2011). Finally, we observe 
the considerable overall welfare losses for current generations following the adoption of policy 6. 
The cost imposed on the transition generations is a well-known problem in policy proposals that 
consider to substitute a fully-funded private system for a PAYG model. Welfare effects on future 
generations are much more positive, however. A different treatment of non-employment benefits in 
policy 6b does not affect these conclusions. Finally, we observe consistently negative welfare effects 
on all generations from moving to basic pensions in policy 5. 
 
Figure 11. Welfare effects for current and future generations after pension reform 
 
Note:  The vertical axis indicates the welfare effect for the generation born in t+k, where t is when  
             the policy change is introduced. The horizontal axis indicates k.  
             For a description of our welfare measure, see the main text. 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the evolution of the current account under the different pension policies.  In the first 
periods after the policy reform, it reveals strong capital outflows in policy 6, which is in line with the 
literature, and inflows in many other policies. In line with our earlier findings, changes in 
employment and human capital (which affect the productivity of physical capital) and savings can 
explain these movements.  In later periods, capital flows under the fully-funded regime are reversed. 
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Figure 12. Current account balance (in % of GDP) after pension reform 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Rising pressure on the welfare state due to ageing is forcing all OECD countries to develop effective 
employment and growth policies, and to reconsider pension and social security systems. This paper 
shows that both tasks are highly related. Pension reform can be an important policy instrument for 
higher employment (mainly of older workers), human capital and growth. 
We build and parameterize a four-period OLG model for an open economy to study hours of work 
among young, middle-aged and older workers, education of the young, the effective retirement age 
of older workers, and aggregate per capita growth, within one coherent framework. We explain 
these endogenous variables as functions of various tax rates, various kinds of government 
expenditures, and key characteristics of the public PAYG pension system. Old-age pensions in our 
model are related to earned labor income over the three periods of active life, but the link between 
pension benefits and earlier labor income (and contributions) may be tight or loose. The government 
can also decide on the weight attached to each of the three active periods in the pension assessment 
base. Finally, we pay particular attention to a realistic modeling of the transition from work to 
retirement. Workers can optimally choose their effective retirement age, and receive early 
retirement benefits. However, the statutory retirement age after which old-age pensions are being 
paid, is exogenous.  
We find that our model explains the facts remarkably well for many OECD countries. We then use the 
model to investigate the effects of various reforms of the pension system. Studying pension reform 
in a model where employment by age, education and human capital, and growth, are all endogenous 
is the main contribution of this paper.  
Our simulation results prefer an intelligent PAYG pension system above a fully-funded private system. 
Key elements of an intelligent PAYG system include: (i) a close link between old-age pensions, and 
individual labor earnings and contributions, via a high pension replacement rate, (ii) a high weight of 
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labor income (i.e. hours worked and human capital) earned as an older worker in the pension 
assessment base. Pension reform in this direction encourages young individuals to study and build 
human capital, which promotes long-run growth. Furthermore, it encourages older individuals to 
work and postpone retirement. Strengthening the link between one’s future old-age pension, on the 
one hand, and one’s human capital and labor supply when older, on the other, introduces strong 
financial incentives which may bring about important changes in behavior. Policy reforms in this 
direction may also raise welfare levels of current and (especially) future generations. Furthermore, 
our results confirm that the partial abolishment of various early retirement regimes, through a 
reduction in the generosity of early retirement benefits or the introduction of more strict eligibility 
criteria for early retirement, substantially stimulates employment of older workers along both the 
intensive and extensive margin. 
Our findings tend to support recent pension reforms in countries like Sweden and Finland. Sweden 
moved from a quite non-actuarial PAYG system to a quasi-actuarial system with individual notional 
accounts (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; OECD, 2005). These accounts establish a close relationship 
between working hours, labor earnings and contributions on the one hand, and future pensions on 
the other, as in the case of a high replacement rate b4a in our model (and a low b4b). Finland 
introduced a system where the pension accrual rate rises with age, which corresponds to the case of 
a rising pj as workers get older in our model (OECD, 2005). There is no support in our model for policy 
changes which imply an extension of the pension assessment base to those years when young 
people may optimally be studying.  
 
We see various possibilities for future research. First, we assume in this paper a constant population 
structure and life length. The implementation of a birth and mortality rate and uncertain life length, 
is left for future research. Second, we assume in this paper homogeneous individuals in each 
generation. The implementation of different ability levels is also left for research in the near future. 
Welfare effects from the policy measures discussed in this paper may be very different for high and 
low ability (wage income) individuals. This may affect policy evaluation.  
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank David de la Croix, Fabian Kindermann, Pierre Pestieau, Dirk Van de gaer, Geert 
Vancronenburg and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments on earlier versions of 
this paper. We have also benefited from comments received at the 2011 OLG Days (Vielsalm, May 
2011), the 10th Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet - Conference in Public Economics (Marseille, June 
2011), the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics (Ghent, July 2011), and 
seminars in Brussels and Louvain. We acknowledge support from the Flemish government 
(Steunpunt Fiscaliteit en Begroting - Vlaanderen) and the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of 
Attraction, initiated by the Belgian State, Federal Office for scientific, technical and cultural affairs, 
contract UAP No. P 6/07. Tim Buyse acknowledges support from the Research Foundation – Flanders 
(FWO). Any remaining errors are ours.  
 Chapter 2 
   51 
References 
Agénor, P.-R. (2008) Fiscal policy and endogenous growth with public infrastructure, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 60, 57–87. 
Altig, D.A., Auerbach, A., Kotlikoff, L., Smetters, K. and Walliser, J. (2001) Simulating fundamental tax 
reform in the United States. American Economic Review 91, 574–595. 
Arcalean, C. and Schiopu, I. (2010) Public versus private investment and growth in a hierarchical 
education system, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34, 604-622. 
Auerbach, A. and Kotlikoff, L. (1987) Dynamic Fiscal Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Auerbach, A., Kotlikoff, L., Hagemann, P. and Nicoletti, G. (1989) The Economic Dynamics of an 
Ageing Population: The Case of Four OECD Countries, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers 62, Economics Department 
Azariadis, C. and Drazen, A. (1990) Threshold Externalities in Economic Development, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 105, 501-526.  
Backus, D., Henriksen, E. and Storesletten, K. (2008) Taxes and the global allocation of capital, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 55, 48-61.  
Barr, N. (2006) Pensions: Overview of the issue, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22, 1-14. 
Barro, R.J. (1990) Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth, Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, S103-125. 
Benhabib, J. and Farmer, R. (1994) Indeterminacy and increasing returns, Journal of Economic Theory, 
63, 19-41. 
Blanchard, O. and Wolfers, J. (2000) The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European 
unemployment: The aggregate evidence, Economic Journal, 110, C1-33. 
Börsch-Supan, A., Ludwig, A. and Winter, J. (2006) Ageing, Pension Reform and Capital Flows: A 
Multi-Country Simulation Model, Economica, 73, 625-658 
Börsch-Supan, A.H. and Ludwig, A. (2010) Old Europe ages: Reforms and Reform Backlashes, NBER 
Working Paper, N° 15744. 
Boucekkine, R. (1995) An alternative methodology for solving non-linear forward-looking models. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19, 711–734. 
Bouzahzah, M., de la Croix, D. and Docquier, F. (2002) Policy reforms and growth in computational 
OLG economies, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26, 2093–2113. 
Brandt, N., Burniaux J.-M. and Duval, R. (2005) Assessing the OECD Jobs Strategy: Past developments 
and reforms, Economics Department Working Paper, No. 429 (annexes). 
Buiter, W.H., and Kletzer, K.M. (1993) Permanent International Productivity Growth Differentials in 
an Integrated Global Economy, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95, 467-493. 
Cigno, A. (2010) How to avoid a pension crisis: a question of intelligent system design, CESIfo 
Economic Studies, 56, 21-37. 
Cremer, H., Lozachmeur, J.-M. and Pestieau, P. (2008) Social Security and Retirement Decision : A 
Positive and Normative Approach, Journal of Economic Surveys, 22, 213-233. 
Chapter 2 
 52 
de la Croix, D., Pierrard, O. and Sneessens, H.R. (2010) Aging and Pensions in General Equilibrium : 
Labor Market Imperfections Matter, IZA Discussion Papers 5276. 
Devereux, M.P., Griffith, R. and Klemm, A. (2002) Corporate income tax reforms and international tax 
competition, Economic Policy, 35, 451-495.  
Dhont, T. and Heylen, F. (2008) Why do Europeans work (much) less? It is taxes and government 
expenditures, Economic Inquiry, 46, 197-207. 
Dhont, T. and Heylen, F. (2009) Employment and growth in Europe and the US: the role of fiscal 
policy composition, Oxford Economic Papers, 61, 538-565. 
Diamond, P. (1965) National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, American Economic Review, 55, 
1126-1150. 
Docquier, F. and Michel, P. (1999) Education subsidies, social security and growth: The implications 
of a demographic shock, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101, 425-440.  
Docquier, F. and Paddison, O. (2003) Social security benefit rules, growth and inequality, Journal of 
Macroeconomics, 25, 47-71. 
Duval, R. (2003) The Retirement Effects of Old-Age Pension and Early Retirement Schemes in OECD 
Countries, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 370. 
Feldstein, M. (1974) Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 
Journal of Political Economy, 82, 905-926. 
Feldstein, M. (2005). Rethinking Social Insurance, American Economic Review, 95, 1-24. 
Fenge R. and Pestieau, P. (2005) Social Security and Early Retirement, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Fernandez Cordon, J.A. (2001) Youth as a transition to full autonomy, Family Observer, No. 3, 4-11. 
Fisher, W.H. and Keuschnigg, C. (2010) Pension reform and labor market incentives, Journal of 
Population Economics, 23, 769-803. 
Fougère, M., Harvey, S., Mercenier, J. and Mérette, M. (2009) Population ageing, time allocation and 
human capital: a general equilibrium analysis for Canada, Economic Modelling, 26(1), p. 30-39 
Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, G. (1992) Public vs. private investment in human capital: Endogenous 
growth and income inequality, Journal of Political Economy, 100, 818-834. 
Gruber, J. and Wise, D. (2002) Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: 
Microestimation, NBER Working Paper, N° 9407. 
Hachon, C. (2010) Do Beveridgian pension systems increase growth, Journal of Population Economics, 
825-831. 
Hanushek, E.A. and Woessmann, L. (2009) Do better schools lead to more growth? Cognitive skills, 
economic outcomes, and causation, NBER Working Paper, N° 14633.  
Heijdra, B. and Romp, W. (2009) Retirement, pensions and ageing, Journal of Public Economics, 93,  
586-604. 
Heylen, F. and Van de Kerckhove, R. (2010) Fiscal policy, employment by age, and growth in OECD 
economies, Paper presented at the 25th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, 
Glasgow, August 2010 (www.sherppa.be). 
Hu, S.C. (1979) Social security, the supply of labor and capital accumulation, American Economic 
Review, 69(3), 274-283. 
 Chapter 2 
   53 
Jaag, C., Keuschnigg, C. and Keuschnigg, M. (2010) Pension reform, retirement, and life-cycle 
unemployment, International Tax and Public Finance, 17, 556-585. 
Juillard, M. (1996) Dynare: A program for the resolution and simulation of dynamic models with 
forward variables through the use of a relaxation algorithm. Working Paper, N° 9602, CEPREMAP. 
Kaganovich, M. and Meier, V. (2008) Social security systems, human capital, and growth in a small 
open economy, CESifo Working Paper, N° 2488. 
Kaganovich, M. and Zilcha, I. (1999) Education, social security and growth, Journal of Public 
Economics, 71, 289-309.  
Kemnitz, A. and Wigger, B.U. (2000) Growth and social security: the role of human capital, European 
Journal of Political Economy, 16, 673-683. 
King, R.G. and Rebelo, S. (1990) Public policy and economic growth: developing neoclassical 
implications, Journal of Political Economy, 98, S126-150. 
Le Garrec, G. (2012) Social security, income inequality and growth, Journal of Pension Economics and 
Finance, 11, 53-70.  
Lindbeck, A. and M. Persson (2003) The gains from pension reform, Journal of Economic Literature, 
41, 74-112. 
Ludwig A., Schelkle T. and Vogel E. (2011) Demographic change, human capital and welfare, Review of 
Economic Dynamics, forthcoming.  
Lucas, R.E. (1988) On the mechanics of economic development, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22, 3-42. 
Nickell, S., Nunziata, L., and Ochel, W. (2005) Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. What do 
we know?, Economic Journal, 115, 1-27. 
OECD (2005) Pensions at a Glance: Public policies across OECD countries, OECD, Paris. 
Ohanian, L., Raffo, A., and Rogerson, R. (2008) Long-term changes in labor supply and taxes: Evidence 
from OECD countries, 1956-2004, Journal of Monetary Economics, 55, 1353-1362.  
Reyneri, E. (1994) Italy: A long wait in the shelter of the family and of safeguards from the State in: O. 
Benoit-Guilbot and D. Gaillie (eds.), Long-term Unemployment, London, Pinter, 97-110. 
Rogerson, R. (2007) Taxation and market work: Is Scandinavia an outlier?, NBER Working Paper, N° 
12890. 
Rogerson, R. and Wallenius, J. (2009) Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 2277-2292. 
Salomäki, A. (2003) Remain in or withdraw from the labour market? A comparative study on  
incentives, European Economy Economic Papers, N° 193. 
Samuelson, P.A. (1958) An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest, With or Without the Social 
Contrivance of Money, Journal of Political Economy, 66, 467-482. 
Sánchez Martín, A. (2010) Endogenous Retirement and Public Pension System Reform in Spain, 
Economic Modelling, 27, 336-349. 
Sheshinski, E. (1978) A Model of Social Security and Retirement Decisions, Journal of Public 
Economics, 10, 337-360. 
Stokey, N.L. and Rebelo, S. (1995) Growth effects of flat-rate taxes, Journal of Political Economy, 103, 
519-550. 
Chapter 2 
 54 
Turnovsky, S.J. (2000) Fiscal policy, elastic labor supply, and endogenous growth, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 45, 185-210. 
Whiteford, P. and Whitehouse, E. (2006) Pension Challenges and Pension Reforms in OECD Countries, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(1), 78-94. 
Whitehouse, E., D’Addio, A., Chomik, R. And Reilly, A. (2009) Two decades of pension reform: What 
has been achieved and what remains to be done, The Geneva Papers, 34, 515-535.  
Woessman, L. (2003) Schooling resources, educational institutions and student performance: the 
international evidence, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 65, 117-170. 
Zhang, J. (1995) Social security and endogenous growth, Journal of Public Economics, 58, 185-213. 
Zhang, J. and Zhang, J. (2003) Long-run effects of unfunded social security with earnings-dependent 
benefits, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28, 617-641.  
  
 Chapter 2 
   55 
Appendix: Construction of data and data sources 
In this appendix we provide more detail on the construction of some of our performance variables 
and policy variables.  
 
Employment rate in hours (in one of three age groups, 1995-2007) 
Definition: total actual hours worked by individuals in the age group / potential hours worked. 
Actual hours worked = total employment in persons x average hours worked per week x average 
number of weeks worked per year 
Potential hours = total population in the age group x 2080 (where 2080 = 52 weeks per year x 40 
hours per week) 
Data sources:  
* Total employment in the age group / total population in the age group: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics by Sex and Age. Data are available for many age groups, among which 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 
45-49, 50-54, 55-64. We constructed the data for our three age groups as weighted averages. 
* Average hours worked per week: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics, Average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job. These data are available only for age groups 15-24, 25-54, 55-64. We use 
the OECD data for the age group 15-24 as a proxy for our age subgroup 20-24, the OECD data for the 
age group 25-54 as a proxy for our age (sub)groups 25-34, 35-49 and 50-54. 
* Average number of weeks worked per year: Due to lack of further detail, we use the same data for 
each age group. The average number of weeks worked per year has been approximated by dividing 
average annual hours actually worked per worker (total employment) by average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job by all workers (total employment). Data source: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics, Hours worked. 
 
Education rate of the young (age group 20-34, 1995-2006) 
Definition: total hours studied by individuals of age 20-34 / potential hours studied 
As a proxy we have computed the ratio:  20 34 20 24 25 34 20 340 5 0 25fts . pts . pts / pop      
with:  fts the number of full-time students in the age group 20-34 
           pts the number of part-time students in the age groups 20-24 and 25-34. 
           pop total population of age 20-34 
Full-time students are assumed to spend all their time studying. For part-time students of age 20-24 
we make the assumption (for all countries) that they spend 50% of their time studying, part-time 
students of age 25-34 are assumed to spend 25% of their time studying. Due to the limited number 
of part-time students, these specific weights matter very little.  
Data sources:  
* Full-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes, full-time)  
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* Part-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes). We subtracted the data for full-
time students from those for ‘full-time and part-time students’.  
Data are available in 1995-2006. However, for many countries (quite) some years are missing. Period 
averages are computed on the basis of all available annual data.  
 
Average effective retirement age (1995-2006) 
Definition: Average age of all persons (being 40 or older) withdrawing from the labor force in a given 
period.   
Data sources: 
* OECD, Ageing and Employment Policies – Statistics on average effective age of retirement 
 
Annual real potential per capita GDP growth rate (aggregate, 1995-2007) 
Definition: Annual growth rate of real potential GDP per person of working age 
Data sources:  
* real potential GDP: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, supply block, series GDPVTR. 
*population at working age: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, labour markets, series 
POPT. 
 
Tax rate on labor income (1, 2, 3) 
Definition: Total tax wedge, marginal tax rate in %. The data cover personal income taxes, employee 
and employer social security contributions payable on wage earnings and payroll taxes.  
Data source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, Financial and Fiscal Affairs, Taxing Wages, Comparative 
tax rates and benefits (new definition). 
The OECD publishes these tax data for several family and income situations. We computed 1 as the 
average of marginal tax rates for (i) a one-earner married couple at 100% of average earnings (2 
children), (ii) a two-earner married couple, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 33% (2 
children), (iii) a single person at 67% of average earnings (no child) and (iv) a single person at 100% of 
average earnings (no child). We computed 2  and 3 as the average of tax rates for (i) a one-earner 
married couple at 100% of average earnings (2 children), (ii) a two-earner married couple, one at 
100 % of average earnings and the other at 67% (2 children), (iii) a single person at 100% of average 
earnings (no child) and (iv) a single person at 167% of average earnings (no child). The reported data 
concern 2000-2002. 
 
Government debt (Dt) 
Definition: General government gross financial liabilities.  
Data source: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, N° 89, Government Accounts. 
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Net benefit replacement rates (b1, b2, b3a) 
Definition: The data concern net transfers received by long-term unemployed people and include 
social assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also 
include unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, 
i.e. if workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit 
eligibility. The data are expressed in % of after-tax wages. The OECD provides net replacement rates 
for six family situations and three earnings levels. In line with our assumptions for labor tax rates (see 
above), we computed b1 as the average of the net benefit replacement rates for ‘families’ with 
earnings levels corresponding to 67% and 100% of the average worker’s wage (AW). We computed b2 
as the average of the net benefit replacement rates for ‘families’ with earnings levels corresponding 
to 100% and 167% of the average worker’s wage. The reported data are averages for 2001 and 2004. 
We assume b3a to be equal to b2. 
Data source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
Data adjustment: Original OECD data for Norway include the so-called “waiting benefit” 
(ventestønad), which a person could get after running out of unemployment benefits. Given the 
conditional nature of these “waiting benefits”, they do not match our definition of benefits paid to 
structurally non-employed individuals. We have therefore deducted them from the OECD data in 
earlier years, which led to a reduction of net replacement rates by about 19 percentage points. For 
example, recipients should demonstrate high regional mobility and willingness to take a job 
anywhere in Norway. The “waiting benefit” was terminated in 2008. We thank Tatiana Gordine at 
the OECD for clarifying this issue with us.   
 
Early retirement replacement rates (b3b) 
To calculate our proxy for b3b we have focused on the possibility for older workers in some countries 
to leave the labor market along fairly generous early retirement routes. Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. 
(2005) provide data for the so-called implicit tax rate on continued work for five more years in the 
early retirement route at age 55 and age 60. The idea is as follows. If an individual stops working 
(instead of continuing for five more years), he receives a benefit (early retirement, disability…) and 
no longer pays contributions for his future pension. A potential disadvantage is that he may receive a 
lower pension later, since he contributed less during active life. Duval (2003) calculated the 
difference between the present value of the gains and the costs of early retirement, in percent of 
gross earnings before retirement. We use his data as a proxy for the gross benefit replacement rate 
for older workers in the early retirement route. To compute the net benefit replacement rate, we 
assume the same tax rate on early retirement benefits as on unemployment benefits. We call this 
net benefit replacement rate r3. However, these implicit tax rates are only very rough estimates of 
the real incentive to retire embedded in early retirement schemes and are subject to important 
caveats (Duval, 2003). “First, the focus on a single “early retirement route” leaves aside the 
participation effects of a number of other social transfer programs that may actually be used as early 
retirement devices. Second, the actual strictness of eligibility criteria for these programs is imperfectly 
reflected in the calculations. For instance, even in those countries for which it has been assumed that 
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retirement on account of disability is not […] an available option, due to the official strictness of 
eligibility criteria, the share of disability benefit status in non employment actually grew significantly 
during the second half of the 1990s (e.g. Sweden, United States).” (Duval, 2003, p. 15). In sum, the 
available implicit tax rates take into account neither the strictness of eligibility criteria nor the 
presence of alternative social transfer programs that may de facto be used as early retirement 
devices. Our assumption will be that a realistic replacement rate for the early retirement route (b3b) 
will be a weighted average of r3 and b3a, where we take the latter as a proxy for the replacement rate 
in alternative social transfer programs. If r3 > b3a, older workers will aim for the official early 
retirement route, but they may not all meet eligibility criteria and have to fall back on alternative 
programs. If r3 < b3a, workers will aim for the alternative, but again they may not be eligible. We 
propose that b3b = ξb3a + (1-ξ)r3. Underlying the data in Table 4 is the assumption that ξ=0.5.  
Correlation between b3b and r3 is 0.95. Cross-country differences roughly remain intact. Clearly, our 
results in the main text do not depend in any serious way on this assumption for ξ.  
Data Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Duval (2003), 
Brandt et al. (2005).  
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Abstract 
We study the effects of pension reform in a four-period OLG model for an open economy where 
hours worked by three active generations, education of the young, the retirement decision of older 
workers, and aggregate growth, are all endogenous. Within each generation we distinguish 
individuals with high, medium or low ability to build human capital. This extension allows to 
investigate also the effects of pension reform on the income and welfare levels of different ability 
groups. Particular attention goes to the income at old-age and the welfare level of low-ability 
individuals.  
Our simulation results prefer an intelligent pay-as-you-go pension system above a fully-funded 
private system. When it comes to promoting employment, human capital, growth, and aggregate 
welfare, positive effects in a pay-as-you-go system are the strongest when it includes a tight link 
between individual labor income (and contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high 
weight to labor income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Such a 
regime does, however, imply welfare losses for the current low-ability generations, and rising 
inequality in welfare. Complementing or replacing this ‘intelligent’ pay-as-you-go system by basic 
and/or minimum pension components is negative for aggregate welfare, employment and growth. 
Better is to maintain the tight link between individual labor income and the pension also for low-
ability individuals, but to strongly raise their replacement rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Concern for the long-run financial viability of public pension systems has put pension reform high on 
the agenda of policy makers and researchers. The past two decades have seen a wave of reforms in 
many countries (Whitehouse et al., 2009). At the same time the literature on pension economics has 
grown rapidly (see e.g. Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Barr, 2006; Fenge et al., 2008; and many recent 
papers that we refer to below). To face the pension challenge, there seems to be general agreement 
on the need for higher employment, especially among older individuals, and higher productivity 
growth. Many studies have documented how the pension system may affect the incentives of 
individuals of different ages to work (e.g. Sheshinski, 1978; Auerbach et al., 1989; Gruber and Wise, 
2002; Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2010; Sommacal, 2006; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; Jaag et al., 
2010; de la Croix et al., 2010). Others have investigated the relationship between the pension system 
and investment in human capital formation, as a major determinant of productivity growth (e.g. 
Zhang, 1995; Kemnitz and Wigger, 2000; Zhang and Zhang, 2003; Kaganovich and Meier, 2008; 
Cremer et al., 2011; Le Garrec, 2012). Still others have demonstrated the crucial role of human 
capital formation to counteract the negative effects of population ageing on per capita output (e.g. 
Docquier and Michel, 1999; Ludwig et al., 2012). Consensus on what pension reform would serve the 
goals of higher employment, productivity growth, and welfare best, has however not been reached. 
The results in some papers support parametric adjustments in the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system that 
most countries rely on. Other papers prefer a gradual move to an actuarially neutral fully-funded 
private system. Often, differences in the particular specification of the model economy that is used 
for the analysis may explain the differences in results (Buyse et al., 2013). 
The above-mentioned literature has strongly improved our understanding of the effects of pension 
systems on employment, education and growth. Still, it is limited in some respects. First of all, about 
all existing studies either investigate incentives to work in a model with exogenous human capital 
and growth, or investigate human capital and growth while ignoring the labor-leisure choice and the 
endogeneity of labor supply. Buyse et al. (2013) and Ludwig et al. (2012) are exceptions1. These two 
studies also clearly demonstrate the importance of modelling the many mutual relationships 
between key variables. For example, if policy can make people postpone retirement and work longer, 
the return to investment in education will rise, and so may human capital and growth. Conversely, 
policies that promote education will also encourage people to work longer since they will then get a 
higher return from their investment. Also, if pension reform discourages employment of the young, it 
may still be positive if this contributes to education and growth. For a proper assessment of the 
effects of pension reform it is important to take such interactions into account.  
 Second, with the exception of Sommacal (2006) and Cremer et al. (2011) who distinguishes 
exogenous fractions of skilled and unskilled workers, the above mentioned literature disregards 
differences in abilities and capacity of people to learn. Models with education and growth typically 
assume that everyone is able to study and succeed in education. Reality is different, however. Data 
                                                        
1
 Ludwig et al. (2012) develop a model with endogenous employment by age and human capital, but they have 
exogenous growth. Buyse et al. (2013) also have endogenous growth.  
 Chapter 3 
 
 63 
reveal that in 2008 about 30% of the 25-64 year old population on average in the OECD had no upper 
secondary degree. About 44% had an upper secondary degree but no tertiary degree. The fraction of 
people with a tertiary degree therefore remained below 30%. Among young cohorts, educational 
attainment is higher. Yet, the fraction that does not complete upper secondary education is still 
about 20% on average. About 40% obtains an upper secondary degree, but no tertiary degree. More 
or less another 40% completes both secondary and tertiary education (OECD, Education at a Glance, 
Tables A1, A2.2, A3.2). The simple fact that innate ability as for example reflected by IQ varies across 
people, implies that one can never expect everyone to succeed at the secondary, let alone the 
tertiary level.  
In this paper we study pension reform in a general equilibrium four-period OLG model where hours 
of work of young, middle aged and older individuals, education and human capital formation of the 
young, the retirement decision of the older generation, and aggregate per capita growth are all 
endogenous. We build on our earlier work in Buyse et al. (2013). The model includes a public PAYG 
old-age pension system which pays out pensions to a fourth generation of retired. The statutory 
retirement age in the model is 65 and exogenous. Old-age pensions are paid from this age onwards. 
Individuals, however, may optimally choose a lower effective (early) retirement age. They then 
receive early retirement benefits. Our main innovation in this paper is to introduce heterogeneous 
abilities. We make the assumption that within each generation three ability groups exist. These 
groups differ both in the degree to which they (when young) assimilate existing knowledge, i.e. 
inherit human capital from the middle aged generation, and in their productivity of schooling when 
they spend time studying. One group has low ability. They inherit relatively little human capital from 
the middle aged generation, and will never engage in tertiary education. They will only work or have 
‘leisure’. A second group has medium ability, a third group high ability. These groups inherit higher 
fractions of existing human capital, and do allocate time to tertiary education. Given the variation 
between them in the productivity of schooling, this amount of time will differ, however.  
Our aim is then to investigate the effects of various parametric adjustments in the old-age PAYG 
pension system on the employment rate of young, middle aged and older workers, education, 
growth and welfare. These parametric adjustments include changes in benefit levels, changes in the 
link between benefits and individual contributions, and changes in the weights of the three active 
periods in the computation of the old-age pension assessment base, i.e. earned labor income used to 
calculate pension benefits. We also consider the effects of moving to full private capital funding. An 
advantage of realistically introducing heterogeneous abilities, and therefore an important 
contribution of this paper, is that we will be able to study differential effects of pension reform on 
the income and welfare levels of individuals with different abilities and human capital. Particular 
attention goes to the income at old-age and the welfare level of the low-ability individuals. The link 
to a major issue as old-age poverty (see e.g. Kidd and Whitehouse, 2009) is obvious.  
Our results prefer an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system above a fully-funded private system. When it comes 
to promoting employment, human capital, growth, and aggregate welfare, we find positive effects in 
a PAYG system to be the strongest when it includes a tight link between individual labor income (and 
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contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor income earned as an 
older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Pension reform in this direction encourages 
young individuals to study and build human capital, which promotes long-run growth. Furthermore, 
it encourages older workers to postpone retirement. Strengthening the link between one’s future 
old-age pension, on the one hand, and one’s human capital and labor supply when older, on the 
other, introduces strong financial incentives which may bring about important changes in behavior. 
In this sense, our results fully confirm those of Buyse et al. (2013). However, our paper also sharply 
clarifies the limitations of neglecting heterogeneity in people’s ability. We find that the above 
described ‘intelligent’ PAYG system implies welfare losses for the current low-ability generations who 
cannot study and who earn low wages. Aggregate welfare inequality rises strongly. Complementing 
or replacing this system by basic and/or minimum pension components promotes welfare of the 
current and (maybe some) future low-ability generations, but it is negative for aggregate welfare, 
employment and growth. Labor supply and employment among low-ability individuals in particular 
fall sharply. Better is to maintain the tight link between individual labor income and the pension also 
for low-ability individuals, but to significantly raise their replacement rate.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we document differences in employment by age, 
education of the young, the effective retirement age, and per capita growth across 13 OECD 
countries since 1995. Section 3 sets out our model. Next to the pension system, we introduce a role 
for education quality as well as a rich fiscal policy block. The government in the model sets tax rates 
on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its revenue to productive expenditures (mainly for 
education), consumption, ‘non-employment’ benefits (including early retirement benefits), old-age 
pensions, and interest payments on outstanding debt. In Section 4 we calibrate the model on actual 
data and confront its predictions with the facts described in Section 2. Section 5 includes the results 
of a range of model simulations. We investigate the steady state employment, education and growth 
effects of various reforms of the pension system. We also study welfare effects per generation and 
per ability group. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
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2. Cross-country differences in employment, tertiary education and per capita growth 
 
Table 1  
Employment rate in hours ( ) by age, effective retirement age, education rate ( ) and per capita 
growth in OECD countries (1995-2006/7)  
 
   
(20-34) 
   
(35-49) 
   
(50-64) 
Effective 
retirement 
age 
 
  
Annual real per 
capita growth 
       
Austria 59.9 64.3 34.7 59.5 12.5 2.06 
Belgium 51.1 56.8 29.3 57.9 14.1 1.77 
France 48.7 60.3 38.0 58.8 14.9 1.54 
Germany 49.7 55.2 34.9 61.1 17.2 1.56 
Italy 50.1 61.9 33.8 60.1 12.6 1.30 
Netherlands 50.8 54.6 34.2 60.0 14.7 2.20 
Core euro 
area 
average 
 
51.7 58.8 34.2 59.6 14.3 1.74 
Denmark 56.2 66.7 49.6 62.2 21.7 1.81 
Finland 55.6 69.0 47.3 60.2 23.1 2.72 
Norway 51.9 60.9 50.6 63.1 18.1 2.29 
Sweden 53.6 66.1 55.4 63.4 17.7 2.18 
Nordic 
Average 
 
54.3 65.6 50.7 62.2 20.2 2.25 
US 65.6 74.2 59.6 64.2 12.8 1.54 
       
UK 60.8 68.4 49.4 62.0 12.3 2.13 
Canada 60.9 69.5 50.4 62.1 13.6 1.68 
       
All country 
Average 
55.0 63.7 43.6 61.1 15.8 1.91 
Data sources: OECD (see Appendix A); data description: see main text and Appendix A. The data for 
employment and growth concern 1995-2007, those for education 1995-2006. The effective retirement age is 
an average for 1995-2006. All data are in percent, except the retirement age. 
 
Table 1 contains key data on employment, education and growth in 13 OECD countries in 1995-2007. 
One would like a reliable model to match the main cross-country differences reported here. The 
employment rate in hours ( ) indicates the fraction of potential hours that are actually being worked 
by the average person in one of three age groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64). Comparable data for hours 
worked by ability type (skill level) are not available. Potential hours are 2080 per person per year (52 
weeks times 40 hours per week). The observed employment rate rises if more people in an age group 
have a job, and if the employed work more hours. The employment rate in the age group of 50 to 64 
is also affected by the average age at which older workers withdraw from the labor force. We include 
the effective retirement age in the Table. In most countries, this age is well below the official age to 
receive old-age pensions (65 in most countries, 60 in France and Italy). The education rate ( ) is our 
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proxy for the fraction of time spent studying by the average person of age 20-34. It has been 
calculated as the total number of students in full-time equivalents, divided by total population in this 
age group. Our data for (average annual) real per capita growth concern real potential GDP per 
person of working age. We refer to Appendix A for details on the calculation of our data, and on the 
assumptions that we have to make. 
As is well-known, middle aged individuals work most hours, followed by the young. The older 
generation works the lowest number of hours. Average employment rates across countries in these 
three age groups are 55.0%, 63.7% and 43.6% respectively. Furthermore, the data reveal strong 
cross-country differences. We observe the highest employment rates in each age group in the US. 
Employment rates are much lower in the core countries of the euro area. The Nordic countries take 
intermediate positions, although they are close to the core euro area for the younger generation. 
The latter, however, seems to be related to education. Young people’s effective participation in 
education is also by far the highest in the Nordic countries. These countries also show the highest 
potential per capita growth rates. On average, growth in the core euro area and the US was more 
than 0.5 percentage points lower in the period under consideration. The US and the other Anglo-
Saxon countries tend to have the lowest participation in education among people of age 20 to 34. 
Finally, we note that the effective retirement age also varies across countries. The retirement age is 
quite low in Belgium (57.9) and France (58.8). By contrast, individuals in Nordic or Anglo-Saxon 
countries participate longer. Unsurprisingly, correlation between the effective retirement age and 
the employment rate among older workers (  ) is very high (0.89).   
 
3. The model 
Our analytical framework consists of a computable four-period OLG-model for a small open 
economy. We assume perfect international mobility of physical capital but immobile labor and 
human capital. Seminal work in the OLG tradition has been done by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond 
(1965). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) initiated the study of public finance shocks in a computable 
OLG model. Buiter and Kletzer (1993) developed an open economy version of the model with 
endogenous growth, putting human capital at the centre. As we have documented in Section 1, a 
large literature has used OLG models to study the behavioral effects of the pension system either on 
employment assuming exogenous growth, or on human capital and growth ignoring the labor-leisure 
choice and assuming exogenous employment. New in this paper is that we explain both employment 
by age, and human capital and growth as jointly endogenous variables and that we realistically take 
into account differences in individuals’ innate abilities. 
 
We consider three active adult generations, the young, the middle aged and the older, and one 
generation of retired agents. Within each generation we assume three types of individuals with 
different ability a to build human capital: a group  with high ability, a group  with medium ability 
and a group    with low ability. The last group will never enter into tertiary education. We assume 
that the three ability groups are of equal size, and so are the different generations. We normalize 
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each ability group to 1, so that the size of a generation is 3, and total population is 12, and constant2. 
Individuals enter the model at age 20. Each period is modeled to last for 15 years. High and medium 
ability young people can choose either to work and generate labor income, to study and build human 
capital, or to devote time to ‘leisure’ (including other non-market activities). Low ability young 
individuals and all middle aged and older workers do not study anymore, they only work or have 
‘leisure’. The statutory old-age retirement age in our model is 65. Individuals may however optimally 
choose to leave the labor force sooner in a regime of early retirement.  
 
Output is produced by domestic firms which act competitively and employ physical capital together 
with existing technology and effective labor provided by the three active generations. A final 
important assumption is that education generates a positive externality in the sense of Azariadis and 
Drazen (1990). Each young generation inherits a fraction of the average level of human capital of a 
middle aged generation. The higher an individual’s ability, the larger the fraction he inherits. In what 
follows, we concentrate on the core elements of the model: the optimizing behavior of individuals, 
the production and inheritance of effective human capital, the behavior of domestic firms and the 
determination of aggregate output and growth, capital and wages.    
 
3.1. Individuals 
An individual with ability   (       ) reaching age 20 in period t maximizes an intertemporal 
utility function of the form: 
 
  
  ∑     (     
  
  
   
(   
 )
   
)                          (1) 
 
with                  (   ) and where we shall impose that 
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          (4) 
   
    and    
   .   
  
Superscript t indicates the period of youth, when the individual comes into the model. Subscript j 
refers to the jth period of life and a refers to the ‘ability type’. Lifetime utility depends on 
consumption (   
 ) and enjoyed leisure (   
 ) in each period of life. The intertemporal elasticity of 
                                                        
2
 Assuming demography and population to be constant may seem strange given that ageing is a crucial factor 
behind pension reform in many countries. Note however that this assumption is not uncommon (see also Jaag 
et al., 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; Buyse et al., 2013). Moreover, and most importantly, it need not be a 
limitation to disentangle behavioral effects from different routes of pension reform. 
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substitution in consumption is 1, the intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 
 
 
. Finally,   is the 
discount factor and  specifies the relative value of leisure versus consumption. The preference 
parameters       and    do not depend on ability type. Note, however, that    may be different in 
each period of life. Except for the latter assumption, our specification of the instantaneous utility 
function is quite common in the macro literature (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Rogerson, 2007).  
 
Figure 1. Life-cycle of an individual of generation t and ability a 
 
     
 
Period t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Work    
     
     
    
  ̃  
  0 
Study    
   0 0 0 
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 (   ̃  
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 Note:    
   . 
 
Equations (2)-(4) describe the individual’s enjoyed leisure in each of the four periods of his life. For a 
proper understanding we summarize his life-cycle in Figure 1. Time endowment in each period is 
normalized to 1. Next to leisure, individuals devote time to work (   
 ) in their three active periods 
and to education (   
 ) when young. In the first period of active life, leisure therefore falls in labor 
supply and in education time. Only the low ability individuals do not study (   
   ). In the second 
and third period leisure falls in labor supply only. A key element in the individuals’ optimal choice of 
leisure time in the third period of life (50-65) is the determination of early retirement. Individuals 
choose   
  which relates to the optimal effective retirement age and which is defined as the fraction 
of time between age 50 and 65 that the individual participates in the labor market; (     
 ) is then 
time in early retirement. We use    
  to denote the fraction of time devoted to work between 50 and 
65, and  ̃  
  as the fraction of time devoted to work before early retirement, but after 50. As labor 
market exit is irreversible and post-retirement employment is not allowed in our model, the 
relationship between use    
  and  ̃  
  is as follows:    
    
   ̃  
 . In the third period, leisure time 
thus consists of two parts: non-employment time before the effective retirement age   
 (   ̃  
 ), 
and time in early retirement after it (     
 ). Equation (4) then describes composite enjoyed leisure 
of an older worker as a CES-function of both parts (see also Buyse et al., 2013). We assume imperfect 
substitutability between the two leisure types. The idea here is that leisure time after and between 
periods of work is not the same as leisure time in periods when individuals are not economically 
20              35             50                 65                 80 
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active anymore.3 Equation (4) expresses that individuals prefer to have a balanced combination of 
both rather than an ‘extreme’ amount of one of them (and very little of the other). In this equation   
is the constant elasticity of substitution,   is a usual share parameter and Γ is added as a 
normalization constant such that the magnitude of    
  corresponds to the magnitude of total leisure 
time (     
 ). The latter assumption allows to interpret    as the relative value of leisure versus 
consumption in the third period, comparable to    and   . The main results in this paper are not in 
any way influenced by the magnitude of  ,   or  . 
 
Individuals will choose consumption, labor supply and education to maximize Equation (1), subject to 
Equations (2)-(4) and the constraints described in (5)-(13). Equations (5)-(8) describe the individuals’ 
dynamic budget constraints. The LHS of these equations shows that individuals allocate their 
disposable income to consumption (including consumption taxes,   ) and the accumulation of non-
human wealth. In each equation we denote by    
  the stock of wealth held by a type   individual 
who enters the model at time t at the end of his jth period of life. Equations (5) and (8) respectively 
indicate that individuals start and finish adult life with zero assets. During the three periods of active 
life, disposable income at the RHS includes after-tax labor income, non-employment benefits, 
interest income and lump sum transfers. In each equation,     stands for the real wage per unit of 
effective labor supplied at time k by an individual with ability a,    is the exogenous (world) real 
interest rate at time k, and    is the lump sum transfer that the government pays out to all 
individuals at time k. Effective labor of an individual with ability a depends on hours worked (   
 ) and 
effective human capital (   
 ). Given the tax rate on labor income   , young individuals earn an after-
tax real wage equal to       
    
 (    ). After-tax labor income when middle aged and older in 
Equations (6) and (7) are determined similarly.  
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For the fraction of time that young, middle aged and older individuals are inactive, they receive a 
non-employment benefit from the government. Older workers may be eligible to two kinds of 
                                                        
3
 The former may be particularly valuable from the perspective of relaxation and time to spend on personal 
activities of short duration. The latter may be valuable to enjoy activities which take more time and ask for 
longer term commitment (e.g. long journeys, non-market activity as a volunteer).  
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benefits: standard non-employment benefits (analogous to what young and middle aged workers 
receive) as long as they are on the labor market, and early retirement benefits after having 
withdrawn from the labor market. All benefits are defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a 
full-time worker. The net replacement rate for standard non-employment benefits is  , for early 
retirement benefits it is    
4   
After the statutory retirement age (65) individuals have no labor income and no non-employment 
benefits anymore. They then receive an old-age pension benefit (   
 ) and the lump sum transfer. 
Equation (9) describes the old-age pension. We assume a public PAYG pension system in which 
pensions in period k are financed by contributions (labor taxes) from the active generations in that 
period k (see below). Individual net pension benefits consist of two components. A first one is related 
to the individual’s earlier net labor income. It is a fraction of his so-called pension base, i.e. a 
weighted average of revalued net labor income in each of the three active periods of life. The net 
replacement rate is    . The parameters       and    represent the weights attached to each 
period. This part of the pension rises in the individual’s hours of work   
  and his human capital    
 . 
It will be lower when the individual retires early (lower   
 ). Thanks to revaluation, this part of the 
net pension is adjusted to increases in the overall standard of living between the time that workers 
build their pension entitlements and the time that they receive the pension. We assume that past 
earnings are revalued in line with economy-wide wage growth   and hence follow practice in many 
OECD countries (OECD, 2005; Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006).5 The second component of the 
pension is a flat-rate or basic pension. Every retiree receives the same amount related to average net 
labor income in the economy at the time of retirement. This assumption assures that also basic 
pensions rise in line with productivity. Here, the net replacement rate is    . Fourth generation 
individuals consume their pension and the lump sum transfer, as well as their accumulated wealth 
from the third period plus interest (Equation 8). They leave no debts, nor bequests. 
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4
 Our approach to model early retirement benefits as a function of a worker’s last labor income, similar to 
standard non-employment benefits, reflects regulation and/or common practice in many countries. In some 
countries (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands) workers can enter the early retirement regime only from 
employment, with their benefits being linked to the last wage. In other countries (e.g. Denmark) there is only 
access from unemployment, with the early retirement benefit being linked to the unemployment benefit. As to 
common practice, Duval (2003) confirms that in many countries, unemployment-related or disability benefits 
can be used de facto to bridge the time between the effective retirement age and old-age pension eligibility. 
Again there is a link between benefits and former wages. 
5
 We explain economy-wide wage growth in Section 3.3. Individuals take it as exogenous. 
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Note that we allow ability-specific pension replacement rates     and    . This specification is in 
line with the data in many countries, which show that the importance of own-income related versus 
flat components may be very different depending on people’s earned income, and therefore ability 
(see Section 4.2. and Table 5 below). For other policy variables like labor tax rates such differences 
are much smaller (Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010). The introduction of ability-specific pension 
replacement rates also allows a richer policy analysis. 
 
Equations (10) and (11) describe the intergenerational transfer of human capital. At the age of 20 a 
young worker with ability  inherits a fraction   of the average effective human capital of the middle 
aged generation. A young worker with ability  enters our model with only a fraction     , a young 
worker with ability   enters with an even lower fraction    . Lower ability may imply more difficulty 
to learn and accumulate knowledge at primary and secondary school (Azariadis and de la Croix, 2002 
and Cremer et al., 2011). During their second and third period, workers supply more units of 
effective human capital. It is our assumption in Equation (12) that    
 , and therefore labor 
productivity, rise in education time when young (   
 ), productive government spending in percent of 
GDP (  , mainly education spending) and an overall quality of schooling parameter ( ). Individuals 
take    and   to be exogenous. Note that the human capital accumulation function itself (  ) also 
depends on innate ability. We specify and discuss effective human capital production and human 
capital inheritance in greater detail in Section 3.2. Finally, we assume in Equation (13) that human 
capital remains unchanged between the second and the third period. We have in mind that learning 
by doing in work may counteract depreciation. 
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Substituting Equations (2)-(4) for    
  and (5)-(8) for    
  into (1), and maximizing with respect to 
   
     
     
     
     
   ̃  
    
  and    
 , yields eight first order conditions for the optimal behavior of 
an individual with ability a entering the model at time t. Equation (14) expresses the law of motion of 
optimal consumption over the lifetime. Equations (15.a), (15.b) and (15.c) describe the optimal labor-
leisure choice in each period of active live. Individuals supply labor up to the point where the 
marginal utility of leisure equals the marginal utility gain from work. The latter consists of two parts. 
Working more hours in a particular period raises additional resources for consumption both in that 
period and when retired. The marginal utility gain from work rises when the marginal utility of 
consumption (     
 ) is higher, and when an extra hour of work yields more extra consumption. 
Higher human capital (and its underlying determinants), lower taxes on labor, lower taxes on 
consumption and lower non-employment benefits contribute to the gain from work. Extra 
consumption during retirement rises in the own-income- related pension replacement rate (   ), in 
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the weight attached to the relevant period when computing the pension base (  ), and in the 
revaluation parameters. Equations (15.a)-(15.c) highlight positive substitution effects from the 
pension replacement rate    . To the extent that higher replacement rates raise individuals’ 
consumption possibilities (   
 ), they also cause adverse income effects on labor supply. Basic 
pensions (   ) do not directly occur in Equations (15), but they do affect employment via this income 
effect. 
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Equation (16) describes the first order condition for the optimal effective retirement age. The LHS 
represents the utility loss from postponing retirement. Later retirement reduces enjoyed leisure as 
early retiree, but raises enjoyed leisure in between periods of work for given work time  ̃  
 . The RHS 
shows the marginal utility gain from postponing retirement. This marginal gain follows from 
consuming the extra labor income (vis-à-vis the early retirement benefit) in the third period, and the 
higher future old-age pension after 65. The latter effect rises in     and   . 
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Finally, Equation (17) imposes for high and medium ability individuals that the marginal utility loss 
from investing in human capital when young equals the total discounted marginal utility gain in later 
periods from having more human capital. Individuals will study more the higher future versus current 
after-tax real wages and the higher the marginal return of education to human capital (
   
    
 )  Labor 
taxes during youth therefore encourage individuals to study, whereas labor taxes in later periods of 
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active life discourage them. Notice also that high benefit replacement rates in later periods, and a 
high income-related pension replacement rate (   ), combined with high weights    and   , will 
encourage young individuals to study. The reason is that any future benefits and the future pension 
rise in future labor income, and therefore human capital. A final interesting result is that young 
people study more – all other things equal – if they expect to work harder in later periods (    
 , 
   
    
   ̃  
 ). 
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It will be obvious from the above discussion that (for a given way of financing) the specific 
organization of pension benefits may have strong effects on behavior in earlier periods of life. Both 
income and substitution effects occur. The latter are particularly rich when pensions are linked to 
individuals’ own labor income. A higher replacement rate     raises the return to working ( , for all 
ability groups) and to building human capital (     for high and medium-ability individuals) in earlier 
periods. Changes in the particular weight attached to these earlier periods may modify these 
incentive effects. The return to education will rise in    and   , but fall in   . The return to working 
in the third period will rise in   , etc. Policy makers may change all these parameters. We investigate 
the effects of policy interventions in Section 5.  
 
3.2. Inheritance and production of effective human capital  
Equations (10) and (11) above assume that when entering the model young workers with high ability 
inherit a fraction    of the average effective human capital of the middle aged generation. The value 
of    is to be calibrated. Individuals with medium and lower ability inherit less (       ). OECD 
PISA scores leave no doubt. On average over the 13 countries that we focus on in this paper, the test 
scores for science of students at the 17th and the 50th percentiles are 67.3% and 83.7% respectively of 
the test score of students at the 83th percentile. We take these numbers as proxies for    and    (see 
also Section 4). After entering the model, young individuals may decide to study and accumulate 
more human capital. The specification and parameterization of the human capital production 
function  ( ) 
in Equation (12) is often a problem in numerical endogenous growth models. In 
contrast to goods production functions, there is not much empirical evidence and no consensus 
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about the determinants of human capital growth, nor about the underlying functional form and 
parameter values. The literature shows a variety of functions, typically including one or two of the 
following inputs: individual time allocated to education, private expenditures on education by 
individuals themselves or by their parents, and government expenditures on education (e.g. Lucas, 
1988, Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Docquier and Michel, 1999, Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; 
Bouzahzah et al., 2002; Ludwig et al., 2012). In case of two inputs, the adopted functional form is 
very often Cobb-Douglas (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; Docquier 
and Michel, 1999).  
 
Our specification of the human capital production function also includes education time of young 
individuals and education expenditures by the government as indicators for the quantity of invested 
private and public resources. Compared to most of the literature, however, we differ in three 
respects. First, we adopt a more flexible CES functional form, allowing the elasticity of substitution to 
differ from 1. Second, our definition of relevant government expenditures includes more than 
education. It also includes active labor market expenditures, public R&D expenditures and public 
fixed investment. This approach goes back to our use of the broader concept of effective human 
capital6. Our third extension is to take into account the quality of education and the schooling system. 
We recognize that better quality implies higher cognitive skills for the same allocation of resources. 
Young individuals’ capacity to build human capital will then rise.  
 
All these arguments find their way in Equations (18.a) and (18.b). The former shows the growth rate 
of effective human capital for high and medium ability individuals as a CES specification in education 
time when young (   
 ) and productive government expenditures in % of output (  ). In steady state 
both determinants are constant, which will imply constant steady state growth. We add the quality 
of the schooling system ( ) in a multiplicative way. We will use country-specific PISA science scores 
as a proxy for q.7 Next to   we introduce (constant common) technical parameters:   is a positive 
efficiency parameter reflecting natural ability,   a scale parameter,   a share parameter and   the 
elasticity of substitution. These parameters will be calibrated. Note in Equation (18.b) that low ability 
individuals supply no education time, but they also enjoy positive effects on their effective human 
capital  from productive government expenditures. The quality of the schooling system   also plays a 
role here. 
                                                        
6
 As in Dhont and Heylen (2009), effective human capital (and worker productivity) rise not only in accumulated 
schooling or training, but also in the productive efficiency of accumulated schooling. Education and active labor 
market expenditures contribute directly to more human capital being accumulated, public R&D and fixed 
investment expenditures will mainly raise the productive efficiency of accumulated human capital. 
7
 Ideally, one would employ a quality indicator relating to tertiary education, but this is not (yet) available. Still, 
PISA scores may be very useful. They are informative about the quality that young people attain in secondary 
education, and with which some enter tertiary education. Quality at entrance should have a positive effect on 
people’s capacity to learn and to raise human capital in tertiary education. Furthermore, PISA scores have been 
found empirically significant for growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009).  
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                 (18.b) 
 
Lack of existing empirical evidence makes an ex-ante assessment of our specification very difficult. In 
previous work, however, we have been able to verify that a specification like (18.a) performs better 
than alternative ones without quality, with a narrower definition of government expenditures, or 
with a different functional form (see Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010; Buyse et al., 2013). 
 
3.3. Domestic firms, output and factor prices 
Firms act competitively on output and input markets and maximize profits. All firms are identical. 
Total domestic output (  ) is given by the production function (19). Technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale in aggregate physical capital (  ) and effective labor (  ), so that profits are zero in 
equilibrium. Equation (20) defines total effective labor as a CES aggregate of effective labor supplied 
by the three ability groups. In this equation s is the elasticity of substitution between the different 
ability types of labor and       and    are the input shares. We will impose that           . 
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Equation (21) specifies effective labor per ability group. Within each ability group we assume perfect 
substitutability of labor supplied by the different age groups.  
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To derive Equation (21) we make use of Equations (12) and (13) where we define: 
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It then follows that:     
       
      
      
                
 
Furthermore, we exploit the result that8 : 
                                                        
8
 Starting from Equation (10), and using (11), (12) and (22), it is easy to see that: 
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where by definition:     (
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Substituting Equation (21) for       and   into (20), and recognizing differences in the capacity 
   to inherit human capital as indicated by Equations (10) and (11), yields Equation (24).  
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Competitive behavior implies in Equation (25) that firms carry physical capital to the point where its 
after-tax marginal product net of depreciation equals the world real interest rate. Physical capital 
depreciates at rate   . Capital taxes are source-based: the tax rate k applies to the country in which 
the capital is used, regardless of who owns it. The real interest rate being given, firms will install 
more capital when the amount of effective labor increases or the capital tax rate falls. In that case 
the net return to investment in the home country rises above the world interest rate, and capital 
flows in. Furthermore, perfect competition implies for each ability type equality between the real 
wage and the marginal product of effective labor (Equation 26). Workers of a particular ability type 
will earn a higher real wage when their supply is relatively scarce and when physical capital per unit 
of aggregate effective labor is higher. Taking into account (25), real wages per unit of effective labor 
will therefore fall in the world real interest rate and in domestic capital tax rates. 
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Substituting (24) for   and (25) for     , we can rewrite (19) as  
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If we finally recognize that in steady state             and     are constant, we obtain the long-run 
(per capita) growth rate of the economy as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Human capital of the lower ability individuals (     ) will grow at the same rate 
   
 
   
    
     
 
     
    
   
 
   
    
which explains the first part of Equation (23). Lagging this result by one period, generates the second part. 
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In line with earlier models (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Buiter and Kletzer, 1993), 
the long-run (per capita) growth rate is positively related to the quality of schooling ( ) and to the 
fraction of time that young people allocate to education (   ). It is also positively related to the share 
of productive government expenditures (  ), like in Barro (1990). Growth will rise also if young 
individuals incorporate a larger fraction of average human capital of the middle aged generation 
(     ).  
 
3.4. Government 
Equation (28) describes the government’s budget constraint. Productive expenditures    , 
consumption    , benefits related to non-employment    (including early retirement benefits), old-
age pension benefits    , lump sum transfers    and interest payments      are financed by taxes on 
labor    , taxes on capital    , and taxes on consumption     and/or by new debt      . We define 
   as outstanding public debt at the beginning of period t. 
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Note our assumption that each ability group has size 1 and that each generation has size 3. Following 
Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009), we assume that the government claims given 
fractions    and    of output for productive expenditures and consumption. Non-employment 
benefits (  ) are an unconditional source of income support related to inactivity (leisure) and non-
market household activities. Although it may seem strange to have such transfers in a model without 
involuntary unemployment, one can of course analyse their employment and growth effects as a 
theoretical benchmark case (see also Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2008, 2009). Moreover, 
there is also clear practical relevance. Unconditional or quasi unconditional benefits to structurally 
non-employed people are a fact of life in many European countries. Note also our assumption that 
the pension system is fully integrated into government accounts. We do not impose a specific 
financing of the PAYG pension plan, the government can use resources from the general budget to 
finance pensions. Finally, as we have mentioned before, the government pays the same lump sum 
transfer    to all individuals living at time t. 
 
3.5. Aggregate equilibrium and the current account 
Optimal behavior by firms and households, and government spending for productive and 
consumption purposes, underlie aggregate domestic demand for consumption and investment goods 
in the economy. Our assumption that the economy is open implies that aggregate domestic demand 
may differ from supply and income, which generates international capital flows and imbalance on 
the current account. Equation (29) describes aggregate equilibrium as it can be derived from 
Equations (5)-(8), defined for all generations living at time t, Equations (19)-(21), (25)-(26) and (28). 
The LHS of (29) represents national income. It is the sum of domestic output    and net factor 
income from abroad     , with    being net foreign assets at the beginning of t. The aggregate stock 
of wealth    accumulates wealth held by individuals who entered the model in t-1, t-2 and t-3. At the 
RHS of (29)     stands for the current account in period t. 
 
                                           (29) 
  
with:              
                               
               
 
4. Parameterization and empirical relevance of the model  
The economic environment described above allows us to simulate the transitory and steady state 
growth and employment effects of various changes in fiscal policy and the pension system. This 
simulation exercise requires us first to parameterize and solve the model. In Section 4.1 we discuss 
our choice of preference and technology parameters. Starting from actual cross-country policy data 
in Section 4.2, we compare in Section 4.3 our model’s predictions with the employment and growth 
differences that we have reported in Table 1. This comparison provides a first and simple test of our 
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model’s empirical relevance. In Section 5 we consider long-run equilibrium effects of policy changes, 
as well as welfare effects per generation and ability group. To solve the model and to perform the 
simulations, we choose an algorithm that preserves the non-linear nature of our model. We follow 
the methodology basically proposed by Boucekkine (1995) and implemented by Juillard (1996) in the 
program Dynare. We use Dynare 4.2. 
 
Table 2 Basic parameterization and benchmark equilibrium 
Technology and preference parameters 
Goods production (output)                                        
Effective human capital 
 Oduction 
                                              
Human capital inheritance                           
Preference parameters                                         
                   
World real interest rate          
Capital depreciation rate           
 Target values for calibration 
Employment, growth and education (a) 
 
 
                                      
51.1% 56.8% 29.3% 57.9 1.77% 14.2% 
      
Relative wages US (b) 
                                                
0.43 0.63 0.38 0.58 
Notes:  (a) Values for Belgium, see Table 1;  
(b) As a proxy for the relative wage of low-ability (medium-ability) young workers, we use available 
data on earnings of workers of age 25-34 with below upper secondary education (secondary education) 
in the US relative to earnings of workers with a tertiary degree. For the relative wage of middle aged 
workers, we use the same kind of data. However, since middle age-specific data are missing, we use 
average values for the whole age group 25-64 as a proxy. Data for the age group 55-64 are about the 
same (0.38 and 0.55). Data source: OECD Education at a Glance, 2009, Table A7.1. 
 
4.1. Preference and technology parameters 
Table 2 contains an overview of all parameters. We set the rate of time preference equal to 1.5% per 
year. Considering that periods in our model consist of 15 years, this choice implies a discount factor 
  equal to 0.8. In the production function we assume a capital share coefficient   equal to 0.285. The 
elasticity of substitution   between the different ability types of effective labor is set equal to 1.5. 
Our values for the rate of time preference and the capital share are well within the range of values 
imposed in the literature (e.g. Docquier and Michel, 1999; Altig et al., 2001; Heijdra and Romp, 2009). 
So is the value for s. The empirical labor literature consistently documents values between 1 and 2 
(see Caselli and Coleman, 2006). There is more controversy about the value of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in leisure (
 
 
). Micro studies often reveal very low elasticities. However, given 
our macro focus, these studies may not be the most relevant ones (Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009; 
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Fiorito and Zanella, 2012). Rogerson (2007) also adopts a macro framework. He puts forward a 
reasonable range for   from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, p. 12). In line with this, we impose   to be equal 
to 2. The world real interest rate is assumed constant and equal to 4.5% per year. Considering a 
period of 15 years, this implies that   = 0.935. Finally, we set the physical capital depreciation rate to 
8% per year, which implies   =0.714. These values are also within the range of existing studies (see 
e.g. Heijdra and Romp, 2009).  
 
A second series of ten parameters have been determined by calibration: three taste for leisure 
parameters (        ), the human capital inheritance parameter ( ), three efficiency parameters in 
the human capital production function (      and   ), the elasticity of substitution ( ) in the 
composite leisure function in Equation (4) and two share parameters in aggregate effective labor (   
and   , where    follows as        ). The ten target values to which these parameters have 
been calibrated are reported at the bottom of Table 2. Six of them concern the employment rates, 
the effective retirement age, education, and growth for Belgium in our study. We choose this country 
since in Belgium the calculation of pension benefits fits exactly within the way we model it. Public 
pensions are proportional to average annual labor income earned over a period of 45 years, with 
equal weights to all years. In our model this comes down to           and          
 
 
 9. 
The other four target values are the relative wages of young and middle aged workers of low and 
medium ability in the US. Although in practice a whole system of simultaneous equations is solved in 
which each target value is important for each parameter to be calibrated, it may be useful for our 
exposition here to bring some more structure. Certain parameters are clearly more than others 
linked to certain target values. The leisure parameters, including the elasticity of substitution in the 
composite leisure function (4), are basically determined such that with observed average levels of 
the policy variables (tax rates, non-employment benefit replacement rates, pension replacement 
rates, etc.) and the observed level of schooling quality (q)10 in Belgium, the model correctly predicts 
Belgium’s employment rates by age (        ) and effective early retirement age ( ). We find that 
the taste for leisure rises with age (                          ) and observe a stronger 
degree of substitutability than in the Cobb-Douglas case between the two types of leisure for older 
workers (      ). The human capital inheritance parameter is basically determined to match 
average per capita growth. We find an inheritance rate for the highest ability group of 85% (  
    ). Taking into account the values for     and   , we obtain inheritance rates for the medium 
ability and the low ability groups of about 71% (=0.85x0.837) and 57% (=0.85x0.673). As we have 
explained in the beginning of Section 3.2., we rely on PISA science scores to obtain    and     
 
                                                        
9
 Only individuals with labor income below about 75% of the mean receive an additional social assistance 
benefit. We include this as ‘basic pension’ for the low ability individuals (     , see Table 5, and our 
discussion there). 
10
 And with the values of three parameters in the human capital production function (     ) that we discuss 
below (see also footnote 11). 
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Calibration of the share parameters    and    is mainly driven by the values for relative wages of 
young workers in the US. As shown by Equation (26), these share parameters are important 
determinants of the relative productivity of labor. Actual wages are informative if a close link can be 
assumed between wages and productivity. This condition is much more likely fulfilled in the US, 
which explains the introduction here of US relative wages rather than those in Belgium (or in any 
other European country). We illustrate the key elements in our procedure to obtain values for    and 
   from these relative wage data in Appendix B. The results imply                 and 
       . A similar procedure is applied to derive values for
       and   . These are basically 
determined such that the model correctly predicts relative wages of middle aged workers in the US, 
as well the target value for the education rate   (see also Appendix B). We obtain            
     and       . 
 
Finally, we had no strong ex ante indication on three parameters in the human capital production 
function: the scale parameter  , the share parameter   and the elasticity of substitution parameter  . 
We could assign sensible values to these parameters thanks to a sensitivity analysis on the results 
that we report in the next section. There we evaluate the capacity of our model to explain the facts 
in 13 OECD countries that we reported in Table 1. Our guideline to pin down specific values for 
    and   was to minimize the deviation of our model’s predictions from the true data11. This 
procedure implied                and        . We observe decreasing returns in human 
capital growth. The result for  reveals a higher degree of complementarity between private 
education time and government expenditures than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The result for v 
demonstrates relatively high importance for human capital formation of private education time 
versus productive public expenditures. Neither did we have an ex ante indication on the remaining 
parameters in the composite leisure function in Equation (4). We impose equal weight for both 
leisure types ( =0.5). The normalisation parameter   equals 2. The size of this parameter has no 
impact at all on our country predictions or simulation results. 
 
4.2. Fiscal policy, pensions and education quality 
Tables 3 and 4 describe key characteristics of fiscal policy in 1995-2001/2004. Our proxy for the tax 
rate on labor income concerns the total tax wedge, for which we report the marginal rate in %. The 
data cover personal income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on 
wage earnings and payroll taxes. The OECD publishes these marginal tax data for eight family and 
                                                        
11
 From our model’s predictions and the true data for 13 countries we computed for each variable 
(                   ) the root mean squared error normalized to the mean. We minimized the average 
normalized RMSE over all six variables. More precisely, we adopted the following iterative procedure. We 
chose values for     and   and then calibrated the other ten parameters (although it should be mentioned 
that the values for     and   hardly affected the calibration results for   ). Given the obtained values for the 
other parameters, we computed the average normalized RMSE over all six endogenous variables. We then 
checked whether changes in     and    and a recalibration of the other parameters, could further reduce this 
statistic. We did this until no further reduction was possible.    
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income situations. Our data for    in Table 3 are the average of all these situations. Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Finland have marginal labor tax rates above 55% or even 60%. The US 
have marginal labor tax rates below 40%. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates 
reported by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (their EMTR, base case). Germany and Belgium have the 
highest rates. In contrast to labor (and consumption), capital is taxed relatively little in the Nordic 
countries. As to consumption taxes, we follow Dhont and Heylen (2009) in computing them as the 
ratio of government indirect tax receipts (net of subsidies paid) to total domestic demand net of 
indirect taxes and subsidies. Our simplifying assumption is that consumption tax rates correspond to 
aggregate indirect tax rates. The Nordic countries stand out with the highest consumption tax rates, 
the US with the lowest. The utter right column in Table 3 shows the average ratio of gross 
government debt to GDP in the period that we study. The data range from less than 50% in Norway 
and the UK to more than 100% in Belgium and Italy.  
 
Table 3 Fiscal policy: Tax rates and government debt 
 
tax rate on 
labor income  
(in %) 
consumption tax rate 
(%) 
tax rate on 
capital income 
(%) 
Public debt  
(% of GDP) 
   Proxy for:               
Austria 54.9 13.2 17.3 69.6 
Belgium  67.2 13.4 27.1 111.7 
France 52.9 17.1 21.7 68.9 
Germany 60.4 11.1 34.4 63.1 
Italy 55.2 14.7 14.9 122.1 
Netherlands 52.0 12.2 24.3 68.2 
Denmark 48.6 18.9 22.5 60.3 
Finland 56.2 15.2 17.2 54.1 
Norway 50.8 16.4 22.1 40.4 
Sweden 56.0 17.9 16.1 67.2 
UK 44.9 14.5 21.2 46.6 
US 37.4 7.2 23.6 61.9 
Canada 46.4 14.5 24.8 83.8 
     
Overall 
average 
52.5 14.3 22.1 70.6 
Notes: Labor tax rates are data for the total tax wedge, marginal rate (OECD, Taxing Wages). Data are for 2000-
2004. Earlier data are not available. For details, see Appendix A. Capital tax rates are effective marginal 
corporate tax rates (Institute for Fiscal Studies, their EMTR, base case; data are for 1995-2001, see also 
Devereux et al., 2002). Consumption tax rates are from Dhont and Heylen (2009). Data are for 1995-2001. 
 
Table 4 summarizes our data for the expenditure side of fiscal policy. A first variable is our proxy for 
the net non-employment benefit replacement rate  . Since in our model non-employment is a 
structural or equilibrium phenomenon, the data that we use concern net transfers received by 
structurally or long-term unemployed people. They include social assistance, family benefits and 
housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also include unemployment insurance or 
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unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally 
unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit eligibility12. The data are expressed in 
percent of after-tax wages. In line with our approach to determine labor tax rates, we again compute 
the average of data reported by the OECD for a wide range of family and income cases to determine 
b (see Appendix A). Overall, the euro area countries and the Nordic countries pay the highest net 
benefits on average. Transfers to structurally non-employed people are by far the lowest in the US. A 
related variable is our proxy for the net early retirement benefit replacement rate ber. The data are 
again expressed in percent of after-tax final wages. To assess the generosity of early retirement we 
integrate the information available via b and data for the implicit tax rate on continued work in the 
early retirement route as provided by Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. (2005). For details, see Appendix 
A. We observe a very generous early retirement regime in Belgium and Finland, whereas net early 
retirement benefits in Anglo-Saxon countries are much lower. 
 
Table 4 Fiscal policy: net benefit replacement rates, consumption, productive expenditures  
 
 Non-
employment 
benefit (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
Early 
retirement 
benefits 
(net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
government 
consumption  
 (% of GDP) 
 
government 
productive 
expenditures 
 (% of GDP) 
Proxy for:               
       
Austria 56.3 71.6  14.6  9.1 
Belgium 59.6 79.0  16.9  8.9 
France 46.0 63.8  18.3  11.0 
Germany 64.7 70.8  15.3  8.6 
Italy 17.0 55.7  14.3  8.0 
Netherlands 55.0 68.1  18.4  10.3 
Denmark 61.9 43.2  18.4  12.5 
Finland 61.3 73.8  16.0  11.4 
Norway 56.9 39.9  14.7  12.1 
Sweden 55.4 39.0  20.0  14.0 
UK 51.1 39.4  14.4  7.3 
US 30.5 18.3  10.3  9.3 
Canada 44.4 27.0  14.7  9.3  
Overall 
average 
52.2 53.8  15.9  10.1  
Notes: A description of all variables is given in the main text. For more details, see Appendix A. The data for net 
benefit replacement rates are an average for 2001-2004 (earlier data are not available). The data for 
government consumption and productive expenditures concern 1995-2001.  
 
                                                        
12
 In the period that we study, this is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, Ireland, and the 
UK. Workers cannot be structurally non-employed and still receive unemployment benefits in the Netherlands, 
Italy, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and the US (OECD, 2004, 
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Benefits and Wages, country specific files).  
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Our data for productive government expenditures (  ) in Table 4 include education, active labor 
market expenditures, government financed R&D and public investment, in percent of GDP. On 
average, education expenditures constitute close to 60% of total   . Governments in the Nordic 
countries allocate by far the highest fractions of output to productive expenditures. Productive 
expenditures in percent of GDP are the lowest in the UK. The US and most core countries of the euro 
area take intermediate positions. Government consumption in percent of GDP is the highest also in 
the Nordic countries, followed at close distance by several countries of the core euro area13. In the 
US, government consumption is (much) lower.  
 
Table 5 contains our data for the net pension replacement rates    and    . The data have been 
taken or computed from OECD (2005). They include only (quasi-)mandatory pension programs14. In 
line with our specification in Equation (9),     is expressed as a percentage of an individual’s average 
lifetime net labor income, while     is expressed as a percentage of average economy-wide net labor 
income at the time of retirement. We consider individuals at 50 percent of mean earnings as 
representative for the low ability group, individuals with mean earnings as representative for the 
medium ability group, and individuals at twice the mean earnings as representative for the high 
ability group. Appendix A gives more details on the construction of the data. In the majority of 
countries individuals with mean or higher earnings only receive earnings-related pensions 
(            for      ). Among these countries, Austria and Italy pay the highest net 
replacement rates (   >85%), Belgium and the US the lowest (   < 65%)
15. Five countries also pay 
basic pensions to individuals with mean or higher earnings: the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the 
UK and Canada. For individuals with low earnings, the situation is somewhat the opposite. Their 
pension includes a significant basic (or similar) component in most countries. Unsurprisingly, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and the UK pay the highest ‘basic’ amounts16.   
 
                                                        
13
 Like Dhont and Heylen (2009) we calculate our data for government consumption as total government 
consumption in % of GDP, diminished with the fraction of public education outlays going to wages and 
working-expenses. We include the latter in productive expenditures.  
14
 In most countries mandatory programs are public. For Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden the data also 
include benefits from mandatory private systems. These benefits are earnings-related and included under    . 
Voluntary, occupational pensions are not included in our data. 
15
 Next to the pension level, differences exist also in the precise organization of the earnings-related system. 
Some countries have pure defined-benefit systems (e.g. Belgium, Finland, US), others have so-called point 
systems (Germany) or notional-account systems (Italy, Sweden).
 
Although these three systems can appear very 
different, OECD (2005) shows that they are all similar variants of earnings-related pension schemes. 
16
 As we explain in Appendix A, it should be mentioned that our proxy for     also includes targeted and 
minimum pensions. Basic pensions pay the same amount to every retiree. Targeted plans pay a higher benefit 
to poorer pensioners and reduced benefits to better-off ones. Minimum pensions are similar to targeted plans. 
Their main aim is to prevent pensions from falling below a certain level (OECD, 2005, p. 22-23). Our main 
motivation to merge these three categories in our proxy for     is that they are not (or even inversely) linked to 
earnings. 
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We emphasize that the straightforward way in which the OECD computes the pension replacement 
rates, in percent of an individual’s average lifetime labor income, comes down to assuming in our 
model that the weights       and    are all equal to 1/3. For reasons of consistency we will 
therefore make this assumption for all individual countries when we derive our model’s predictions. 
We are aware, however, that equal weights do not fully match practice in all countries. Some deviate 
from this prototype, to varying degrees17. When we compare our model’s predictions for these 
countries to the facts in the next section, we should take this into account. Assuming equal weights 
may slightly bias our predictions. 
 
Table 5 Net pension replacement rates and PISA education score  
 
Net earnings-related pension 
replacement rate (% average 
earned net labor income) 
Net basic pension 
replacement rate (% 
economy-wide average net 
labor income) 
PISA science 
score 
(divided by 
1000) 
Proxy for: Low Medium High Low Medium High  
                           
Austria 88.7 88.9 75.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.507 
Belgium 55.4 63.1 42.7 17.2 0.0 0.0 0.505 
France 62.9 68.8 59.2 23.2 0.0 0.0 0.502 
Germany 60.4 71.8 67.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.502 
Italy 89.3 88.8 89.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.480 
Netherlands 0.0 42.1 62.9 46.4 42.1 36.2 0.525 
Denmark 15.3 11.0 10.0 43.6 43.1 42.2 0.484 
Finland 82.3 78.8 78.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.550 
Norway 36.4 43.0 38.4 26.4 22.1 20.3 0.490 
Sweden 64.6 65.9 74.3 13.6 2.3 0.0 0.507 
UK 0.0 5.0 8.0 43.6 42.6 41.2 0.523 
US 61.4 51.0 39.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.493 
Canada 31.6 33.9 18.1 31.5 23.2 23.3 0.527 
Overall average 49.9 54.8 51.0 19.3 13.0 12.6 0.507 
   Notes: Pension replacement rates have been taken or computed from OECD (2005, p. 52 and part II). The 
data concern 2002. 
   For more details, see Appendix A. The PISA science scores are an average for 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
 
A final variable in Table 5 is our indicator for education quality ( ) in the human capital production 
function (12, 18). For each country we use PISA science scores. We concentrate on test results for 
science given their expected closer link to growth (Barro, 2001). The mean score is best in Finland, 
followed by the Netherlands, Canada and the UK. Education quality is relatively low in Italy, Denmark, 
Norway and the US. Note that there is no correlation between productive government expenditures 
in Table 4 and the PISA scores in Table 5. The coefficient of correlation is -0.04. There is no 
                                                        
17
 In Austria, Norway and France earnings-related pensions are not calculated from average lifetime income but 
from average income during the final working years or a number of years with the highest earnings. Ideally, 
one would impose different weights p1, p2 and p3. However, the pension replacement rate reported by the 
OECD would then no longer be reliable since it is based on the assumption of equal weights. 
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correlation either if we restrict productive expenditures to education only. Both variables seem to 
tell different stories (see also Woessmann, 2003). 
 
4.3 Predicted versus actual employment by age, education of the young, and growth in the OECD  
Can our model match the facts that we have reported in Table 1? In this section we confront our 
model’s predictions with the true data for 1995-2007. Clearly, one should be aware of the serious 
limitations of such an exercise. First of all, our model is highly stylized and may (obviously) miss 
potential determinants of growth or employment. Second, even if we compute the true data in Table 
1 as averages over a longer period, these averages need not be equal to the steady state. Countries 
may still be moving towards their steady state. Third, this exercise only concerns the last 15 years. 
Due to lack of data – especially with respect to marginal labor tax rates and non-employment 
benefits before the mid 1990s – it is impossible for us to relate changes in growth and employment 
to changes in policy within countries over longer time periods. In spite of all this, if one considers the 
extreme variation in the predictions of existing calibrated models investigating the effects of fiscal 
policy in the literature (see Stokey and Rebelo, 1995), even a minimal test of the ‘goodness of fit’ of 
our model is informative. This information is important to assess the value of the simulations that we 
present in the next section, and their reliability for policy analysis. In most papers in the literature a 
test of the external validity of the model is missing.   
 
Our calibration implies that our model’s prediction matches the employment rates by age, the 
effective retirement age of older workers, education, and per capita growth in Belgium. The test of 
the model’s validity is whether it can also match the data for the other countries, and cross-country 
differences. Before one uses a model for policy analysis, one would like to see for example that the 
model does not overestimate, nor underestimate the performance differences related to observed 
cross-country policy differences. Our test is tough since we impose the same preference and 
technology parameters, reported in the upper part of Table 2, on all countries. Only fiscal policy 
variables, the pension replacement rate, and education quality differ. Moreover, assuming perfect 
competition, we disregard differences in labor and product market institutions, which some authors 
consider of crucial importance (e.g. Nickell et al., 2005). Still, we find that the model matches the 
facts remarkably well for a large majority of countries. Basically, we here confirm earlier findings by 
e.g. Ohanian et al. (2008) and Dhont and Heylen (2008) that once one controls for fiscal policy 
differences, variation in taste for leisure or different market rigidities are not critical to explain cross-
country variation in labor market performance.  
As a part of fiscal policy, lump sum transfers also differ across countries. Underlying our model’s 
predictions for each country is the assumption of a constant debt to GDP ratio at the level reported 
for that country in Table 3. Lump sum transfers adjust endogenously in Equation (28) to obtain this 
equilibrium debt to GDP ratio. 
 
Figures 2 to 4 relate our model’s predictions to actual observations for three employment rates by 
age (aggregated over the three ability groups). We add the 45°-line to assess the absolute differences 
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between predictions and facts, as well as the coefficient of correlation between predictions and facts. 
Our model performs quite well. In each age group, it correctly predicts high employment rates in the 
US and Canada and low employment in Germany. For young workers it also correctly predicts 
relatively low employment in most other countries of the core euro area, and in the Nordic countries. 
For older workers it has relatively high employment right in the Nordic countries and the UK. Overall 
correlation between the model’s predictions and the actual data in Figure 2 is 0.35. If we drop Italy, 
for which there are good reasons18, this rises to 0.69. Correlation in Figure 3 is 0.48, in Figure 4 it is 
0.76. Moreover, in each figure - again after dropping Italy from Figure 2 - the regression line (not 
shown) is close to the 45°-line, which suggests that our model correctly assesses the size of the 
employment effects of policy differences across countries. Next to Italy, there are a few other 
countries, where our model somewhat over- or underpredicts. The model’s employment predictions 
tend to be too high for France and the Netherlands. They are too low in Figures 2 and 3 for Denmark 
and Finland.  
 
Figure 2. Employment rate in hours of young individuals in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.35.  
Excluding Italy correlation rises to 0.69.  
 
Figure 5 relates our model’s predictions to the facts for the effective retirement age. The model 
again captures the large differences between countries. It predicts the highest retirement age in the 
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries and a much lower retirement age in core euro area countries. 
Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91. In Figures 6 and 7 we relate our 
model’s predictions to the facts for education and growth. For education, the model correctly 
captures key differences between the Nordic countries on the one hand and countries like the UK 
and Italy on the other. Predictions for education are quite close to the 45°-line for all individual 
                                                        
18
 A major element behind the deviation for this country seems to be underestimation of the fallback income 
position for structurally non-employed young workers. OECD data show very low replacement rates in Italy. 
However, as shown by Reyneri (1994), the gap between Italy and other European countries is much smaller 
than it seems when family support as an alternative to unemployment benefits is taken into account. 
Fernández Cordón (2001) shows that in Italy young people live much longer with their parents than in other 
countries.   
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countries except Germany and (especially) Denmark and Finland. The model does not match the high 
participation in education in the latter two countries. Finally, our model has important cross-country 
differences right for growth. The model has some difficulty however to explain observed growth for 
the UK and Canada. Correlation between the model’s predictions and the true data is 0.76 for 
education and 0.69 for growth. 
 
Figure 3. Employment rate in hours of middle aged individuals in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
  
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.48.  
 
 
Figure 4. Employment rate in hours of older individuals in individual countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.76.  
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Figure 5. Effective retirement age, 1995-2006 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91.  
 
 
Figure 6. Tertiary education rate in individual countries, in %, 1995-2006  
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.76.  
 
 
Figure 7. Annual per capita potential GDP growth in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
    Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.69. 
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5. Public pension reform 
Having established the empirical relevance of our model, we now simulate a series of policy shocks. 
Our aim is to discover the (relative) effectiveness of various reforms of the pension system for the 
employment rate of three age and three ability groups, aggregate employment, education of the 
young,  growth, and income at old-age (especially for the low-ability group). We report steady state 
effects, and welfare effects per generation and per ability group. We also show the pension level of 
low-ability retirees. Throughout all our policy simulations we assume that the government maintains 
a constant debt to GDP ratio in each period. To reach this goal, it adjusts the consumption tax rate. 
Alternative simulations where the government adjusts lump sum transfers yield the same 
conclusions as the ones we report below. For a proper understanding of timing, it will be our 
assumption that the economy is in steady state at time t=-1. Reform is announced at time t=0 and 
implemented with a delay of 1 period, i.e. at time t=1. Hence, reforms apply to everyone except the 
generation of retirees at t=0, since they are no longer able to adapt their behavior19. 
Table 6 shows the steady state effects of seven (permanent) reforms in key features of the pension 
system. The benchmark from which we start, and against which all policy shocks are evaluated, is the 
average of the six core euro area countries in our sample. The parameters describing the benchmark 
pension system are indicated in the upper left corner of the table and in a first note below the table. 
Individual earnings-related replacement rates vary in the benchmark between 59% (   ) and 71% 
(   ). They are applied to a pension base where each active period has equal weight (   =1/3). 
Basic pensions take values between 6% (   ) and 15% (   ) of aggregate average net labor income. 
No particular minimum level is imposed to the pension (MP=0). The percentage point change in the 
consumption tax rate to maintain a constant debt to GDP ratio is indicated at the bottom of the table. 
                  
Figure 8 shows the welfare effects of these policy changes for high and for low-ability individuals of 
current and future generations. The results for medium-ability individuals are in general quite close 
to those for the high-ability group. We report on the vertical axis the welfare effect on individuals of 
the generation born k periods after the announcement of the policy reform, where k is indicated on 
the horizontal axis. So, the data at k=0 for example concern the young in the period of the policy 
announcement. The data at k=-3 concern the retirees in that period20. Our welfare measure is the 
(constant) percentage change in benchmark consumption in each period of remaining life that 
individuals should get to attain the same lifetime utility as after the policy shock (see also King and 
Rebelo, 1990). To compute this percentage change we keep employment rates at the benchmark. 
For example, policy 1 implies a welfare gain for the current high-ability young (k=0) equal to 1% of 
                                                        
19
 Current retirees will therefore not experience a change in their pension replacement rate(s), nor in the rules 
behind the computation of their pension assessment base. Their disposable income can change, however, 
when the government adjusts consumption taxes to keep the ratio of public debt to GDP constant, or when the 
aggregate average net wage (to which the basic pension replacement rate     applies) changes. 
20
 Consistent with footnote 19, these retirees are only indirectly affected by the policy change. 
 Chapter 3 
 
 91 
benchmark consumption. It implies a welfare loss for the current older low-ability individuals (k=-2) 
equal to 2% of their benchmark consumption.  
In Table 7 we integrate the welfare effects induced by each policy reform into a single aggregate 
summary measure. For each individual we first compute the present discounted value of the total 
consumption change over life that is required in the benchmark to make him equally well-off as 
under the policy reform. The basis of our computation are the data that we report in Figure 8. But 
now we also take into account differences in the length of remaining life. For young individuals the 
data in Figure 8 apply to four periods, whereas for retired individuals they only apply to one 
remaining period. Next, we impose that all those who lose under the new policy are compensated by 
the winners. Our summary measure is the present discounted value of the net aggregate 
consumption gain of all winners after having compensated the losers, in percent of initial GDP. The 
first row in Table 7 includes all current and four future generations of all three ability types into the 
computation. The second row includes only those generations that live at the moment the reform is 
announced. 
Given its importance for welfare at old-age, and the risk of old-age poverty, we focus in 
Figure 9 on the evolution of the pension level of low-ability retirees in the periods after a policy 
reform. Reported data at time t=0 concern the pension level of those who are retired at the moment 
of announcement of the new policy and who are only indirectly affected by it. Data at t=3 concern 
the pension level of those who are young at the time of announcement. All data are expressed 
relative to the benchmark. 
 
The starting point of our discussion is policy 1, which introduces for all individuals an increase in   , 
and a fall in   , along the lines preferred by Buyse et al. (2013). To compute the pension base, the 
weight of labor income earned as an older worker rises to 2/3, the weight of labor income earned 
when young falls to 0. Our results confirm the important positive effects of such a reform for 
aggregate employment and growth. The higher (lower) marginal utility from work when older (young) 
makes it interesting to shift work from the first period of active life to the third, and to postpone 
effective retirement (   and   rise,    falls). The positive effect that we observe on   and    is fully 
in line with earlier arguments by Sheshinski (1978) and Gruber and Wise (2002), among others. Jaag 
et al. (2010) also predict a shift from    to    when    falls and    rises. Unlike in Jaag et al., 
however, the role of endogenous education in our model strongly qualifies the fall in young workers’ 
labor supply. As is clear in Table 6, young individuals are encouraged to study (e increases) because 
the lifetime rate of return to building human capital rises. This follows first from the reduction of the 
opportunity cost of studying when young, second from the perspective of working longer, and third 
from the greater importance of effective human capital when old in the pension calculation. Extra 
schooling contributes to steady-state growth and reinforces incentives to work at older age. We 
observe an increase in the annual growth rate by 0.08 %-points. Note also that the employment rate 
rises in each ability group (        ), but most so among low-ability individuals (   =1.43). These 
individuals can only respond to the new policy by working longer, they cannot study and enjoy higher 
human capital. Interestingly, the government budget does not deteriorate. It becomes possible to 
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cut the consumption tax rate while keeping the ratio of public debt to GDP constant (see bottom of 
Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Steady state effects of pension reform – Effects for a benchmark of 6 core euro area 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). 
 
Initial values: 
   =1/3 
   =1/3 
   =1/3 
  =0 
Policy 1 
   =0 
   =1/3 
   =2/3 
Policy 2 
  =0.6 
Policy 3 
   =0 
   =0.75 
 
 
Policy 4 
   =0 
   =1/3 
   =2/3 
   =0.6 
Policy 5 
   =0 
   =1/3 
   =2/3 
   =0.85 
Policy 6 
    =0 
    =1/3 
    =2/3 
   =0.85 
Policy 7 
Fully 
Funded 
Effect (a):        
     -3.41 -0.51 -1.06 -3.33 -3.56 -2.84 0.04 
     0.12 -1.00 -3.02 -0.92 0.36 0.29 -1.47 
     7.02 -3.48 -10.4 1.15 8.24 5.99 -7.80 
   (c) 0.85 -0.47 -1.41 0.09 1.00 0.80 -1.15 
    1.37 0.00 -0.46 1.37 1.37 1.41 -0.36 
        
   (a. b) 0.92 -1.55 -4.50 -1.14 1.31 0.88 -2.79 
     (d) 1.66 -2.81 -8.14 -2.06 2.37 1.62 -5.05 
     0.60 0.01 -3.88 0.61 0.59 0.60 -2.84 
     0.72 0.01 -4.66 0.73 0.72 0.72 -2.98 
     1.43 -4.68 -4.96 -4.75 2.61 1.10 -2.55 
∆ annual 
growth 
rate(b) 
0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.02 
∆  
 (e) -1.19 1.66 5.07 1.15 -0.38 0.13 7.50 
     Notes: Initial values:    =59.4,    =70.6,    =66.1,    =14.6,    =7.0,    =6.0. 
    (a) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark.  except 
      and  . 
(b) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours, change in percentage points. 
    (c) change in optimal effective retirement age in years 
 (d) change in volume of employment in hours, in percent.  
(e) change in consumption tax rate in percentage points to keep the ratio of debt to GDP 
constant. 
 
A quick comparison with the other policies in Table 6, to be discussed immediately, reveals that most 
of them are less effective than policy 1 when it comes to promoting (aggregate) employment and 
growth. Table 7 also reveals significant net aggregate welfare gains. The main disadvantage of policy 
1, however, is the welfare loss that it imposes on the current older and middle aged generations of 
low-ability individuals (Figure 8, upper panel, RHS). These individuals work more, but can hardly 
consume more. Even if policy 1 offers a convincing solution to the overall challenge of employment 
and growth in today’s economies, and even if it may contribute to safeguard the welfare state in the 
future, it may also worsen conditions for a significant part of the lower ability individuals. Moreover, 
it may offer no solution to the problem of old-age poverty faced by many. Figure 9 shows an 
important fall relative to the benchmark in the pension level of many generations of low-ability 
individuals to come. These observations make it politically difficult to impose such a policy. 
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Policies 2 and 3 focus on the problem of low pensions for low-ability individuals. Policy 2 maintains 
all benchmark replacement rates, but also introduces a minimum pension. Individuals are sure of a 
pension equal to at least 60% of average net labor income per worker in the economy. In practice the 
latter implies a strong increase in the pension level for the low-ability group (see also Figure 9), but 
no ex-ante change for the other two groups. Their optimal behavior given all policy variables implies 
a pension that is above 60% of the average net wage from the beginning. We remind that none of 
the policy reforms that we discuss apply to the retired at the moment of the announcement of the 
reform, so they are not eligible to the minimum pension. As shown by Figure 8, all low-ability 
individuals except the retired (k=-3) experience welfare increases up to about 4% under policy 2. For 
the welfare of all other individuals, however, these policies have very negative effects. A key element 
is the drastic drop in the employment rate among low-ability individuals. The perspective of a 
minimum pension introduces a strong disincentive for them to work (see also Sommacal, 2006). The 
implied fall in aggregate employment and its negative effects on the government’s budget, force the 
latter to raise consumption tax rates for all. Furthermore, medium and higher ability individuals can 
also expect a fall in their wage per unit of effective labor due to the reduction of low-ability labor 
supply21.  
 
Policy 3 imposes a shift from own-earnings related pensions to ‘basic’ pensions on all individuals. 
Every retiree gets a basic pension equal to 75% of average net labor income per worker in the 
economy. In our model    goes to zero for all ability groups,    becomes 0.75. This policy basically 
goes one step further than policy 2. It breaks the relationship between the pension and an 
individual’s human capital and labor supply also for the high and medium-ability groups. The fall in 
the return to studying and to working also for these groups is at the basis of an overall and strong fall 
in employment, education time and growth. Figure 8 reveals negative welfare effects almost across 
the board, especially for higher ability individuals and all future generations. Only current older low-
ability individuals gain. They benefit most from higher pensions. Due to lower growth, this gain will 
not persist for the future low-ability generations however. As a result, policy 3 shows among the 
worst net aggregate welfare effects in Table 7.  
 
Policies 4, 5 and 6 search for ways to combine the efficiency of policy 1 with the objective to reduce 
the risk of old-age poverty for low-ability individuals. Policy 4 extends policy 1 with a minimum 
pension equal to 60% of the average net wage, like in policy 2. This policy is most beneficial for the 
welfare of all low-ability individuals (except the retired). They enjoy both an immediate increase in 
their pension, for which they have to work less, and the benefits from increased human capital 
formation by the high and medium-ability groups. The latter immediately contributes to higher 
wages per person, also for the lower ability individuals, and to increased levels of inherited human 
capital for all future generations. Like policy 2, however, policy 4 also imposes significant welfare 
                                                        
21
 As a narrow alternative to policy 2, we also investigated the introduction of a minimum pension combined 
with an abolishment of all basic pensions. All effects were very similar. Only the required increase in the 
consumption tax rate was smaller, since the government could save money from     going to 0.   
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losses on the current generations of high and medium-ability individuals, which drastically reduces its 
chances politically. Net aggregate effects in Table 7 are still negative. 
  
Figure 8. Welfare effects for individuals belonging to current and future generations after pension 
reform 
                                                   High ability                                                     Low ability 
               
 
 
Note:  The vertical axis indicates the welfare effect for individuals belonging to the generation born k periods 
after the announcement of permanent pension reform. The horizontal axis indicates k. Negative numbers for k 
point at generations born before the reform. 
 
Policy 5 tackles the problem of low income at old-age for the low-ability group by significantly raising 
their individual earnings-related pension replacement rate to 85% (     = 25.6%-points). This policy 
combines the efficiency gains from policy 1 with strong incentives for the low-ability group to work 
more and longer. In contrast to the disincentives induced by basic or minimum pensions, policy 5 
raises the return to work since it yields more future pension. Among all the policies that we discuss in 
Table 6, not one has more favorable effects on aggregate employment (  =1.31) or on the 
employment rate of low-ability individuals (   =2.61). Higher pensions can as a result be paid 
without the need for the government to raise consumption taxes. Given the strong rise in output and 
employment, c can even be reduced. Compared to policy 1, welfare effects for the low-ability group 
are better, without hurting the medium and high-ability groups. Policy 5 induces the best net 
aggregate welfare effects in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Net welfare effect after compensating welfare transfers (expressed as % of initial GDP) 
Included generations  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 5 Policy 6 Policy 7 
All current + 4 future 1.8 -1.6 -6.1 -0.2 1.9 1.8 -2.8 
All current 0.6 -1.3 -4.2 -0.8 1.0 0.9 -4.5 
Note: for a description of the computation of these data, see main text. 
 
Policy 6 reconsiders the basic choice made in policy 1 to raise the weight of labor income earned as 
an older worker in the computation of the pension assessment base, and to reduce the weight of 
labor income earned as a young worker. One of the main advantages of this choice is that it 
promotes education and human capital formation. Given that low-ability individuals will never 
continue education at the tertiary level, however, one may question this change in weights for them. 
Policy 6 therefore maintains the much higher individual earnings-related replacement rate for the 
low-ability group (   =85%), but combines this with equal weights   =1/3 for this group. The shift to 
  =0,   =1/3 and   =2/3 only applies to medium and high-ability individuals. Employment and 
growth effects from policy 6 are better than, or at least as good as, those from policy 1. For the low-
ability individuals, who work the highest fraction of their time while they are young, maintaining    
at 1/3 in policy 6 implies a further increase in their pension benefit compared to policy 5. This further 
increase in pensions will force the government to slightly raise the consumption tax rate. All in all, 
however, the welfare effects from policy 6 are among the best for the low-ability individuals, with 
quasi no cost imposed on the others. Net aggregate welfare effects from policy 6 are in between 
those from policies 1 and 5.  
 
Figure 9. Pension level (relative to benchmark) of low-ability retirees at time t (where t=0 is when the 
policy reform is announced and t=1 is when it is implemented) 
 
Note: Policy 7 is not included. This policy implies a gradual reduction of public pensions to zero. 
 
Policy 7 is a gradual shift from the PAYG system in the benchmark to a system with full private capital 
funding. This policy completely abolishes old-age pension benefits (       ). For the government it 
implies a drastic cut in pension expenditures. We assume that this drop in expenditures feeds 
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through into lower social security contributions for all workers such that, ex ante, the decline in total 
labor tax receipts in % of GDP is exactly the same as the drop in pension expenditures.22 We observe 
in Table 6 that this transition to a private fully-funded pension scheme is not beneficial for 
employment. The new steady state shows lower hours worked among all ability groups and all age 
groups. The fall in employment is the strongest among older workers. The aggregate employment 
rate n drops by about 2.8%-points. An important element here is that a fully-funded system breaks 
the direct positive link between individual labor income and the pension, which exists in the PAYG 
system as we have modeled it. Steady state time allocated to education also falls, slightly. So does 
growth (-0.02%-points). Furthermore, we observe that a shift to a fully-funded system affects the 
government balance negatively (as the consumption tax rate has to be increased by more than 7 
percentage points). The latter is mainly due to the decline in the tax base as hours of work decrease. 
Another element is that, although we also find that moving to a system with private capital funding 
encourages national savings (see e.g. Feldstein, 1974, 2005), this need not imply an increase in 
domestic physical capital formation, and capital taxes. If effective labor supply and employment fall, 
so will the marginal product of physical capital, which causes savings to be invested abroad. Figure 8 
reveals a strong intertemporal trade-off in the welfare effects from moving to a fully-funded system. 
Future generations gain, but current, transitional generations experience large welfare losses23. This 
result is well-known in the literature. Although the future gains in Figure 8 are relatively strong when 
compared to those from e.g. policy 6, it should also be recognized that in the more distant future 
(k>5) a fully-funded system will bring less gains. A key element is that it lacks the incentives to 
promote human capital formation and growth inherent in policies 1, 5 and 6.  
 
The possibility that a fully-funded pension system has lower growth than a PAYG model has been 
shown before by Kemnitz and Wigger (2000), Zhang and Zhang (2003), and Kaganovich and Meier 
(2008). The endogeneity of education and human capital is crucial for that result also in their models. 
The inferior employment effects from a shift to a fully-funded system may, however, be surprising 
from the perspective of recent work by e.g. Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010), Ludwig et al. (2012) 
and Fisher and Keuschnigg (2010). For a discussion of this issue we refer to Buyse et al. (2013). A 
major element is that the existing literature generally compares a fully-funded system with a specific 
                                                        
22
 In particular, the gradual decline in     and     is announced at time t=0 and implemented as follows. 
Pension benefits are not reduced for retirees at the moment of policy announcement (t=0), since retirees are 
not able to react to a pension reduction. In t=1 and t=2 the replacement rates are respectively reduced to 2/3 
and 1/3 of their initial rates. From t=3 onwards,     and     are zero. At each moment, overall labor tax rates 
are reduced to ex ante compensate for the decline in pension expenditures. 
23
 The explanation for the welfare loss of current generations in our model is as follows. The announcement of 
the transition to a fully-funded system, and the perspective of a gradual fall in labor taxes during periods 1,2 
and 3, as described in footnote 22, makes individuals shift hours worked to the future. During transition the 
young will study more, but total effective labor falls. Since this reduces the marginal productivity of physical 
capital, it will also discourage investment. Capital flows out. The economy experiences a strong drop in 
aggregate output (and tax revenue), which will force the government to raise consumption taxes. In later 
periods the economy enjoys the benefits from having accumulated more human capital during transition, but 
increased education efforts are not permanent (on the contrary). 
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PAYG system which is less ‘intelligent’ than in our policies 5 or 6. Either one assumes for example a 
‘flat’ PAYG system where individuals’ pensions do not depend on their own human capital and labor 
earnings (as in our policy 3), or one models the public old-age pension system as an immediate 
alternative to work, neglecting the reality of early retirement systems.  
 
6. Conclusion        
We study the effects of pension reform in a four-period OLG model for an open economy where 
hours worked by three active generations, education of the young, the retirement decision of older 
workers, and aggregate growth, are all endogenous. Within each generation we distinguish 
individuals with high, medium or low ability to build human capital, which allows to investigate also 
the effects of pension reform on the income and welfare levels of different ability groups. Our 
specification of pension benefits allows for both own-earnings related and flat-rate or basic 
components. The weight of each component may differ for individuals with different abilities. Next 
to the pension system, we introduce a role for education quality as well as a rich fiscal policy block. 
The government sets tax rates on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its revenue to 
productive expenditures (mainly for education), consumption, non-employment benefits (including 
early retirement benefits) and pensions.  
We check the validity of our model and our calibration by simulating the model for 13 OECD 
countries and comparing its results with the true data. Imposing common technology and preference 
parameters but country-specific policy parameters, we find that the predictions of our model match 
the main facts remarkably well.  
 
Simulating various models of pension reform, we find that an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system may have 
positive effects on both employment, the effective retirement age, education, aggregate growth and 
welfare. These positive effects are the strongest when the PAYG system includes a tight link between 
individual labor income (and contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to 
labor income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Such a system 
stimulates individuals’ labor supply when they are middle aged and older, and education when they 
are young. Positive effects on human capital formation promote future productivity and earnings 
capacity, also for future generations. An ‘intelligent’ PAYG system may perform (much) better than a 
system with a strong basic pension component, or a system with full private funding.   
Recognizing realistic differences across people in ability to learn and to build human capital, however, 
we find that this ‘intelligent’ PAYG system implies significant welfare losses for current generations of 
low-ability individuals, who cannot study and who work at low wages. We therefore study various 
alternatives to maintain the aggregate efficiency gains of an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system, while at the 
same time contributing to higher income at old-age and welfare for all individuals. Most promising is 
to maintain the tight link between individual labor income and the pension also for low-ability 
individuals, but to strongly raise their replacement rate. Such a system performs much better 
economically, and may expect to receive much more support politically, than basic or minimum 
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pension components to promote the income of low-ability individuals. A tight link between individual 
labor income and the pension, combined with a high replacement rate, is a very effective way to 
promote labor supply. Basic and minimum pension models by contrast have strong negative effects 
on labor supply of low-ability individuals. A second welfare increasing adjustment would be to 
maintain equal weights in the pension assessment base for low-ability individuals. Since these 
individuals cannot study at the tertiary level, it is not optimal to give a lower weight to the labor 
income they earn when young.  
 
Our findings tend to support recent pension reforms in countries like Sweden and Finland. Sweden 
moved from a quite non-actuarial PAYG system to a quasi-actuarial system with individual notional 
accounts (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; OECD, 2005). These accounts establish a close relationship 
between working hours, labor earnings and contributions on the one hand, and future pensions on 
the other, as in the case of a high replacement rate    in our model (and a low   ). Finland 
introduced a system where the pension accrual rate rises with age, which corresponds to the case of 
a rising pj as workers get older in our model (OECD, 2005). Our results support this policy, except for 
individuals with low capacity to study at the tertiary level.   
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Appendix A: Construction of data and data sources 
In this appendix we provide more detail on the construction of some of our performance variables 
and policy variables.  
 
Employment rate in hours (in one of three age groups, 1995-2007) 
Definition: total actual hours worked by individuals in the age group / potential hours worked. 
Actual hours worked = total employment in persons x average hours worked per week x average 
number of weeks worked per year. 
Potential hours = total population in the age group x 2080 (where 2080 = 52 weeks per year x 40 
hours per week) 
Data sources:  
* Total employment and total population in the age group: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics by Sex 
and Age. Data are available for many age groups, among which 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-
64. We constructed the data for our three age groups as weighted averages. 
* Average hours worked per week: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics, Average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job. These data are available only for age groups 15-24, 25-54, 55-64. We use 
the OECD data for the age group 15-24 as a proxy for our age subgroup 20-24, the OECD data for the 
age group 25-54 as a proxy for our age (sub)groups 25-34, 35-49 and 50-54. 
* Average number of weeks worked per year: Due to lack of further detail, we use the same data for 
each age group. The average number of weeks worked per year has been approximated by dividing 
average annual hours actually worked per worker (total employment) by average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job by all workers (total employment). Data source: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics, Hours worked. 
 
Education rate of the young (age group 20-34, 1995-2006) 
Definition: total hours studied by individuals of age 20-34 / potential hours studied 
As a proxy we have computed the ratio:  20 34 20 24 25 34 20 340 5 0 25fts . pts . pts / pop      
with:  fts the number of full-time students in the age group 20-34 
           pts the number of part-time students in the age groups 20-24 and 25-34. 
           pop total population of age 20-34 
Full-time students are assumed to spend all their time studying. For part-time students of age 20-24 
we make the assumption (for all countries) that they spend 50% of their time studying, part-time 
students of age 25-34 are assumed to spend 25% of their time studying. Due to the limited number 
of part-time students, these specific weights matter very little.  
Data sources:  
* Full-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes, full-time)  
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* Part-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes). We subtracted the data for full-
time students from those for ‘full-time and part-time students’.  
Data are available in 1995-2006. However, for many countries (quite) some years are missing. Period 
averages are computed on the basis of all available annual data.  
 
Average effective retirement age (1995-2006) 
Definition: Average age of all persons (being 40 or older) withdrawing from the labor force in a given 
period.   
Data source: OECD, Ageing and Employment Policies – Statistics on average effective age of 
retirement. 
 
Annual real potential per capita GDP growth rate (aggregate, 1995-2007) 
Definition: Annual growth rate of real potential GDP per person of working age 
Data sources:  
* real potential GDP: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, supply block, series GDPVTR. 
* population at working age: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, labour markets, 
series POPT. 
 
Tax rate on labor income (w) 
Definition: Total tax wedge, marginal tax rate in % of gross wage earnings. The data cover personal 
income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on wage earnings and 
payroll taxes.  
Data source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, Financial and Fiscal Affairs, Taxing Wages, Comparative 
tax rates and benefits (new definition). 
The OECD publishes marginal labor tax rates for several family and income situations: single persons 
at 67%, 100% and 167% of average earnings (no children), single persons at 67% of average earnings 
(two children), one-earner married couples at 100% of average earnings (two children), two-earner 
married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 33 % (no children, 2 children), 
two-earner married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 % (2 children). Our 
data in Table 3 are the averages of these eight cases. Data for 2000-04. 
 
Government debt (Dt) 
Definition: General government gross financial liabilities.  
Data source: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, N° 89, Government Accounts. 
 
Net benefit replacement rates when young and middle aged (b) 
Definition: The data concern net transfers received by long-term unemployed people and include 
social assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also 
include unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, 
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i.e. if workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit 
eligibility. The data are expressed in % of after-tax wages. The OECD provides net replacement rates 
for six family situations and three earnings levels. Our data in Table 4 are the averages of these 18 
cases. Data for 2001-04. 
Data source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
Data adjustment: Original OECD data for Norway include the so-called “waiting benefit” 
(ventestønad), which a person could get after running out of unemployment benefits. Given the 
conditional nature of these “waiting benefits”, they do not match our definition of benefits paid to 
structurally non-employed individuals. We have therefore deducted them from the OECD data, 
which led to a reduction of net replacement rates by about 19 percentage points. For example, 
recipients should demonstrate high regional mobility and willingness to take a job anywhere in 
Norway. The “waiting benefit” was terminated in 2008. We thank Tatiana Gordine at the OECD for 
clarifying this issue with us.   
 
Early retirement replacement rates (ber) 
To calculate our proxy for ber we have focused on the possibility for older workers in some countries 
to leave the labor market along fairly generous early retirement routes. Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. 
(2005) provide data for the so-called implicit tax rate on continued work for five more years in the 
early retirement route at age 55 and age 60. The idea is as follows. If an individual stops working 
(instead of continuing for five more years), he receives a benefit (early retirement, disability…) and 
no longer pays contributions for his future pension. A potential disadvantage is that he may receive a 
lower pension later, since he contributed less during active life. Duval (2003) calculated the 
difference between the present value of the gains and the costs of early retirement, in percent of 
gross earnings before retirement. We use his data as a proxy for the gross benefit replacement rate 
for older workers in the early retirement route. To compute the net benefit replacement rate, we 
assume the same tax rate on early retirement benefits as on unemployment benefits. We call this 
net benefit replacement rate rer. However, these implicit tax rates are only very rough estimates of 
the real incentive to retire embedded in early retirement schemes and are subject to important 
caveats (Duval, 2003, p. 15). The available implicit tax rates take into account neither the strictness of 
eligibility criteria nor the presence of alternative social transfer programs that may de facto be used 
as early retirement devices. Our assumption will be that a realistic replacement rate for the early 
retirement route (ber) will be a weighted average of rer and b, where we take the latter as a proxy for 
the replacement rate in alternative social transfer programs. If rer > b, older workers will aim for the 
official early retirement route, but they may not all meet eligibility criteria and have to fall back on 
alternative programs. If rer < b, workers will aim for the alternative, but again they may not be 
eligible. We propose that ber = ξb + (1-ξ)rer. Underlying the data in Table 4 is the assumption that 
ξ=0.5. Correlation between ber and rer lies around 0.92. Cross-country differences roughly remain 
intact. Our results in the main text do not depend in any serious way on this assumption for ξ.  
Data Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Duval (2003), 
Brandt et al. (2005).  
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Net pension replacement rates (    and     for a=L,M,H) 
OECD (2005, p. 52) presents net pension replacement rates for individuals at various multiples of  
average individual earnings in the economy. We consider the data for individuals at 50% of average  
earnings as representative for the low ability group, individuals with average earnings as 
representative for the medium ability group, and individuals with twice average earnings as 
representative for the high ability group. Country studies in OECD (2005, part II) show the 
composition (sources) of this net replacement rate. This composition may be different for individuals 
with different income levels. Our proxy for     includes all earnings-related pensions and mandatory 
occupational pensions when they depend on wages or hours worked. Our proxy for     includes 
basic pensions, minimum pensions, targeted pensions, and old-age social assistance benefits, i.e. all 
categories that are not (or even inversely) related to individual earnings.  
Since in our model     is a percentage of the average net wage in the economy (Equation 9), 
whereas the above described OECD data are in percent of an individual’s net wage, we multiply the 
OECD data with the ratio of the replacement in percent of average earnings to the replacement rate 
in percent of individual earnings to obtain our    . This ratio can be derived from the ‘pension 
modelling’ tables in the individual country studies, at various multiples of average earnings. 
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Appendix B: Detail on calibration procedure to determine    and   (with        ) 
Given the data for US relative wages in Table 2, we have for the low-ability group that:  
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We also know from Equation (26) that 
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Similarly, it is easy to obtain for the medium ability group: 
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If we finally take into account that           , and we introduce values for          and 
          which we simultaneously obtain elsewhere in the calibration (as functions of the 
employment rates and       and   , which themselves depend on       and  ), it is easy to see 
that we have three remaining equations in three unknowns (        ) that can be solved. 
 
Along the same line of reasoning, we obtain values for       and    such that our model matches 
the relative wages of middle aged low and medium ability workers for the US, as well as the target 
value for education (e) over all 13 countries. The direct link between          and education, and 
these relative wages, is obvious from the following two equations:   
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where we know that       and    are functions of       and    respectively and    and   . 
Furthermore, also      and      depend on these parameters via      and      as we 
have shown above.  
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Abstract 
In this paper, we evaluate the effects of a parametric adjustment to an earnings-related PAYG 
pension system. We show that a simple but ‘intelligent’ reform, in which the calculation of the 
pension base is changed, may result not only in more employment and growth, but also in an 
increase in fertility. Such an ‘intelligent’ pension design would maintain the strong link between own 
labor income and the earned pension, while putting more weight on the labor income earned as an 
older worker in the calculation of the pension base. The higher (lower) marginal utility from work 
when older (young) following this reform makes it interesting to shift work from the first period of 
active life to the later. Part of the available time that arises during youth is spent on education. 
Another part can be spent on raising offspring. By contrast, a shift to a fully-funded system might 
even reduce fertility.  
The goal of this paper is to indicate that ‘intelligent’ adjustments to the pension scheme that have 
been shown to have beneficial effects on employment and growth, may also serve the goal of 
increasing fertility. We believe this idea can be seen as complementary to proposals implying the 
introduction of a child-related pension benefit. As such, we adhere to the recent idea of Cigno (2010) 
to develop a pension system consisting of two parallel schemes: a part being Bismarckian and a part 
being child-related, i.e. related to having and raising children. The results in this paper give insight on 
how to construct the former part. 
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1.  Introduction: research question and related literature 
Public pension systems face increasing pressure in many OECD countries given the overall rise in life 
expectancy and decline in fertility rates. In order to face the pension challenge in an ageing society, 
many economists agree on the need for higher employment, especially among older individuals, and 
higher productivity growth. While a lot of research has been performed on this issue, a consensus on 
best pension reform has not yet been reached.1 Some studies are in favor of parametric adjustments 
in the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system that many countries rely on, while others prefer a move to a 
fully-funded private system.  
 
Given the importance of the demographic evolution for the sustainability of a pension system, a 
large literature has studied the interaction between public pensions and the fertility rate. Some 
authors see the public pay-as-you-go pension system as one of the reasons for the decline in fertility 
rates (e.g. Zhang, 1995; Cigno and Rosato, 1996; Sinn, 2004 and Boldrin et al., 2005). The general 
idea is that the introduction of a public pension system diminishes the necessity to raise children as a 
source of old-age income support. As such, public pensions reduce transfers within the family and 
hence distort demand for children.  
With respect to the issue of declining fertility, several pension reform proposals have already been 
put forward. In order to revert the decline in population growth, some economists are in favor of a 
switch to a fully-funded system since such a system is stable in case of demographic change. Others 
advocate the idea of relating the pension benefit received at the time of retirement (partly) to the 
number of children raised by the pensioner (e.g. Voigtländer, 2004 and Sinn, 2005). Such a children-
pay-as-you-go (CPAYG) system directly raises the return to having children. Moreover, it does not 
suffer from problems related to ageing as individuals who do not have children are forced to save for 
their own old-age income. One possible caveat, however, would arise if quality (i.e. investments in a 
child’s education) is substituted by quantity (Becker, 1960).2 
 
In this paper, and in contrast to studies that analyze how pensions benefits can be related directly to 
the number of offspring (see e.g. Fenge and Meier, 2005), we take the existing PAYG pension system 
that most OECD countries rely on as given. We propose a fertility-increasing reform that does not 
require the introduction of a CPAYG. We propose one specific parametric adjustment policy, which is 
also shown to be beneficial for economic growth and employment of older workers. More 
specifically, we are in favor of a pension system that maintains the strong link between own labor 
income and the earned pension, while putting a high weight on the labor income earned as an older 
worker in the calculation of the pension assessment base. Pension reform in this direction not only 
encourages young individuals to study and build human capital and encourages older individuals to 
                                                        
1
 Many studies document how the pension system may affect the incentives of individuals of different ages to 
work (e.g. Auerbach et al., 1989; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; de la Croix et al., 2010). Others investigate the 
relationship between the pension system and human capital investment (e.g. Zhang and Zhang, 2003). 
2
 It should be mentioned that, as a remedy to low fertility, many countries have resorted to other policy 
instruments such as child subsidies, parental leave schemes and public provision of day-care centres. 
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work and postpone retirement. It may also bring about behavioral effects that induce individuals to 
bear more children and may hence increase total fertility. To show these effects, we extend the 
general equilibrium four-period OLG model of Buyse et al. (2013) to allow for an endogenous fertility 
choice. The model explains hours of work of young, middle-aged and older individuals, education and 
human capital formation of the young, fertility, retirement of the older generation and aggregate 
growth (per capita). It includes a public PAYG old-age pension system. The statutory retirement age is 
65 and exogenous. To keep the model as streamlined as possible, we abstract from concerns as 
longevity and the inability of certain individuals to bear children. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and calibration. In Section 3 we show the results 
of simple pension reform proposals. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  The model 
We use the computable overlapping-generations model for a small open economy of Buyse et al. 
(2013) as our starting point. We maintain most of the assumptions in their model such as perfect 
international mobility of physical capital and immobile labor. We will not develop the complete 
model here – we refer to the original paper of Buyse et al. – but instead focus on the novelties that 
are relevant to this paper such as the decision about the number of offspring and the old-age social 
security system. For completeness, however, all equations of the model are reported in Appendix A. 
As to notation, a superscript t indicates the period an individual enters the model while a subscript t 
refers to the historical time period. 
 
Demographics 
A certain generation t, which enters the model at the age of 20, consists of Nt individuals. Within 
each generation agents are assumed homogeneous.   
 
  and   
 
 denote the number of children raised 
by generation t, born either during the young or middle-aged period of adulthood. Both the total 
number of offspring and the time to have children are hence decision variables for the household. 
Population grows according to the following equation        
      
     . Each period is 
modeled to last for 15 years in real life. There is no uncertainty concerning mortality: all individuals 
die at the age of 80. 
 
Individuals 
The model consists of three active adult generations, the young, the middle-aged and the older, and 
one generation of retired agents. Figure 1 shows the life-cycle time profile of an individual reaching 
age 20 in t. Young people, i.e. between the age of 20 and 35, can choose either to work and generate 
labor income (n), to study and build human capital (e) or to devote time to raising children (   ), 
where    is a time cost per child (see further). The remaining time is spent on ‘leisure’ (including 
other non-market activities). Time endowment is normalized to 1 in each period. Middle-aged 
workers may also raise children but do not study. Older workers do not bear children and do not 
study; they only work, have ‘leisure’ and continue raising their children born the period before. Note 
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that the period of childhood (i.e. the period before the age of 20 when children live with their 
parents) is not modeled explicitly.  
 
Figure 1. Life-cycle of an individual of generation t3 
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The statutory old-age retirement age is 65. Individuals may however optimally choose to leave the 
labor force sooner in a regime of early retirement. The determination of early retirement is part of 
the individuals’ optimal choice of ‘leisure’ time in the third period of life (50-65). Individuals choose R, 
which relates to the optimal effective retirement age and which is defined as the fraction of time 
between age 50 and 65 that the individual participates in the labor market; (1-R) is then time in early 
retirement. We use    to denote the fraction of time devoted to work between 50 and 65, and  ̃  as 
the fraction of time devoted to work before early retirement, but after 50. As labor market exit is 
irreversible and post-retirement employment is not allowed in our model, the relationship between 
   and  ̃  is as follows:       ̃ . Finally, note that retired agents leave no debts, nor bequests. 
 
   ∑  
   [    
    
  
    
   
]            
         
           (1) 
 
Equation (1) shows the intertemporal utility function that an individual reaching age 20 in t 
maximizes. Lifetime utility depends on consumption (  ) and enjoyed ‘leisure’ (  ) in each period of 
life. Superscript t indicates the period of youth, when the individual comes into the model. 
Furthermore,   is the discount factor (     ). The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption is 1, the intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure    . Finally,    specifies the 
relative value of leisure versus consumption. Note that   may be different in each period of life.  
                                                        
3 
A superscript t indicates the period of youth of an individual. Subscripts 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer respectively to the 
period in which the individual is young, middle-age, old or retired.
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A final part of Equation (1) is related to the utility of having children. As mentioned above, individuals 
decide upon the number of offspring they bear in their first (  
 ) or second (  
 ) period of life. When 
choosing this number of children, individuals take into account both the benefits and costs from 
raising them. As to the benefits, we assume that individual utility depends directly on the number of 
children. This assumption of weak altruism is mainstream in the literature (e.g. Eckstein and Wolpin, 
1985; Galor and Weil, 1996; Eckstein et al., 1988; Fanti and Gori, 2012 and Cipriani, 2013). It implies 
that children are considered as a pure consumption good and not as an investment good, i.e. 
children yield utility to their parents only in the period in which they are born. 4 For simplicity, we 
assume a logarithmic specification:  (  
 )       (  
 ) for      . 5 
Raising children is also costly. There are two types of costs which prevail both in the first (subscript 1) 
and second (subscript 2) period after a child is born. First, parents spend some exogenous amount s1 
(resp. s2) of their available time on child rearing (see also Figure 1). If raising an additional child thus 
implies taking less leisure, this has a direct negative effect on utility. If on the other hand, it means 
less labor supply, it has an indirect financial effect due to lower labor income. 6 Second, there is also a 
direct financial cost to bring up offspring. We think of food costs, living expenditures, college tuition... 
We define the latter as a fraction of the after-tax wage income (see also Cipriani, 2013). We assume 
these fractions to be ω1 resp. ω2. 
 
As mentioned before, we will not describe in detail all equations of the model in the main text. 
However, we do mention the first order condition for the decision on the number of children in 
Equations (2a) and (2b) below. 
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The above first order conditions state that individuals choose the number of children   
  to equalize 
the costs and benefits of raising an additional child. The left-hand side of Equations (2a) and (2b) 
                                                        
4
 Many studies exist in which children are considered as investment goods. Bental (1989) and Sinn (2004) 
consider a transfer from children to elderly parents. However, given the fact that may developed countries 
have social security systems and old-age pension systems, the motive for having children as an investment 
good is not that prevelant anymore. 
5
 Note that the utility-value of offspring can be different depending on their timing of birth. In our model, for 
instance, the fact that     might be smaller than     could capture the fact that the higher the mother’s age 
when pregnant, the higher the possibility of difficulties during the period of pregnancy, premature birth or 
congenital handicap of the child. 
6
 We do not model a time cost of bearing children in the third period after the child is born. We believe this is a 
realistic assumption. It would of course be possible to introduce such a cost s3. In that case, as long as children 
require more care and attention, in terms of time costs, when parents are younger than age 50 the results in 
this paper will hold.  
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describe the direct utility gain from bearing an additional child given our assumption of children as 
consumption goods. The right-hand side shows the marginal utility loss. This loss consists of two 
components. All things equal, more children reduce the available leisure time in the first two periods 
of parenthood, as shown by the first two terms on the right-hand side. These terms thus capture the 
time cost of having children. The final two components in Equation (2) capture the financial cost of 
having children. That is, bearing an additional child implies that a higher fraction of income is spent 
on children (according to fraction    ). Again, given the set-up of the model, these effects occur 
both in the first and second period of parenthood. The resulting fall in after tax-consumption leads to 
a drop in utility.   
 
Another important feature of the model is the social security system. Our set-up is as follows. First, 
between the moment of withdrawal from the labor market (time   ) and the age of 65, individuals 
receive an early retirement benefit. This benefit is defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a 
full-time worker. Second, after the statutory retirement age, individuals receive an old-age pension 
benefit. We assume a public PAYG pension system in which pensions in period k are financed by 
contributions (labor taxes) from the active generations in that period k. Individual net pension 
benefits consist of two components. These are shown in Equation (3) below. A first component is 
related to the individual’s earlier net labor income. It is a fraction of his so-called pension base, i.e. a 
weighted average of revalued net labor income in each of the three active periods of life. The net 
replacement rate is   . The parameters p1, p2 and p3 represent the weights attached to each period. 
In our calibration (see further), it is assumed that these three parameters are equal to 1/3. This part 
of the pension rises in the individual’s hours of work   
  and his human capital   
 . It will be lower 
when the individual retires early (lower Rt). Thanks to revaluation, this part of the net pension is 
adjusted to increases in the overall standard of living between the time that workers build their 
pension entitlements and the time that they receive the pension. We assume that past earnings are 
revalued in line with economy-wide wage growth x and hence follow practice in many OECD 
countries (OECD, 2005; Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006). The second component of the pension is a 
flat-rate or basic pension. Every retiree receives the same amount related to average net labor 
income in the economy at the time of retirement. This assumption assures that also basic pensions 
rise in line with productivity. Here, the net replacement rate is   . 
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Firms 
Domestic firms act competitively on both input and output markets. They use physical capital 
together with existing technology and effective labor provided by the three active generations as 
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inputs in the production process. All firms are identical and total domestic output is given by a 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. Firm maximization leads 
to two well-known equations. First the wage per efficiency unit of labor equals the marginal 
productivity of one additional unit of effective labor. Second, the real interest rate equals the after-
tax marginal productivity of capital, corrected for capital depreciation. These first order conditions 
are also reported in the Appendix. 
 
Human capital 
Human capital has a crucial role in the model. We assume that the average level of human capital of 
a middle-aged generation is inherited by the next young generation. This mechanism, which is the 
source of per capita growth in the model, generates a positive externality from education in the 
sense of Azariadis and Drazen (1990). A young individual may subsequently augment its stock of 
human capital through time investment in education. The private return to schooling depends not 
only on the initial stock of human capital but also on the quality of the education system ( ) and the 
amount of government expenditures on education (  ). We assume a CES-specification for the 
human capital accumulation function. We show the empirical relevance of such a specification in 
Buyse et al. (2012, 2013).  
 
Government 
The model includes an extensive fiscal block. The government raises taxes on individuals’ 
consumption (  ) and labor income (  ) and on firms’ capital (  ). The expenditures consist of 
productive expenditures (  ), which raise the return to education, consumption goods (  ), which 
are wasteful, benefits related to non-employment (  ), including early retirement benefits, old-age 
pension benefits (   ), lump sum transfers (  ) and interest payments on outstanding debt (    ). 
Note that we disregard alternative government expenditures in the model such as expenditures for 
child benefits, subsidies care, public expenditures for schools… A comparative analysis of different 
policies to raise fertility (either through pension reform or child care) is not the purpose of this paper. 
Fenge and Meier (2009) for instance, compare the effects of family allowances and fertility-related 
pensions.  
 
Calibration 
We calibrate our model to Belgian data on employment, education rates and growth rates. We 
choose this country since in Belgium the calculation of pension benefits fits exactly within the way 
we model it. Belgian public pensions are proportional to average annual labour income earned over a 
period of 45 years, with equal weights to all years. There is no basic pension (OECD, 2005). As to the 
pension equation in our model, i.e. equation (2) above, this comes down to   >0,   =0 and 
p1=p2=p3=1/3. We believe that the assumption to calibrate our model to Belgium does not restrict us 
in any way to generalize the results to other OECD countries. In Buyse et al. (2013), where the 
authors also calibrate on Belgium, the model is first validated empirically for a group of 13 OECD 
countries. Before using the parameterized theoretical model for policy simulations, the authors thus 
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test whether the model’s predictions are within reliable bands. More specifically, the authors impose 
common technology and preference parameters on all countries, but country-specific fiscal policy 
and pension system parameters. Simulating the model for each country they find that its predictions 
match the main facts in most countries. These facts concern observed hours of work in three age 
groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64), education of the young (20-34), the effective retirement age, and per 
capita growth since 1995.  
We basically follow the same calibration strategy as in the above paper. We mention the 
resulting parameter values in Appendix B. As to the novel parameters in this model, i.e. on the costs 
and utility of children, our assumptions are as follows. The average total fertility rate (TFR) for 
Belgium in the period 2003-2012 was about 1.8. Given that we do not consider men and women in 
our model, but a representative individual, we want to target a TFR of 0.9 (=1.8/2) in the calibration. 
Data for Belgium further reveal that about 85% of the offspring are born before the age of 35. We 
calibrate the relative utility value of children (    and    ) versus consumption to match these 
figures.7 We further assume a time cost of 10% of available time per child in the first period after the 
child is born and 5% in the second period (i.e.   =0.1 and   =0.05). This assumption is in line with for 
instance Casarico and Sommacal (2012), who assume a time cost of raising children of about 6% in 
the adult period (which in their model lasts for 25 years). In our simulations, we will neglect the 
financial cost of raising offspring and set       . Note that for the main results in this paper, 
the presence of financial costs in in fact superfluous in our model. We come back to this in the next 
section. 
 
3.  Simulation results 
The objective of this paper is to exploit the above model in order to analyze the impact of pension 
policy on fertility, employment, education and growth. Before we proceed, it is important to note 
that any impact of these policies on the government budget is neutralized by a change in lump-sum 
transfers. In other words, we assume that lump sum transfers are endogenously changed to maintain 
a constant debt to GDP ratio.8 Table 1 shows the results of our simulations. We show the steady-
state effects on labor supply of young, middle-aged and older workers, the retirement decision of 
older workers, the education decision of the young, per capita growth, TFR and population growth. 
The required change in lump-sum transfers to maintain a constant debt ratio is indicated at the 
bottom of the table.  
 
In the first and second column of Table 1, we adopt the preferred policies put forward in Buyse et al. 
(2013). More specifically, in Policy 1, we alter the calculation of the pension base, such that more 
weight is given to the net labor income of workers when they are ‘older’. In Equation (3) above, this 
policy involves an increase in p3, and a fall in p1. We assume that this reform does not hold for the 
                                                        
7
 This implies that we set    and    to a value of respectively 0.765 and 0.135 in the calibration. 
8
 Alternatively, simulations in which the consumption tax is used as endogenous instrument are available on 
request. The general results obtained in this paper do not change. 
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current generation of retirees, as they are no longer able to adapt their behavior to these new 
pension weights. 
 
Table 1. Steady-state effects of pension reform – Effects for Belgium 
Initial values: 
p1=1/3 
p2=1/3 
p3=1/3 
   =0.631 
   =0 
Policy 1 
p1=0 
p2=1/3 
p3=2/3 
Policy 2 
p1=0 
p2=1/3 
p3=2/3 
  =0.70 
Policy 3 
  =0 
  =0 
      
Policy 4 
  =0 
  =0 
      
 [  (    )]    
Effect (a):     
n1 -6.46 -6.88 0.54 4.17 
n2  -1.22 -0.81 -1.05 1.72 
n3 7.69 8.94 -13.67 -0.50 
R (b) 1.36 1.59 -2.28 0.28 
e 2.02 2.33 -0.24 -1.34 
TFR 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.6 
d annual (c) 0.88 0.88 0.03 -0.67 
 annual per 
capita growth (a) 
0.16 0.18 -0.02 -0.11 
Z ex post (d) 2.83 2.64 -5.24 3.40 
Notes:  The benchmark values are as follows:   =51.1,   =56.8,   =29.3,  =57.9,  =14.1,  =0.91, TFR=1.8. 
(a) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark, except R. 
(b) change in optimal effective retirement age in years. 
(c) change in annual population growth rate, in % points. 
(d) change in lump sum transfer (as a fraction of output) to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant at the 
level of the benchmark, in percentage points. 
 
An important effect from Policy 1 is the rise in the fertility rate. We observe an increase of 0.88 
percentage points in the annual population growth rate after this reform. For Belgium, this would 
imply a rise in the population growth rate from about -0.60% to 0.28% per year. The mechanism 
driving this increase is a substitution effect. The higher (lower) marginal utility from work when older 
(young) makes it interesting to shift work from the first period of active life to the third. Part of the 
available time that arises during youth is spent on education. Young individuals are encouraged to 
study because the lifetime rate of return to building human capital rises. This follows first from the 
reduction of the opportunity cost of studying when young, second from the perspective of working 
longer, and third from the greater importance of effective human capital when old in the pension 
calculation. Another part of the available time is spent on raising children. As such, the positive effect 
on fertility is indirect as the drop in work hours at the period of youth allows for more time to be 
spent on raising children. Note that we also observe a small drop in the mean age at birth (not 
presented). As bearing offspring after the age of 35 also leads to more time costs during the third 
active period (that is, after the age of 50), the proposed pension reform in fact discourages having 
children at later ages. Overall, however, the net effect on the total fertility rate is strongly positive. 
Finally, note that as long as children require more care and attention, in terms of time costs, when 
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parents are younger than age 50 (which is a realistic assumption) our results will hold. Moreover, our 
results prevail even when would have included a direct financial cost (i.e.       ) of raising 
children in the simulation exercises. 
 
The increase in fertility reduces the financial pressure on the pension system and the overall 
government budget. The drop, although small, in the mean age at birth is also positive from the point 
of view of pension funding. Note that the impact on the government budget is not negative at all: 
lump-sum transfers are allowed to rise due to this reform, as shown in the final row in Table 1. 
Given the rise in lump-sum transfers to maintain a constant debt-to-GDP ratio, it becomes 
possible to even slightly increase the generosity of the pension system by augmenting   , the 
income-related pension replacement rate. We do this in Policy 2 where we let the earnings-related 
replacement increase from the initial 0.631 to 0.70. The rise in the pension replacement rate 
strengthens the link between earned labor income and work (especially at older ages) on the one 
hand and the pension benefit on the other. Further increases in employment, education rates and 
growth can be observed. Fertility and population growth are constant. Interestingly, when one would 
include a financial cost in the simulations, this pension policy, which leads to a rise in household 
consumption, would reduce the relative cost of having children and fertility would increase even 
more.  
 
The second part of Table 1 (Policies 3 and 4) shows the effects of a gradual shift from the PAYG 
system in the benchmark to a system with full private capital funding. These policies completely 
abolish old-age pension benefits (     ). For the government, this reform would imply a drastic cut 
in pension expenditures. We therefore assume that this drop in expenditures feeds through into 
lower social security contributions for all workers such that, ex ante, the decline in total labor tax 
receipts in % of GDP is exactly the same as the drop in pension expenditures.9 Policy 4 adds an 
additional feature to this reform. It acknowledges that, when the move to a fully-funded system 
implies a cut in taxes on labor, this will in our model also raise net non-employment benefits, as 
these are proportional to net wages. The gain from work versus non-employment then remains 
unaffected. Therefore, we keep the net non-employment benefit replacement rate unchanged in 
Policy 4, such that the labor tax cut raises the relative gain from work.10 In a way, this feature biases 
upwards the impact on employment. However, this setup is much more in line with the existing 
literature, where non-employment benefits are often disregarded (see our discussion in Buyse et al., 
2013).  
                                                        
9
 In particular, the gradual decline in    and    is announced at time t=1 and implemented as follows. 
Pensions benefits are not reduced for retirees at the moment of policy implementation (t=1), since retirees are 
not able to react to a pension reduction. In t=2 and t=3 the replacement rates are respectively reduced to 2/3 
and 1/3 of their initial rates. From t=4 onwards,    and    are zero. At each moment, overall labor tax rates 
are reduced to ex ante compensate for the decline in pension expenditures. 
10
 Mathematically, this implies constant   (    ). 
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An important effect of shifting to a fully-funded system is that the direct positive link between 
individual labor income and the pension system, which exists in the PAYG system as we have 
modeled it, is broken. Interestingly, as one can see in Table 1, the effect on employment depends on 
the assumption we make with respect to the net replacement rate of non-employment benefits. In 
Policy 3, where we only lower labor taxes to compensate for the decline in pension benefits, the 
effect on employment is clearly negative. (See the significant drop in employment of older workers). 
In Policy 4, when we keep the net benefit rates constant, the effect becomes positive due to the 
mechanism explained above. Whatever set-up is chosen, however, both policies imply the same 
negative impact on schooling. Growth decreases (up to -0.10%-points in Policy 4) as tertiary 
education is discouraged by the fall in the pension replacement rate   . Finally, both policies 
indicate either a zero or negative impact on the total fertility rate and population growth rate. 
Although the reduction in hours worked due to the drop in the pension generosity in Policy 3 leads to 
more available time to raise children, the drop in labor taxes (partly) offsets this effect. In case we 
would have included a financial cost in the simulations, defined as a fraction of net labor income, the 
depressing effect of a shift to a fully-funded system on the fertility and population growth rate is 
even larger. In this case, labor tax cuts increase the net income of individuals, and thereby raise the 
cost of children. Moreover, the drop in public pensions increases private savings (see next paragraph) 
and decreases households’ consumption. This drop in consumption raises the marginal utility of 
additional consumption and again indirectly increases the costs from bearing children. 
 
We further note that our simulations confirm an additional feature of moving to a fully-funded 
system as observed in Buyse et al. (2013). Although this reform encourages national savings (see e.g. 
Feldstein, 1974 and 2005), this need not imply an increase in domestic physical capital formation, 
and capital taxes, in an open economy. If effective labor supply and employment fall, this reduces the 
marginal product of physical capital, and causes savings to be invested abroad. This result is not 
shown but available on request. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we evaluate the effects of a parametric adjustment to an earnings-related PAYG 
pension system. We show that a simple but intelligent reform in which the calculation of the pension 
base is changed, may result not only in more employment and growth, but also in an increase in 
fertility. Such an intelligent pension design would maintain the strong link between own income and 
the earned pension, while putting more weight on the labor income earned as an older worker in the 
calculation of the pension base. By contrast, a shift to a fully-funded system can even reduce fertility. 
Note that our proposal above is not in any way an assault on the possible introduction of a 
child-related pension pillar or other policy instruments as remedies to low fertility. We acknowledge 
the possible positive impact of such instruments. However, we do show that when one takes the 
existing earnings-related pension scheme as given, and wants to maintain it, there exist other 
possibilities of reform such that fertility is stimulated. The main mechanism that drives our result 
goes as follows. Given that bearing children is costly and that this cost occurs mainly in the beginning 
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of adulthood, a reform in which the pension benefit depends more on hours worked and earned 
labor income in the later periods of active life, reduces the relative cost of bearing children. As a 
positive side effect, it may also stimulate individuals to study longer, as already shown by previous 
research (Buyse et al., 2013).  Note further that we have not allowed for an exogenous increase in 
longevity in the model, as to reflect the issue of ageing. Therefore, it is important to stress that we do 
not argue that the ‘proposed’ pension reform is a panacea for the issue of ageing. The only 
statement we want to make based on the results put forward in this paper is that our proposed 
pension reform is capable of relieving some of the pressure on the pension budget that arises due to 
an ageing population. The crucial element in this reasoning is that investment in education, 
employment at older age, per capita growth and the fertility rate all rise after the introduction of the 
pension reform. 
 
More generally, our results can be aligned with a recent proposal by Cigno (2010). He proposes a 
two-scheme pension system: “a part being Bismarckian in which individuals qualify for a pension by 
working and paying contributions, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension 
by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing.” We believe that future 
research should focus on how these two pillars can be optimally combined and constructed. That is, 
how can parametric adjustments of the current pension system, combined with the introduction of a 
child-related pension, be constructed in such a way that benefits employment, growth and welfare 
best? The results in this paper give insight on how to construct the former part. 
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Definition of parameters not described in the main text 
   Elasticity of output w.r.t. physical capital 
   Individual discount factor 
      Intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 
    Relative preference for leisure at age ‘j’ 
    Relative preference for children 
   Elasticity of substitution in enjoyed leisure in the third 
period of life 
     Share parameter in enjoyed leisure in the third period 
of life 
   Exogenous world real interest rate 
   Efficiency parameter in human capital production 
   Scale parameter in human capital production 
   Share parameter 
   Elasticity of substitution between education time and 
productive government expenditures 
    Depreciation rate of physical capital 
 
Appendix B: Calibration of main parameters 
Production parameters (output)          
Effective human capital production                               
Preference parameters                                       
                                 
World real interest rate          
Physical capital depreciation rate           
Child costs                              
 
Fiscal policy data used for calibration 
Capital tax rate (%)          
Labor tax rate (%)          
Consumption tax rate (%)          
Government debt (% of GDP)     ⁄         
Non-employment benefit replacement rates (%)         
Early-retirement benefit replacement rate (%)           
Pension benefit (net replacement rate, % )          
Basic pension (% of net average earnings)       
Government consumption (% of GDP)          
Government productive expenditures (% of GDP)         
PISA-science (divided by 1000)         
Note: for more information on the construction and sources of these data, we refer to Buyse et al. (2013). 
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Abstract 
We study the evolution of the ratio of public debt to GDP during 132 fiscal episodes in 21 OECD 
countries in 1981-2008. Our main focus is on debt dynamics during 40 consolidation periods. To 
define these periods we use data on the evolution of the underlying cyclically adjusted primary 
balance, and as such avoid biases that may be induced by one-off budgetary measures. The paper 
brings new evidence on the role of public sector efficiency for the success of fiscal consolidation. 
First, we confirm that consolidation programmes imply a stronger reduction of the public debt ratio 
when they rely mainly on spending cuts, except public investment. Government wage bill cuts, 
however, only contribute to lower public debt ratios when public sector efficiency is low. Second, we 
find that a given consolidation programme will be more effective in bringing down debt when it is 
adopted by a more efficient government apparatus. Third, more efficient governments adopt 
consolidation programmes of better composition. As to other institutions, consolidation policies are 
more successful when they are accompanied by product market deregulation, and when they are 
adopted by left-wing governments. By contrast, simultaneous labour market deregulation may be 
counterproductive during consolidation periods. 
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1.  Introduction 
The sharp increase in public debt ratios and growing concern about the sustainability of public 
finances since the recession in 2008-09 have imposed the need for a significant fiscal adjustment and 
credible debt reduction strategies in most OECD countries.  
Many countries have gained experience with fiscal consolidation programmes in the past two or 
three decades. Analysis of the effects of fiscal consolidation has also been high on the agenda of 
many researchers since seminal work by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Perotti (1995). 
Most of these researchers have tried to explain the probability of success in debt or deficit reduction 
(e.g. McDermott and Wescott, 1996; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Ardagna, 2004; Guichard et al., 
2007; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009; Tagkalakis, 2009; Larch and Turrini, 2011; Afonso and Jalles, 2012). 
Others focus on the evolution of economic growth, private consumption, or private investment 
during and after consolidation periods (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996; Hjelm, 2002; Alesina et al., 
2002; Ardagna, 2004; IMF, 2010a; Alesina and Ardagna, 2012).  
This paper contributes to the literature by studying directly the evolution of the ratio of public debt 
to GDP during and after fiscal consolidations. We embed this study in an empirical analysis of 132 
fiscal episodes in 21 OECD countries in 1981-2008. To the best of our knowledge, only one study has 
investigated the dynamics of the public debt ratio during consolidation periods before (see Heylen 
and Everaert, 2000). Given that ultimately it is the evolution of public debt that matters most in a 
consolidation context, this scarcity of available studies is surprising. A particular advantage of our 
approach is that it allows to empirically exploit the whole variation in outcomes after consolidation 
programmes. In our view, changes in the public debt to GDP ratio by for example -10, -1, +5 or +25 
percentage points are very different outcomes, which are worth being explained, rather than being 
restricted to either ‘success’ cases or ‘failures’. Compared to Heylen and Everaert (2000) we make 
progress along several lines. First, we include more recent fiscal episodes. Second, we also test more 
recent hypotheses on the success or failure of fiscal consolidation. We take Alesina and Perotti’s 
well-known composition hypothesis as our starting point, and also control for the influence of the 
international macroeconomic environment and of any preceding devaluation. More recent 
hypotheses concern the influence of labour and product market institutions and institutional reform, 
and the ideological orientation of the government. As we document in this paper, the literature has 
not come up with unambiguous answers concerning the effects of these institutions. Moreover, they 
have hardly been studied simultaneously. Most importantly, we put forward a new hypothesis 
emphasizing the role of public sector efficiency. We show that the level of public sector efficiency 
matters for the effects of any given consolidation programme, as well as for the characteristics of the 
programmes (size, composition) that governments adopt. We study all hypotheses simultaneously 
within one common framework, and with one dataset. Third, when defining fiscal episodes, we take 
the IMF (2010a) criticism seriously and focus on the evolution of underlying cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balances. The influence of one-off measures is excluded when we select fiscal 
episodes and test composition effects. Finally, our analysis allows to distinguish short-run effects of 
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fiscal adjustment policies on the debt to GDP ratio, i.e. effects during the adjustment period, from 
more persistent longer run effects. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define 132 fiscal episodes in 21 OECD 
countries since 1981. Among these, 40 are classified as consolidation episodes, 29 as expansions. The 
others are ‘neutral’ periods. In Section 3 we review some of the existing hypotheses on the 
determinants of the success or failure of fiscal consolidation, in particular those where institutions 
are important, and we refer to the results of related empirical studies. In addition, we launch a new 
hypothesis on the role of public sector efficiency. In Section 4 we derive our empirical specification 
for the evolution of the ratio of public debt to GDP, and discuss our estimation methodology. Section 
5 contains the results of our empirical work.  We conclude our paper and summarize our main results 
in Section 6. 
 
2.  Fiscal episodes in the OECD, 1981-2008 
The fiscal consolidation literature commonly determines consolidation and expansion periods using a 
criterion based on swings in the cyclically adjusted primary balance in percent of GDP (further CAPB). 
In a recent study, IMF (2010a) criticizes this method. Although the CAPB corrects for interest 
expenditures and business cycle fluctuations, it may sometimes give wrong signals about actual 
policy changes. Periods in which no specific consolidation measures were taken, were sometimes 
classified by researchers as consolidations. Also, periods with a deteriorating CAPB despite severe 
consolidation measures were sometimes not selected (IMF, 2010a). An important element is the 
influence of one-off budgetary measures. When one-off measures are taken, they may typically 
imply a temporary improvement of the reported CAPB, followed by a subsequent deterioration when 
their effect disappears. From the reported CAPB, one might erroneously conclude that a fiscal 
consolidation year was followed by an expansion year, whereas in reality there was no deliberate 
policy at all. A second problem is that traditional cyclical adjustment methods may sometimes suffer 
from measurement errors. They may for example fail to remove swings in tax revenue that are 
associated with (cyclically affected) asset price movements. 
Instead of the CAPB as a selection variable for consolidation and expansion periods, we use the 
underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance in percent of potential GDP (CAPBu). The latter 
corrects the CAPB for one-off transactions and budgetary measures. CAPBu data are published by the 
OECD. Annual data are available since 1980. On the basis of these data, we then distinguish three 
kinds of fiscal episodes. Each episode is a period of flexible duration in which the CAPBu consistently 
moves in the same direction. Following Heylen and Everaert (2000), a consolidation period is a period 
of at least two consecutive years when the CAPBu improves by at least 2 percentage points. Besides 
the requirement that the CAPBu improves in each single year of the consolidation period, there 
should be an improvement by at least 0.25 percentage points in the first year of the consolidation 
period and at least 0.10 percentage points in the final year. With the latter conditions, we hope to 
exclude years of mere stabilization. Similarly, we define an expansion period as a period of at least 
two consecutive years when the CAPBu deteriorated by at least 2 percentage points. Periods that do 
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not fit our definition of expansion nor consolidation, are labeled ‘neutral’. Applying these criteria to 
21 OECD countries in 1981-2008 yields 40 consolidations, 29 expansions and 63 neutral periods. 
Table 1 shows the different consolidation and expansion periods and their changes in the CAPBu. We 
also display the associated change in the gross government debt to GDP ratio (GD) up to two years 
after the end of the period. We list all neutral periods in a companion working paper (see Heylen et 
al., 2011, their Table 1). 
 
The definition of fiscal episodes is not uniform in the literature. Heylen and Everaert (2000), Guichard 
et al. (2007) and recently Alesina and Ardagna (2012) also define episodes of flexible duration. Most 
others, however, specify periods of a fixed number of one or two, and sometimes three, years during 
which the change of the CAPB exceeds a chosen number (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Alesina and 
Ardagna, 1998; von Hagen et al., 2002; Tavares, 2004; Larch and Turrini, 2011). An important 
advantage of our flexible duration approach is that it allows to study homogeneous episodes as well-
defined cases. Each episode ends with a change in policy. Among the 40 consolidation episodes that 
we define, 37 are followed by ‘neutral’ policy. Clearly, this facilitates consistent estimation of policy 
effects.  If one defines episodes as periods of for example one or two years, the next episode may be 
of a different kind, but it may also be of the same kind. It may then be more difficult to study longer 
run debt dynamics.   
 Furthermore, it is not common to use the CAPBu as a selection criterion to define fiscal 
episodes. To check if this variable is indeed more reliable than the CAPB, we have compared our 
selection of periods with the ones found by the IMF. The IMF (2010a) uses a narrative action-based 
approach to select fiscal adjustments. The authors emphasize five striking years which the commonly 
used CAPB-method incorrectly classifies as consolidations. Moreover, they point out five effective 
years of consolidation which are not classified as such. Nine of these ten years relate to 1981-200854. 
We report the details from our comparison in Heylen et al. (2011). We conclude that with the 
exception of only one case (Finland 1992), the change in the CAPBu gives the same signal as the IMF 
narrative approach. The data that one obtains to evaluate policy using CAPBu are in general much 
closer to the action-based indicator from the IMF than the data obtained when considering CAPB.     
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 Incorrectly classified as severe consolidations according to the CAPB-method are Belgium 1984, Germany 
1996, Japan 1999, Finland 2000 and Japan 2006. Incorrectly not classified as consolidations are Ireland 1982, 
Finland 1992, Finland 1993 and Italy 1993. 
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Table 1. Fiscal consolidation and expansion periods in the OECD: 1981-2008 
Consolidation periods    Expansion periods       
Country    Period ∆CAPBu ∆GD Country   Period ∆CAPBu ∆GD 
      (ts - tf)         (ts - tf)     
Austria  1984-1985 2.32 13.5 Austria  1993-1995 -2.40 9.2 
 
 1996-1997 3.88 1.4 
 
 1998-2000 -2.04 6.3 
Belgium  1982-1987 9.47 35.1 Belgium  2002-2005 -2.19 -24.0 
 
 1993-1994 2.77 -3.3 Canada  1982-1985 -2.65 24.5 
 
 1996-1998 2.41 -21.7 
 
 2001-2003 -3.55 -10.5 
Canada  1986-1988 3.71 8.3 Denmark  1989-1995 -3.94 7.5 
 
 1993-1997 7.23 1.1 Finland  1982-1983 -3.30 4.4 
Denmark  1983-1986 10.5 2.2 
 
 1985-1987 -3.51 -0.8 
 
 1996-1999 2.45 -23.4 
 
 1990-1992 -6.41 44.3 
 
 2003-2005 4.18 -24.1 
 
 2001-2004 -4.29 -6.9 
Finland  1993-1996 4.40 16.6 Hungary  1997-1998 -2.55 -16.5 
 
 1998-2000 6.46 -15.2 
 
 2001-2002 -5.04 4.2 
France  1994-1999 3.63 13.2 
 
 2005-2006 -2.62 13.3 
Germany  2003-2007 2.96 14.4 Ireland  2000-2002 -5.23 -18.9 
Ireland  1982-1984 5.95 37.3 Italy  2000-2003 -4.37 -6.5 
 
 1986-1989 6.25 -6.1 Japan  1992-1996 -5.68 50.0 
 
 1992-1994 2.59 -21.0 Netherlands  1989-1990 -3.16 4.8 
 
 2003-2004 2.05 -7.3 
 
 2001-2002 -3.04 -1.7 
Italy  1982-1983 4.37 -2.3 New Zealand  1996-1999 -2.80 -18.3 
 
 1990-1993 6.18 27.0 Norway  1987-1992 -7.68 -3.5 
 
 1995-1997 3.19 5.5 
 
 2001-2003 -6.17 14.9 
 
 2006-2007 2.27 7.8 Portugal  1989-1991 -2.72 0.6 
Japan  1981-1985 3.72 29.7 Spain  1988-1991 -2.50 16.8 
 
 2005-2008 3.01 32.9 Sweden  1990-1993 -6.92 30.6 
Netherlands  1981-1983 3.11 28.9 
 
 2001-2003 -4.68 -4.4 
 
 2004-2005 2.59 -9.9 UK  1990-1993 -5.42 15.6 
New Zealand  1992-1994 3.86 -15.3 
 
 2001-2004 -5.55 0.9 
Norway  1994-1995 5.40 -8.7 USA  1982-1986 -2.69 20.2 
 
 2004-2007 6.39 -0.7 
 
 2001-2003 -5.95 6.9 
Portugal  1982-1984 7.37 19.5 
     
 
 2006-2007 2.73 14.4 
     Spain  1992-1997 5.25 19.8 
     Sweden  1981-1984 4.12 22.8 
     
 
 1986-1987 3.09 -20.0 
     
 
 1996-2000 8.20 -20.8 
     
 
 2004-2005 2.26 -12.0 
     UK  1981-1982 2.72 1.8 
     
 
 1994-1999 6.97 -8.3 
     USA  1987-1989 2.00 9.0 
     
 
 1993-1998 4.59 -15.8 
     Average 
  
4.42 3.16 Average 
  
-4.11 5.61 
Note: ∆CAPBu: change in the underlying cyclically adjusted primary government balance in percent of potential 
GDP (change in percentage points between ts−1 and tf); ∆GD: change in the gross public debt ratio in percent of 
GDP (change in percentage points between ts-1 and tf+2). We indicate by ts the first year of the consolidation 
period and by tf the last year. Next to the 19 countries in this table, our dataset also includes Poland (1997-2008) 
and the Czech Republic (2000-2008). These two countries only yield ‘neutral’ fiscal episodes (see Heylen et al., 
2011).   
Data sources: OECD (2010a) and European Commission, AMECO. See Appendix 2 for details. 
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The left part of Table 1 confirms a well-known fact. Even if during consolidation severe fiscal 
measures are taken, this does not guarantee a reduction of the public debt ratio. In about half of the 
40 consolidation periods the debt ratio rises. Correlation between CAPBu and GD during all 
consolidation periods is surprisingly positive (0.14). Among the worst periods we find Ireland, 1982-
84, Belgium, 1982-87 and Japan, 2005-08, with increases in the debt ratio of more than 30 
percentage points. Table 1, however, also reveals many successful consolidation episodes, with debt 
ratio reductions by more than 20 percentage points (e.g. Denmark, 1996-99, 2003-05; Ireland, 1992-
94 and Sweden, 1996-2000). Heylen and Everaert (2000) observed the same striking differences and 
pointed to economic growth during the consolidation period as much more important for the evolution 
of the public debt ratio than the size of the consolidation programme. We confirm their finding in our 
working paper. Correlation between the change of the output gap and GD during the 40 
consolidation periods in Table 1 is -0.47 (see Heylen et al., 2011, Figure 1). Only in three consolidation 
periods we observe a falling public debt ratio in times of weak growth (Belgium, 1993-94; Ireland, 1992-
94; Italy, 1982-83).   
 
3.  Consolidation, growth and the public debt ratio 
The previous section has shown the absence of a clear relationship between the size of consolidation 
efforts and the change of the public debt ratio. It also indicated economic growth as crucial for the 
success of consolidation. These findings have inspired a huge amount of research into the 
determinants of the success or failure of fiscal consolidation programmes. Building on earlier work by 
Feldstein (1982) and Barro (1989), seminal contributions have been made by Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990, 1996) and Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996). Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998) and Heylen and Everaert (2000) present early surveys of the literature. For recent discussions, 
we refer to IMF (2010a) and Larch and Turrini (2011). 
The thread throughout this literature may be summarized as follows. Basically, tight fiscal policy 
programmes may have negative (Keynesian) effects on demand and economic growth, at least in the 
short run. As a result of these growth effects, consolidation efforts may have only a limited impact on 
the debt to GDP ratio, or no impact at all. Debt may be reduced, but so may GDP (see also IMF, 
2010a, OECD, 2010b). Several authors, however, have argued that if the characteristics of the 
consolidation programme and the context within which it takes place are good, fiscal adjustment 
may also bring about favourable effects. Favourable expectation and/or credibility effects for 
example may raise private consumption and investment. If labour costs fall, competitiveness and net 
exports may improve. The net effect on growth may then even be positive. In this paper we take the 
well-known composition hypothesis as our starting point, and also control for the influence of the 
international macroeconomic environment and of any preceding devaluation. Our focus is on the 
influence of labour and product market institutions and institutional reform, and on the ideological 
orientation of the government. The literature has not come up with unambiguous answers 
concerning the effects of these institutions. As our main contribution, we also introduce a new 
hypothesis on the role of public sector efficiency when discussing composition.  
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3.1.  Composition and the role of public sector efficiency 
The importance of the composition of consolidation programmes has been emphasized in particular by 
Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996). In their view, programmes that rely mainly on government 
consumption cuts (especially cuts in the wage bill) and social transfer cuts have a high probability of 
success, i.e. a high probability of safeguarding economic growth and reducing the debt ratio. 
Programmes that rely mainly on tax rises and government investment cuts, on the other hand, are 
expected to fail. Various explanations relating to both the demand side and the supply side of the 
economy may justify this hypothesis (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; 
IMF, 2010a). Empirically, it has received support from a lot of authors, e.g. McDermott and Wescott 
(1996), Perotti (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2012), von Hagen et al. (2002), and Schaltegger 
and Feld (2009). Heylen and Everaert (2000) confirm the favourable effects from transfer cuts, and 
from not cutting public investment, but they do not find that fiscal consolidation is more successful 
when it mainly relies on public wage bill cuts. Tagkalakis (2009) and Larch and Turrini (2011) confirm 
the contribution to successful consolidation of social spending cuts via a reduction of the generosity 
of the unemployment benefit system, but they find no prominent role for government wage bill cuts 
in successful consolidation either.  
 
Taking the ambiguity in the literature on the effects of government wage bill cuts as a starting point, 
we advance in this paper a new hypothesis emphasizing the role of public sector efficiency. It says 
that wage bill cuts may contribute to debt reduction if public sector efficiency is low, but that it will 
not contribute when public sector efficiency is high. In the latter case, downsizing the public sector 
may have negative effects on overall productivity and growth. Such negative effects may undermine 
competitiveness, and reduce asset prices and private agents’ permanent income. Investment and 
consumption will then fall. Angelopoulos et al. (2008) provide evidence on growth that may support 
our hypothesis. They find that the relationship between the size of the public sector and economic 
growth depends critically on public sector efficiency. At low efficiency, a growing public sector 
reduces growth. At high efficiency they find the opposite. Furthermore, it will be our hypothesis that 
efficient public authorities are more successful in setting up and implementing consolidation 
programmes. There are two elements in this hypothesis. A first one is that the same consolidation 
programme will be more effective in bringing down the public debt ratio when it is adopted by a 
more efficient government apparatus. Private agents may then see the programme as more credible, 
and believe it to be more durable. A second element is that more efficient governments adopt better 
consolidation programmes when it comes to size and composition. Efficiency in collecting tax 
revenue may be one element to explain this. Also, tax compliance and acceptance of expenditure 
cuts may be higher when citizens have stronger appreciation for, and more confidence in 
governments that are more efficient.  
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3.2.  Labour and product market institutions 
The literature reveals various ways in which labour and product market institutions may matter for 
the outcome of fiscal consolidation. Both the existing level of institutions and possible changes in the 
context of labour or product market reform, may be important. However, the sign of the influence of 
these institutions is theoretically often ambiguous. Tagkalakis (2009) discusses most channels. He 
also illuminates the possible trade-offs that policy makers may face between reforming labour 
and/or product markets and initiating fiscal consolidation. 
 One of the reasons for tax based consolidations to fail is that they induce higher wage claims 
and labour costs. Theory suggests that this adverse effect will mainly occur in economies with 
powerful, but uncoordinated unions and uncoordinated wage setting. It will not occur in highly 
competitive labour markets, where unions may be too weak to claim higher wages, or in economies 
with strong but coordinated unions and coordinated wage bargaining (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). In 
the case of coordination, unions internalize the negative aggregate effects from asking higher wages. 
They know that if they raise wage claims, wages will rise in large parts of the economy. This will 
create additional unemployment and new fiscal problems, such that in the end union members pay 
anyway. It is therefore better to accept the loss of purchasing power from the beginning. Ardagna 
(2004) finds evidence supporting this hypothesis. Along the same line of arguments, encompassing 
unions may also better see the long-run advantages of fiscal consolidation, and convince workers to 
accept the efforts needed. Tagkalakis (2009), however, also points to counter arguments. Strong and 
coordinated unions may undermine the success of fiscal consolidation when they use their power to 
organize opposition, or to push the composition of consolidation into the wrong direction. They may 
for example block off transfer cuts or cuts in the public wage bill. They may even cause higher 
expenditures, for example to compensate any losers of consolidation policies. Tagkalakis’ evidence 
tends to support these counter arguments. He finds that weaker unions/weaker degrees of 
coordination raise the likelihood of successful consolidation. In their recent study Alesina and 
Ardagna (2012) cannot confirm either view on the influence of unions. 
 Similar ambiguity exists on the effects of (changes in) employment protection legislation and 
product market regulation. On the one hand, deregulated goods and labour markets may imply 
higher employment, higher firm entry, and higher productivity and growth. In deregulated markets, 
interest groups are typically also less powerful, implying less opposition to efficient fiscal 
consolidation. It would then follow that flexible markets and/or complementary deregulation and 
structural reform raise the chances for successful consolidation. On the other hand, deregulation and 
reform may also imply short-run disruptions, more firings, more need to compensate losers, and a 
loss of political negotiation capital for the government (Tagkalakis, 2009). Flexible markets and/or 
structural reform may then undermine the success of fiscal consolidation. The existing empirical 
evidence is mixed. When it comes to product market deregulation, Tagkalakis (2009) finds that it 
does not raise the likelihood of successful fiscal consolidation, Larch and Turrini (2011) and Alesina 
and Ardagna (2012) find that it does. For the labour market, Tagkalakis (2009) and Larch and Turrini 
(2011) agree in finding no positive contribution from a reduction of employment protection 
 Chapter 5 
   135 
legislation. Alesina and Ardagna (2012), by contrast, claim that labour market deregulation improves 
the outcome of fiscal consolidation. Their evidence is not strong however.  
 
3.3.  Political institutions: ideology 
A large literature has studied the effects of political institutions. Some studies investigate effects on 
the likelihood that a fiscal adjustment programme is started, others concentrate on the chances that 
this programme is successful or fails (see e.g. Mierau et al., 2007, for a survey). Frequently studied 
institutions are the ideological orientation of the government and the degree of government 
fragmentation. Our attention in this paper goes out to the influence of ideology. For research on 
fragmentation, see e.g. Volkerink and de Haan (2001), Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) and de Haan 
et al. (2012). Moreover, we focus on the outcome of consolidation efforts. Mierau et al. (2007) show 
that the decision to start a fiscal adjustment, is primarily driven by economic factors and hardly 
affected by political variables.  
As to ideology, political parties from the left are traditionally associated with bigger government, 
higher (social) expenditures, and higher taxes, but not necessarily more unbalanced budgets. These 
preferences may explain why in periods of consolidation, governments from the left may find it more 
difficult to cut transfers and the public wage bill, and why they may prefer revenue based strategies 
and tax increases (Tavares, 2004). Given the importance of the precise composition of fiscal 
consolidation, the hypothesis may follow that left-wing policy makers have lower probabilities to 
bring down public debt rates if necessary. Right-wing governments would prefer spending cuts to 
reduce debts and deficits, which would raise their chances for successful consolidation. Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) tested this hypothesis, but could not find support for it. Ardagna (2004) even shows 
the opposite. According to her results, left-wing governments are more likely to implement fiscal 
stabilizations associated with a persistent reduction of the debt to GDP ratio. One possible 
explanation is that left-wing governments face less resistance to reform than right-wing ones. Unions 
for example may be more willing to offer their support to left-wing governments and allow them to 
cut government spending and/or increase tax rates. 
 
4.  Dynamics of the public debt ratio: empirical specification and method 
In this section we first derive the basic specification underlying our empirical analysis. Next we 
discuss a number of extensions and our estimation methodology. We also give insight in our data. 
 
4.1.  Basic econometric specification 
Our starting point is Equation (1), the well-known formula for the dynamics of the government debt 
ratio. In this equation, GDt is the ratio of nominal gross government debt to nominal GDP at the end 
of year t, PBt is the nominal primary balance in percent of nominal GDP in t, rn,t the nominal interest 
rate on outstanding government debt, gn,t the growth rate of nominal GDP, and SFt the stock-flow 
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adjustment in percent of GDP. The latter captures the effect on the public debt ratio from the 
accumulation of financial assets for example, and remaining statistical adjustments.  
 
           
(         )
      
                      (1) 
 
Equation (2) follows from (1) after splitting up the primary balance in three components. We have 
already defined CAPBut as the underlying cyclically adjusted component. Furthermore, CCPBt is the 
cyclical component in percent of GDP, and ONEOFFt captures the effect on the primary balance of 
one-off budgetary measures. It is defined as net revenue.   
     is potential to actual nominal GDP. 
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Equation (2) shows the major influence of real economic growth as a driver of the change in the debt 
ratio, which we highlighted at the end of Section 2. This influence runs via two channels. First, for given 
inflation, higher real growth reduces the burden of inherited debt, ((         ) (      )⁄ )     . 
Second, by raising tax receipts and reducing unemployment benefit expenditures, higher growth raises 
the cyclical component of the primary balance, CCPB. Both channels contribute to debt reduction 
(ΔGD<0). The other main determinants of the change of the public debt ratio are the underlying 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPBut) and the interest rate (rn,t). Fiscal policy makers control the 
former. The latter will depend also on actions from monetary policy makers. Finally, Equations (1) and 
(2) show the influence of the historical fiscal situation as reflected by GDt-1. 
Starting from Equation (2), we impose three major rearrangements to derive the basic econometric 
specification that we estimate in Section 5. First, in our regressions, we will not include the cyclical 
component of the primary balance (CCPB), nor the domestic interest and growth rates (gn, rn). It is 
clear from the literature that the evolution of these variables is highly endogenous. They are affected 
by the precise characteristics of discretionary policy and by the context within which policy is 
executed. By not controlling for CCPB, gn and rn in the regressions, we allow the exogenous fiscal 
policy variables and context variables to pick up the endogenous effects that they bring about. Fiscal 
policy variables that we include are the CAPBu and ONEOFF. These policy variables are cyclically 
adjusted and expressed in percent of potential GDP. They typically result from decisions taken before 
the year t. As context variables we include international nominal growth and interest rates 
(GROWTH, INTEREST), and we control for the possible influence of a preceding devaluation (DEVAL) 
on domestic growth and interest rates. Later we also introduce other variables, like institutions, to 
test other hypotheses that we formulated in Section 3. A final element in Equation (2) concerns the 
effects on the gross public debt ratio from stock-flow adjustments. It will be harder to account for 
these. Most of them are small and will show up in the error term. An important exception, however, 
concerns stock-flow adjustments due to deliberate government support to the banking sector 
(capital injections) during financial crises (see IMF, 2010b, p. 14). To capture these we introduce 
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CRISIS dummies related to the recent financial crisis and to the banking crisis in Finland and Sweden 
in the early 1990s. Taking these arguments into account generates the following straight-forward 
empirical specification for the change in the government debt ratio in country i and year t.  
 
                                                                        (3a) 
  
with:            
(                 )
         
        
             and        . 
 
In this equation 1 captures the effect on the change of the debt ratio from the level of the 
government’s (underlying cyclically adjusted primary) surplus. Our expectation from Equation (2) 
would be that 1 is close to -1. It may differ from this value, however, when it picks up the above 
mentioned endogenous responses of domestic interest and growth rates (for given international 
interest and growth) to changes in the government’s basic fiscal position. BURDENi,t is a new variable. 
It captures the automatic ‘snowball’ component of debt dynamics, as well as the effect from 
(exogenous) international nominal growth and interest rates on their domestic counterparts. Finally, 
i is a country-specific fixed effect, and is the country and year specific error term. The fixed 
effect may for example capture the influence of variables that explain structurally higher or lower 
potential growth or interest rates in individual countries during the period under consideration55. 
As our second rearrangement we introduce richer dynamics. Equation (3b) allows for different short-
run and equilibrium (or longer run) effects from discretionary policy changes on the change of the 
debt ratio.  
 
                                                               
                                                        (3b) 
 
Fiscal consolidation efforts for example bring about a temporary CAPBu > 0 which may imply a 
permanent increase of the level of CAPBu and permanently better debt dynamics (more favourable 
GD) in the subsequent periods. The coefficient 1 measures this permanent (longer run) effect, 
whereas 2 captures the temporary effect during the consolidation period. If short-run and 
equilibrium effects are the same, it would follow that 2=1, and we return to Equation (3a). The 
Keynesian view however would be that due to negative (positive) effects from fiscal consolidation 
policies (expansion policies) on domestic growth, 2 would be smaller in absolute value. Non-
keynesian effects, however, may raise 2. According to the hypotheses reported in the previous 
sections, the composition of underlying tax and/or expenditure changes may play a key role here. As 
                                                        
55
 Note that we include no time dummies in Equation (3a). International growth and interest rates and the 
crisis dummies in the regression pick up the main time effects common to all countries. 
,i t
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a final remark on dynamics, note that even temporary effects on the change in the debt ratio (GD) 
give rise to permanent effects on the level of GD.    
 
Our third rearrangement is to move from the annual specification in (3b) to a multi-annual one in 
Equation (4). This rearrangement reflects the focus in this paper on the evolution of the public debt 
ratio during well-defined multi-annual fiscal episodes. Equation (4) follows from summing Equation 
(3b) over all years that are part of the same episode. In Appendix 1 we illustrate the derivation of 
Equation (4) for the case where a fiscal episode includes two years.   
 
                                                             
                                                                         (4)  
 
In this equation, GDi,T is the change in the ratio of public debt to GDP in country i during episode T, 
AvgCAPBui,T is the average annual underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance in % of potential 
GDP during this episode, DURATIONi,T indicates the length of the episode in years, and CAPBui,T is 
the change in CAPBu during the episode56. ONEOFFi,T is the sum of all annual one-off measures over 
the fiscal episode T, DEVALi,T indicates the size of a devaluation in the year before the episode, and 
CRISISi,T again captures the effect of stock-flow adjustments during banking crisis in T. The analogy 
with Equation (3b) is clear. Whereas 1 captures the permanent effects on debt dynamics from 
changing a country’s basic financial position reflected by AvgCAPBui,T, 2 measures the more 
temporary effect from deliberate policy actions (CAPBui,T). The data for GDi,T and CAPBui,T are 
reported in Table 1. Remember that we calculate GDi,T over a period including two years after the 
end of the fiscal episode. Since many of the exogenous determinants of the evolution of the debt 
ratio operate via all kinds of effects on private agents’ behaviour and growth (e.g. credibility effects, 
expectation effects), it may take some time for these effects to materialize. As a final variable in 
Equation (4), we computed BURDENi,T from average international interest and growth rates during 
the episode T and from the level of a country’s government debt ratio in the year before the start of 
the episode T. The latter we indicate as GDINIT. Algebraically, 
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4.2.  Extensions: composition, non-linearity, institutions 
In our empirical analysis we extend Equation (4) in three ways. The first one allows to test for 
composition effects. It has been shown in many studies that the way in which governments change 
                                                        
56
 GDi,T  is computed as the change in GDi between ts−1 and tf+2, where ts is the first year of the episode and tf  
the last one. CAPBui,T is the total change in CAPBui between ts-1 and tf. Finally, AvgCAPBui,T is an annual 
average computed over all years from ts−1 to tf-1.   
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their CAPBu may matter for the effects of fiscal policy (see Section 3.1). We introduce this idea in our 
Equation (4) by substituting one of the following two decompositions for          : 
 
                                                     (5)  
                                                  
                                                     (6) 
 
The same decompositions can be made for the level of AvgCAPBui,T. In (5) we make use of a rather 
general decomposition of CAPBu. This decomposition distinguishes changes in underlying current 
government revenues (INCu) and changes in underlying non-interest expenditures (NIEXPu). A 
very small rest category of changes in underlying ‘other’ net revenue closes the equation. One can 
think of net capital transfers received by the government. The median of the absolute value of 
OTHERu over all countries and years in our dataset is less than 0.1% of GDP.  Equation (6) is a much 
more detailed decomposition of CAPBu. At the revenue side, we distinguish changes in cyclically 
adjusted direct taxes on business (TAXB), and changes in the sum of cyclically adjusted direct taxes 
on households, indirect taxes, and social security contributions paid by workers and firms (TAXT)57. At 
the expenditure side, we decompose changes in non-interest expenditures into changes in 
government wage consumption (WAGE), government non-wage consumption (NONWAGE), social 
security benefits paid (SOCEXP), subsidies (SUBS) and investment in physical capital (INV). Again, a 
component OTHERu2 closes the equation. This component is larger than OTHERu. It includes 
changes in net capital transfers, property income, and other current expenditures (e.g. transfers 
outside social security). In Table 2 below we report all variables that will occur in our regressions, 
with their definition. All fiscal policy data are provided by the OECD, or computed from OECD data. 
They are adjusted for the cycle and for one-offs, and always expressed in percent of potential GDP.  
 By introducing Equations (5) and (6) for CAPBu into Equation (4), and by consequently 
assigning separate coefficients 2j to each component, we fully take into account the government 
budget identity in our estimations. Kneller et al. (1999) have demonstrated the importance of 
appropriately dealing with this identity in order to obtain unbiased estimates and a correct 
interpretation of the effects of changes in each revenue or expenditure component. Our approach 
implies that each of the estimated individual coefficients 2j  measures the effect of a change in the 
CAPBu on the government debt ratio if this change is brought about by one particular expenditure or 
revenue component, controlling for (keeping constant) all other components. The composition 
hypothesis claims that the coefficients 2j may differ strongly. Even if each unit change in a revenue 
or expenditure variable brings about the same change in the CAPBu, its effect on the debt ratio may 
vary. Changes in different components of the government budget may affect the behaviour of 
                                                        
57
 In an earlier version of this paper we included each of the three subcomponents of TAXT separately. 
Empirically, however, we could never observe significant differences between their estimated coefficients. This 
conclusion also holds for the results that we present later in this paper (Table 4). We therefore decided to 
merge them.  
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households, firms, investors, etc. differently. Effects on growth may be different, and so may be 
effects on (the change of) the debt ratio.  
A second extension of Equation (4) allows for different coefficients on the fiscal policy variables 
according to the episode to which they belong: years of neutral policy, consolidation or expansion. 
One reason for doing this is possible asymmetry in the response of households or firms to fiscal 
contraction versus expansion. For example, if forward-looking households face borrowing 
constraints, they may cut consumption more after a tax increase than raise consumption after a tax 
cut. Pozzi et al. (2004) report evidence supporting this hypothesis. The response in real demand and 
output to fiscal shocks would then be stronger during consolidation. The fall in the ratio of public 
debt to GDP during consolidation would then be smaller than its rise during expansion. Another 
factor which may have similar consequences is asymmetry in price or wage flexibility. If prices are 
more rigid downwards, real output effects during consolidation could again be stronger.    
A third series of extensions of Equation (4) concerns the introduction of institutions and 
institutional reform as additional explanatory variables to test the other hypotheses that we 
advanced in Section 3. Table 2 defines also these additional variables.  
 
4.3.  Estimation method 
In regression equations like Equation (3b), which use annual data, and where only cyclically adjusted 
policy variables, predetermined variables, and exogenous foreign variables show up as regressors, 
the least squares estimation methodology would seem a most reasonable choice. An unexpected 
domestic growth slowdown for example which would raise the debt to GDP ratio and show up in the 
error term is not expected to affect these regressors. We know from the literature, however, that the 
validity of this choice may be challenged. A first reason is imperfect cyclical adjustment of fiscal 
variables. IMF (2010a, p. 4) demonstrates how traditional methods may for example fail to remove 
swings in tax revenue that are associated with asset price or commodity price movements. If the 
latter coincide with the cycle, the traditionally computed CAPB may be positively correlated with 
growth shocks. A second reason is that fiscal policy makers may react to shocks in the public debt 
ratio (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Although Beetsma et al. (2008) test this assumption for public 
spending in the European Union, and find no reaction within the year, this does not exclude that 
there is a reaction in a multi-annual setting like ours in Equation (4). Even if governments cannot 
respond within the same year, it may be possible in periods lasting longer. For example, 
consolidating governments that are hit by an adverse shock to the debt ratio may adjust their earlier 
plans. They may change tax codes or spending rules to raise their CAPBu, or take ONEOFF policy 
measures, in order to reach the goals for the debt ratio that they may have set. The use of the CAPBu 
may make us somewhat less vulnerable to the first problem. Given also the second problem, 
however, the possibility of correlation between the error term and some of our explanatory variables 
cannot be excluded ex-ante. If serious, this would impose the use of IV methods. Considering this 
possibility, it was very important for us to test the endogeneity of CAPBui,T, AvgCAPBui,T and 
ONEOFFi,T. We used the Wu-Hausman test as described in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p. 237-
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242). Since the reliability of this test depends crucially on having strong instruments for the 
potentially endogenous variables, we first define these instruments and demonstrate their strength.  
 
Table 2. Description of variables 
Policy variables  
GD 
GDINIT 
GDINIT2 
Gross public debt in % of GDP.  
Gross public debt in % of GDP in the year before the start of a fiscal episode. 
Gross public debt in % of GDP two years before the start of a fiscal episode 
CAPBu 
CAPBuINIT 
Underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance, in % of potential GDP.  
Underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance in the year before the start of a fiscal 
episode. 
CAPBuINIT2 
ONEOFF 
Underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance two years before the start of a fiscal 
episode. 
One-off budgetary measures (net revenue), in % of potential GDP.  
INCu Underlying current receipts, in % of potential GDP.  
NIEXPu Underlying non-interest expenditures, in % of potential GDP.  
TAXB Cyclically adjusted direct taxes on business, in % of potential GDP (corporate tax). 
TAXT Sum of cyclically adjusted direct taxes on households, indirect taxes on production and 
imports, and social security contributions, in % of potential GDP.  
WAGE Government final wage consumption expenditures, in % of potential GDP.  
NONWAGE Government final non-wage consumption expenditures, in % of potential GDP.  
INV Government fixed capital formation, in % of potential GDP.  
SUBS Subsidies, in % of potential GDP.  
SOCEXP Social security benefits paid by general government, in % of potential GDP. 
OTHERu(u2) Underlying other net revenue, in % of potential GDP. 
DURATION Number of years of the fiscal episode. 
DEVAL Official nominal devaluation in % in the year before the start of a fiscal episode 
International macro-context 
INTEREST ‘International’ nominal short term interest rate, in % (a) 
GROWTH 
BURDEN 
‘International’ nominal GDP growth rate, in % (a) 
See main text.  
CRISIS08 
 
CRISIS91sf 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 in all fiscal episodes including the years 2006, 2007 or 
2008 (GDi,T computed for these episodes includes 2008). 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 in fiscal episodes in Sweden and Finland covering 
1991-92. 
Institutions  
EPL Overall strictness of employment protection. Scale from 0 (least) to 6 (most restrictive).  
UNION Trade union density, in %. 
COOR Index from 1 to 5 rising in the degree of wage bargaining coordination. 
PMR Index for product market regulation. Varies from 0 (least) to 6 (most regulated). 
LEFT Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the government is left-wing and 0 otherwise. 
PSEAdm Index of government efficiency in administration. Varies in the data from about 0.5 (least 
efficient) to about 5 (most efficient). 
PSEAvg Index of overall government efficiency in administration, education, infrastructure and 
stabilization. Varies in the data from about 0.7 to about 4. 
Notes: For a detailed description of all variables, and our data sources, see Appendix 2. 
(a) For all European countries except the UK, INTEREST and GROWTH are the (weighted) average short-
term nominal interest rate and the average nominal GDP growth rate among 21 European OECD 
countries. For Canada we use interest and growth data from the US. For the US we use average data for 
Canada, Europe, and Japan. Finally, for Japan, New Zealand and the UK, we take the average of the data 
for Europe and the US.    
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For AvgCAPBui,T.DURATIONi,T  and CAPBui,T in Equation (4) we define instruments that reflect the 
fiscal situation before the start of the episode. A first instrument that we use for both these 
potentially endogenous variables is the CAPBu one year before the start of the episode. We call this 
variable CAPBuINIT. As a second instrument for AvgCAPBui,T.DURATIONi,T  we specify the CAPBu two 
years before the start of the episode (CAPBuINIT2). For CAPBui,T we define the public debt ratio two 
years before the start of the episode (GDINIT2) as our second instrument. The explanatory power of 
these variables for fiscal policy in later years has been shown before in the literature. Mierau et al. 
(2007) and Tagkalakis (2009) for example show a highly significant effect from a weak fiscal position 
on the likelihood of future fiscal adjustment in a panel of OECD countries. Moreover, since 
CAPBuINIT and CAPBuINIT2 will have been decided by policy makers at least one or two years before 
the episode T, they are predetermined with respect to Equation (4). Also GDINIT2 is a predetermined 
variable. This makes them valid instruments provided that there is no autocorrelation in the error 
term 58. As instruments for ONEOFFi,T  we define three dummy variables. A first dummy is also 
predetermined. It is 1 if the beginning of a fiscal episode is preceded by a change of the government 
and the government’s ideological orientation. Typically, these are occasions where political parties 
from either left or right take power after years of opposition. It can be expected that they come with 
a coherent new vision and programme. Moreover, such governments are more likely to enjoy the 
political capital and window of opportunity brought by change (Haggard and Webb, 1994; Mierau et 
al., 2007). It is our hypothesis that they rely less on one-off revenues. The remaining two dummies 
capture specific policy actions in two countries which are unrelated to shocks in domestic growth and 
the debt ratio. Such well-observable cases are particularly helpful to identify the effects of one-off 
measures on the public debt ratio. The first of these dummies is 1 for Finland in 1995 when the 
government had to compensate farmers for falling agricultural prices after joining the European 
Union (OECD, 1995). The second dummy is 1 for Japan in 1998 when the government made a one-
time capital transfer to the Japan National Railway (IMF, 2010a, p. 27). As a final remark, we mention 
that the six instruments that we define do not themselves belong in Equation (4). Tests show that 
they do not matter for the change in the debt ratio beyond their influence on CAPBui,T, AvgCAPBui,T 
and ONEOFFi,T.  
To assess the instruments’ explanatory power in our sample of fiscal episodes we first ran 
simple regressions of CAPBui,T and AvgCAPBui,T.DURATIONi,T on a constant and their two 
instruments and of ONEOFFi,T on a constant and its three instruments. We obtained R² statistics of 
0.38, 0.65 and 0.26 respectively. All instruments have the expected sign and are significant at the 2% 
level in these regressions. Then, for each of the three potentially endogenous variables, we executed 
Wald tests on the significance of their instruments in the so-called first stage regression, i.e. a 
regression of the potentially endogenous variable on all exogenous variables in Equation (4) and on 
all six instruments. These Wald tests yield F-statistics far above Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of 
                                                        
58
 A direct test of autocorrelation is not possible in our setup since this delivers no series of residuals at annual 
frequency. The evidence that we obtain from overidentifying restrictions tests, however, is consistent with the 
hypothesis that this condition is satisfied (see footnote 6). 
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thumb value of 10. More precisely, we obtain values of 19.9, 31.5 and 82.8 in the first stage 
regressions for CAPBui,T, AvgCAPBui,T.DURATIONi,T and ONEOFFi,T  respectively.   
Having defined instruments with good explanatory power finally allowed us to reliably execute 
the Wu-Hausman test. Augmenting our basic specification (Equation 4) with the three residual series 
from the first stage regressions for CAPBui,T, AvgCAPBui,T.DURATIONi,T and ONEOFFi,T and re-
estimating with the least squares method, resulted in highly insignificant coefficients for these 
residual series. A Wald test could not reject their joint insignificance (p-value 0.58). We can as a 
result not reject the null that our regressors in Equation (4) are exogenous and least squares 
estimates are consistent59. Given also its efficiency, we use this method. Details on all above 
mentioned tests are available upon request.   
 
5.  Empirical analysis 
In this section we present the results of an empirical analysis of the evolution of the public debt to 
GDP ratio in 132 fiscal episodes in 21 OECD countries in 1981-2010. Section 5.1. concentrates on the 
effects of fiscal policies as obtained from estimating Equation (4) or extended versions of this 
equation. Extensions allow for different effects from the various subcomponents of the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance according to Equations (5) or (6), and for different effects from fiscal 
variables in consolidation, expansion or neutral episodes. In our discussion we will mainly focus on 
effects during consolidation. In Section 5.2. we investigate the role of institutions and institutional 
change. To assess the statistical significance of our estimates we report White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. The reason is that we focus on multiple fiscal episodes in each country, 
which implies that error terms are bound to be dependent over observations60.  
 
 
5.1.  Basic results 
Column (1) in Table 3 contains the results from estimating Equation (4). All variables have the 
expected sign. With the exception of ONEOFF, they are all highly significant. The coefficients on 
CAPBu and BURDEN are not significantly different from 1 in absolute value. For BURDEN this is in 
line with expectations that one would derive from Equation (2), even if now international growth and 
interest rates are involved. Note that the strong significance of BURDEN in our regressions confirms 
                                                        
59
 With more instruments than potentially endogenous variables, 2SLS estimation allows a test of 
overidentifying restrictions. Estimating for example Eq.
 
(4) by 2SLS, using our set of six instruments, yields a p-
value of 0.24 for this test. The null hypothesis that we defined valid instruments for the Wu-Hausman test 
cannot be rejected.  
60
 Ideally, one applies standard errors that are clustered on the country level. In practice, however, this is not 
advisable in our setup with 21 countries. As described by Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 310-320), when the 
number of clusters is small (less than 42), clustering biases estimated standard errors downward. Moreover, 
the Bell and McCaffrey adjustment to reduce this bias proves unfeasible technically in our case. Angrist and 
Pischke (their footnote 17, p. 320) mention this problem when regressors are dummy variables that are 1 for 
one of the clusters and 0 otherwise. Our crisis dummy CRISIS91sf comes very close to this example.  
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the importance of international growth and interest rates for each country’s debt evolution, most so 
for high debt countries. For CAPBu the outcome is as expected if over the fiscal episode the effect 
of discretionary policy on output and growth is about neutral. The inherited fiscal balance as 
reflected by the level of AvgCAPBu, however, obtains a coefficient which is clearly larger than 1 in 
absolute value. In line with arguments raised in Section 4.1., having a better fiscal position seems to 
matter for GD not only by the mere fact of having to borrow less, as in the first term of Equation 
(2). It may also bring about favourable endogenous domestic interest and/or growth rate effects, 
affecting the ‘snowball’ mechanism. Moreover, the fact that GD has been computed over a period 
up to two years after the fiscal episode may enlarge the induced cumulative effects on interest 
payments. For ONEOFF, by contrast, we find no significant effect. One may imagine that negative 
credibility or expectation effects on private sector behaviour and/or financial markets explain (part 
of) this result. As to the other explanatory variables, our results confirm that a preceding devaluation 
may contribute significantly to a reduction of the public debt ratio. Finally, the CRISIS dummies 
capture direct stock-flow adjustments of more than 10 percentage points on the debt to GDP ratio in 
all countries during the 2008 financial crisis, and even more than 20 percentage points in Sweden 
and Finland during their banking crisis in the early 1990s.  
Table 3. Estimation results – 1  
 
∆GD 
Explanatory variables     (1) se (2) se 
Constant 3.23 2.15 2.34 2.04 
AvgCAPBu*DURATION -1.42*** 0.16 -1.42*** 0.16 
BURDEN*DURATION 1.11*** 0.22 1.16*** 0.22 
∆CAPBu -1.06*** 0.30 - 
 
ONEOFF -1.12 0.88 -1.25 0.88 
CRISIS08 10.8*** 2.22 11.2*** 2.19 
CRISIS91sf 25.4*** 6.08 19.8*** 6.49 
DEVAL -2.28*** 0.41 -2.68*** 0.46 
Consolidation 
    
∆CAPBu - 
 
-0.38 0.43 
Expansion 
    
∆CAPBu - 
 
-2.41*** 0.47 
Neutral 
    
∆CAPBu - 
 
0.51 1.23 
R-squared 0.77 
 
0.79   
Adjusted R-squared 0.71 
 
0.73 
 
Country fixed effects (times 
DURATION) 
yes  yes  
Number of obs. (countries) 132(21) 
 
132(21)   
Notes:  ‘se’ indicates White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors; 
*** (**) (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. For a definition of all variables, see 
Table 2. AvgCAPBu indicates the average level of CAPBu during the fiscal episode (see our discussion of 
Equation 4, footnote 3). 
 
In column (2) we allow the coefficient on CAPBu to differ during fiscal consolidation episodes, 
expansion episodes and neutral periods. Differences are remarkable. Effects of discretionary action 
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on the debt ratio are much smaller during consolidation than in expansion. Our regression results do 
not provide a sharp explanation for this finding, but it clearly seems that domestic output (and 
therefore the denominator in the debt ratio) responds much more to policy in consolidation than in 
expansion, for example due to asymmetry in private sector behaviour. In line with the evidence of 
Pozzi et al. (2004) that we referred to at the end of Section 4.2., households may cut consumption 
after tax increases, but not raise it after tax cuts. Also, they may not raise consumption after public 
expenditure cuts, but reduce it after public expenditure increases. These asymmetries 
notwithstanding, it is clear that permanent consolidation efforts imply a better future CAPBu level. 
The effect of consolidation efforts may be small and insignificant during the consolidation episode (as 
revealed by the coefficient on CAPBu). By permanently improving (future) AvgCAPBu, however, 
they will permanently facilitate debt reduction. The other estimation results in column (2) are hardly 
affected by allowing for different coefficients on CAPBu. 
 Note that we also allowed different coefficients on AvgCAPBu.DURATION in the three 
regimes, but this did not yield anything significant. The p-value on a Wald test that all three 
coefficients are the same, is 0.79. Throughout all regressions that we report in this paper, it is a 
robust result that there are no significant differences in the estimated coefficients on fiscal ‘level’ 
variables (β1). Neither do we observe significantly different effects on BURDEN.DURATION in 
consolidation, expansion or neutral periods. 
 
Table 4 allows for different effects from the various (cyclically adjusted) revenue and expenditure 
components behind the government balance. Column (3) introduces the basic decomposition of 
CAPBu in changes in underlying non-interest expenditures ΔNIEXPu and current receipts ΔINCu. At 
the top of the table we decompose AvgCAPBu.DURATION accordingly, and as such allow for possibly 
different permanent effects of taxes and expenditures on debt dynamics, i.e. effects on GD which 
persist even after the end of a consolidation or expansion episode. Our main results for the 
consolidation episodes are the following. First, fiscal adjustment efforts have only limited effects on 
the government debt ratio during the episode itself, which confirms our findings in Table 3. Column 
(3) reveals a negative coefficient on INCu during consolidation. The most likely effect from raising 
taxes on the public debt to GDP ratio during the consolidation period is therefore negative. However, 
this effect is small and not significantly different from zero. Things are even worse at the expenditure 
side, where the estimated coefficient on NIEXPu is even less significant. It also obtains an 
unexpected negative sign. As a group, expenditure cuts seem ineffective in bringing down the debt 
ratio, at least during the consolidation period. Stronger impact effects on output, as one typically 
finds in multiplier studies (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), may explain the lower effectiveness at 
the expenditure side. Another explanation may be that NIEXPu pools various expenditure 
components, with possibly opposite effects on the debt ratio (e.g. public investment versus social 
transfers). Although these observations may raise doubt about the composition hypothesis, it would 
be too fast to draw this negative conclusion. Maybe more important, and in line with the 
composition hypothesis, are our results in the upper part of column (3). When we also decompose 
the level of AvgCAPBu, we observe significant positive effects from AvgNIEXPu and significant 
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negative effects from AvgINCu with the former being much larger in absolute value. Permanent 
improvements of the CAPBu will have stronger favourable effects on future debt dynamics if these 
permanent improvements are realized by means of expenditure cuts rather than tax increases. 
Although, as such, this finding confirms the composition hypothesis that consolidation policies are 
more effective when they operate at the expenditure side, it can clearly not be concluded that tax 
policies are ineffective.  
 
Columns (4)-(6) investigate the composition hypothesis in greater detail. These columns introduce 
for each policy regime the decomposition of CAPBu that we put forward in Equation (6). The level 
of AvgCAPBu at the top of the table, however, is still decomposed in its two major categories INCu 
and NIEXPu (and OTHERu) as in column (3). A Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis that at this 
level all expenditure subcategories have the same coefficient and all income subcategories have the 
same coefficient. The upper part of columns (4)-(6) confirms that permanent improvements of the 
CAPBu, realized either by expenditure cuts or by tax increases, do have favourable effects on future 
debt dynamics, but the effects from permanent expenditure cuts are stronger. During the 
consolidation period, however, it is more difficult to observe strong effects, at least at first 
inspection. Straightforward estimation in column (4) yields mainly insignificant coefficients, often 
with an unexpected sign. At the revenue side, the only significant and robust result is the favourable 
(negative) effect on the public debt ratio from raising direct taxes on business (TAXB). Although this 
result goes against the composition hypothesis, Alesina and Perotti (1995) also observed it. So did 
Heylen and Everaert (2000). At the expenditure side during consolidation periods, the only significant 
result in column (4) is the negative coefficient on ∆WAGE. Again, this is surprising from the 
perspective of the composition hypothesis. However, as we documented in Section 3.1., similar 
results for ∆WAGE were found earlier by Heylen and Everaert (2000) and Tagkalakis (2009). The 
estimated negative effect on ∆INV during consolidation is much more in line with the composition 
hypothesis. In column (4) this effect is still insignificant, however. Just like in Table 3, these policy 
effects are again larger than those during consolidations. As to the other variables in column (3), we 
observe some changes of limited importance compared to our findings in Table 3. The main 
difference is that now ONEOFF becomes statistically significant, whereas the early 1990s crisis 
dummy in Sweden and Finland (CRISIS91sf) loses significance. Both crisis dummies become smaller. 
In expansionary episodes all policy effects have the expected sign, and are highly significant.  
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Table 4. Estimation results – 2 – composition  
  ∆GD 
Explanatory variables   (3) se (4) se (5) se (6) (b)  se 
Constant   3.37° 2.1 2.27 2.5 4.57° 3.0 5.36° 3.2 
AvgINCu*DURATION   -1.18*** 0.2 -0.97*** 0.2
11
9 
-0.90*** 0.3 -
0.93**
* 
0.3 
AvgNIEXPu*DURATION   1.46*** 0.2 1.12*** 0.2 1.09*** 0.3 1.21**
* 
0.3 
AvgOTHERu*DURATION   -0.68 0.6 -0.44 0.6 -0.37 0.9 0.26 1.3 
BURDEN*DURATION   1.30*** 0.3 1.10*** 0.2 1.12*** 0.4 1.08** 0.5 
ONEOFF   -2.48*** 0.9 -2.31*** 0.9 -2.03** 1.0 -2.32* 1.3 
CRISIS08   8.50*** 2.4 12.7*** 2.5 17.3*** 3.2 15.0**
* 
4.3 
CRISIS91sf   3.15 6.1 14.0* 7.7 9.53 7.3 16.7** 7.5 
DEVAL   -2.03*** 0.7 -1.62*** 0.6 -2.30 2.0 -0.33 2.1 
Consolidation   
        
∆INCu   -0.51 0.8 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
          ∆TAXB   - 
 
-7.87*** 2.2 -4.54** 2.0 -4.40 3.1 
          ∆TAXT   - 
 
-0.28 1.2 1.31 1.5 1.09 1.7 
∆NIEXPu   -0.20 0.6 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
          ∆SOCEXP 
  
- 
 
1.88 2.1 0.20 2.0 0.49 2.6 
          ∆SUBS 
  
- 
 
1.86 3.6 7.86*** 2.8 11.0**
* 
3.5 
          ∆INV 
  
- 
 
-3.90 2.9 -8.09*** 2.5 -
11.4**
* 
3.7 
          ∆WAGE 
  
- 
 
-4.28* 2.4 6.56° 4.3 13.2** 6.6 
          ∆NONWAGE 
  
- 
 
-2.68 3.0 -25.3*** 7.1 -29.2** 13.5 
          ∆OTHERu2 
  
- 
 
4.91** 2.3 6.07*** 2.3 6.14** 2.9 
∆OTHERu   -11.1*** 2.8 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
PSEAdm*DURATON 
  
- 
 
- 
 
-3.15** 1.3 -
4.04**
* 
1.4 
PSEAdm*DURATION*∆WAGE 
  
- 
 
- 
 
-2.17*** 0.6 -
2.65**
* 
0.9 
PSEAdm*DURATION*∆NONWAGE 
 
- 
 
- 
 
4.16*** 1.0 4.91**  2.1 
Expansion 
          
∆INCu   -2.39*** 0.8 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
          ∆TAXB   - 
 
-5.55** 2.4 -5.47** 2.3 -4.84* 2.8 
          ∆TAXT 
  
- 
 
0.85 1.4 -0.23 1.3 -0.06 1.5 
∆NIEXPu   3.08*** 0.6 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
          ∆SOCEXP   - 
 
3.46** 1.7 3.73** 1.7 2.43 1.9 
          ∆SUBS   - 
 
11.9* 6.2 16.1*** 4.6 15.6**
* 
5.3 
          ∆INV   - 
 
2.09 3.3 -2.0 3.6 -3.80 4.3 
          ∆WAGE   - 
 
2.95 2.3 7.84* 4.1 7.19* 4.2 
          ∆NONWAGE   - 
 
2.87 2.7 -5.75* 3.2 0.69 6.8 
          ∆OTHERu2   - 
 
-1.77 3.2 -0.52 3.3 1.46 3.7 
∆OTHERu   -14.8*** 5.0 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
PSEAdm*DURATON   - 
 
- 
 
-2.06° 1.4 -2.40° 1.6 
PSEAdm*DURATION*∆WAGE   - 
 
- 
 
-0.29 1.0 -0.31 1.0 
PSEAdm*DURATION*∆NONWAGE   - 
 
- 
 
1.66*** 0.6 -0.28 1.6 
Neutral (a)           
Adjusted R-squared   0.76 
 
0.79 
 
0.84 
 
0.79 
 
Country fixed effects (times 
DURATION) 
  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Number of obs. (countries)   132(21) 
 
132(21) 
 
118(19) 
 
107(17) 
 
Notes: ‘se’ indicates heteroscedasticity-consistent (White) standard errors;  *** (**) (*)(°) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% (5%) (10%)(15%) level. For a definition of all variables, see Table 2. 
(a) The results for the neutral periods are available upon request. Coefficients are generally  
        insignificant.  
(b) The sample here excludes all observations where WAGE<9.2% on average during the fiscal episode  
      (9.2%  is the 10
th
 percentile value of WAGE over all observations).  
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In columns (5) and (6) we introduce a new hypothesis, which brings a much more nuanced picture, 
and significant estimates for most fiscal policy variables. More precisely, we control in these columns 
for the level of public sector efficiency in administration (PSEadm)61. Our main finding is that cutting 
the public sector wage bill contributes directly to debt reduction only when public sector efficiency in 
administration is low. Evaluated at the median duration of consolidation periods (3 years), and at 
median PSEAdm (=1.69), we observe in column (6) a coefficient on ∆WAGE which is about zero. A 
positive coefficient on ∆WAGE emerges only at lower levels of PSEadm62. Conversely, when 
government efficiency is high, downsizing the public sector is not an effective way to bring down the 
public debt ratio. In this respect, our results are consistent with those of Angelopoulos et al. (2008) 
on growth. Extending the regression as in columns (5) and (6) also affects our estimates for the other 
fiscal variables. We now obtain significant positive effects on changes in subsidies (∆SUBS) during 
consolidation, and significant negative effects on changes in public investment (∆INV) and changes in 
nonwage consumption (∆NONWAGE). The latter effect holds at low levels of public sector efficiency 
and median duration of consolidation periods. The coefficient on changes in social expenditures 
remains insignificant.  
 
We conclude from Table 4 that permanent expenditure cuts and permanent tax increases contribute 
significantly to debt reduction in the longer run, with the effects of the former being stronger. In the 
short-run, by contrast, the effect of tax increases as a group (INCu) may be better than the effect of 
expenditure cuts (NIEXPu), but not much is significant here. We learn that the precise composition 
of expenditure cuts is very important, probably more important than the composition of taxes. Our 
results are in favour of cuts in subsidies and (when government efficiency is low) the public sector 
wage bill. Social benefit cuts may not have much effect during the consolidation period, but only 
matter in the longer run (by decreasing AvgNIEXPu). Reducing expenditures by means of public 
investment cuts, by contrast, is highly counterproductive when the aim is to bring down the public 
debt ratio. Overall, our evidence is broadly in line with the composition hypothesis, except when it 
comes to the effect of changes in government consumption and the government wage bill. Here, our 
results shed new light. Emphasizing the role of public sector efficiency, they may provide a way out 
of the existing ambiguity in the literature (see Section 3.1.).   
 
5.2.  The role of institutions 
The literature shows a lot of ambiguity on the effects of institutions or institutional reform on the 
success of fiscal consolidation policies (see Sections 3.2. and 3.3.). In this section we study the 
possible role of institutions during consolidation from two major perspectives. The first perspective 
                                                        
61
 The difference between both columns is the included sample. Column (6) excludes observations where the 
size of the public sector wage bill is very low (below 9.2% of GDP, which is the 10
th
 percentile). These are most 
likely the observations where ∆WAGE<0  is not an option. 
62
 Algebraically, and evaluated at DURATION=3, it is to see that 
 (   )
 (     )
                           
is positive as soon as PSEAdm<1.66.  
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takes fiscal policies (in particular, consolidation policies) as given. One important question that we 
ask here is whether the influence of given consolidation policies on the public debt ratio is different 
depending on existing institutions. As an example, one may want to know whether the effect of a 
given consolidation effort on the debt ratio is stronger when labour markets are flexible rather than 
rigid, or when government efficiency is high rather than low. A second question is whether the 
effects of given consolidation policies are different when they are executed simultaneously with 
institutional reform. Given growing pressure on governments in many countries, mainly in Europe, to 
reform labour and product markets, one may want to know for example whether consolidation 
policies have more or less effect when at the same time employment protection legislation or 
product market regulation are reduced. The second perspective does not consider fiscal policies as 
given. Instead, we take into account the possibility that the institutions in a country affect the kind of 
consolidation policies adopted, for example their size or composition. An obvious example is that the 
ideology of the government or union power may affect the fraction of tax increases versus spending 
cuts to reduce the public deficit.  
 
We test the role of institutions for given fiscal policies (first perspective) by adding institutional 
variables to the regression equation reported in Table 4, column (4). To begin, we extend this 
equation by ∑ ∑                              , where INSTjiT indicates the level of institution j in 
country i during fiscal episode T. Included institutions are defined in Table 2. We add several 
institutional variables to the regression together. So, unlike what is done in the recent literature (e.g. 
Larch and Turrini, 2011; Alesina and Ardagna, 2012), we study the effect of each institution while 
controlling for others. We multiply by the length of the episode (DURATION) since the total 
contribution of an institution to the change of the debt ratio in a particular episode may obviously 
depend on the length of that episode. Later we further extend the regression by also adding changes 
in institutions (INSTjiT
 .DURATIONiT), in particular changes in employment protection legislation and 
changes in product market regulation63. Finally, like in the previous section, we again allow for 
different effects j across policy regimes R, where R stands for consolidation (c), expansion (e) or 
neutral (n). The results that we show in Table 5 are the estimated coefficients for consolidation 
periods (jc)
64,65.  
 The effects of institutions or institutional change when we do not control for the 
characteristics of fiscal policy (second perspective) are reported in Table 6. In this table we do not 
include revenue or expenditure variables (AvgNIEXPu, AvgINCu, ONEOFF, ∆TAXB, ∆TAXT, etc.) in the 
                                                        
63
 As a rule, changes are computed as the level of the institution at the end of the fiscal episode minus the level 
in the last one or two years before the episode (see Appendix 2). 
64
 Estimates for expansion and neutral periods are available upon request. 
65
 For an assessment not only of the statistical significance, but also the economic importance of estimated 
effects, it is good to know the standard deviation of each institution. Computed over all countries and years 
they are as follows: EPL 1.03, UNION 21.5, COOR 1.45, PMR 1.45, LEFT 0.44, PSEAdm 0.93 and PSEAvg 0.50. 
Multiplication with the estimated coefficient jc indicates the expected effect on the public debt ratio per year 
of consolidation when the level of the institution concerned is one standard deviation higher. 
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regression. Next to the institutional variables, the regressions underlying these results include only 
the level of CAPBu in the last year before the start of the fiscal episode (CAPBuINIT, times 
DURATION), BURDEN (times DURATION), DEVAL, the crisis dummies, and country-specific fixed 
effects (times DURATION). Note that with the exception of columns (8) and (9), the set of included 
institutions in each column of Table 6 is exactly the same as in Table 5. Differences in estimated 
coefficients may give an indication of the influence of these institutions on the evolution of the 
public debt ratio running via their effect on the characteristics of consolidation programmes.  
 
Columns (1) to (3) in both tables include only levels of labour and product market institutions and a 
dummy variable LEFT which is 1 when the government is left-wing. In columns (4) and (5) we add 
government efficiency, in columns (6) and (7) institutional change. Columns (8) and (9) include all 
variables that show at least some significance in earlier columns. Our results demonstrate that 
institutions and institutional change matter for the evolution of the public debt ratio in consolidation 
periods. They matter from the two perspectives described above. Both the outcome of given 
consolidation policies and the kind of consolidation policies adopted, seem to be affected when the 
institutional environment is different. Not all institutions have an equally strong influence, however. 
The evidence is the least convincing when it comes to the effects of existing labour and product 
market institutions. The tendency of our results in Table 5 would be that the evolution of public debt 
during consolidation is less favourable in unionized and rigid labour markets and in more regulated 
product markets. EPL, UNION and PMR all get positive coefficients in Table 5. In general, however, 
they are not statistically significant, or only marginally significant at the 10% or 15% level. Moreover, 
taking into account the possible endogenous effect on adopted policies in Table 6, estimated 
coefficients are even less significant. This is the case especially for EPL. Its estimated coefficient in 
Table 6 also falls back to much less than one half of its value in Table 5. It seems that conflicting 
forces, as one can observe in the literature (see Tagkalakis, 2009), counteract each other. The only 
labour market institution for which we find a slightly more robust indication of significance in Tables 
5 and 6, is the degree of wage bargaining coordination (COOR). Considering its negative coefficient, 
and with most of the effects already occurring in Table 5, we may conclude that a high degree of 
coordination has a favourable influence, mainly by improving the outcome of given consolidation 
policies. Internalization by key players of the long-run advantages of these policies (as well as the 
long-run costs of opposition to these policies) may be one element to explain this result.  
 In contrast to the level of labour and product market institutions, simultaneous institutional 
reform may have more effect on the outcome of fiscal consolidation episodes. Our evidence is 
strongly in favour of the hypothesis that complementary product market deregulation (ΔPMR<0) 
contributes to the success of fiscal consolidation. Product market deregulation may strengthen the 
positive effects of given consolidation policies, for example by simultaneously enhancing 
competition, overall productivity and growth, as in Wölfl et al. (2010). Moreover, observing even 
stronger and more significant effects in Table 6, we conclude that deregulation may also improve the 
outcome of consolidation episodes by contributing to better adjustment policies, for example by 
reducing the power of special interest groups. Our results for the effects of labour market reform are 
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interesting from a different point of view. What is striking is the change of sign on ∆EPL from positive 
in Table 5 to negative in Table 6. Once we no longer control for the characteristics of consolidation 
policies, it seems that parallel labour market deregulation undermines the success of fiscal 
consolidation. Adverse consequences for the government’s financial balance when firms find it easier 
to fire workers when (at least in the short run) demand for their product falls, may offer an 
explanation. So may negative effects on private consumption from increased uncertainty. Our 
evidence on this issue agrees with Bouis et al. (2012) when they find that deregulation of job 
protection pays off more quickly in good times but can entail short-term losses in depressed 
economies. 
 
Table 5. Effect of institutions / institutional change on the public debt ratio during consolidation 
  periods when we take fiscal policy as given 
  
 
Estimated effect of institutions or institutional change on ΔGD  
per year of consolidation (jc)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPL 1.70* 1.68* 1.51° 1.76° 2.45** 1.05 1.12 1.45 2.02 
UNION 0.04 0.04 - - - -0.02 -0.01 - - 
COOR -0.68 - -0.89 -1.49** -1.79** -0.94 -0.78 -1.42* -1.58* 
PMR 0.35 0.13 0.52 0.85° 0.78 0.57 0.42 0.65 0.54 
LEFT -2.61** -2.69*** -2.70*** -1.10 -0.89 - -2.15* -0.68 -0.62 
PSEAdm - - - -3.30** - - - -2.70° - 
PSEAvg - - - - -6.60* - - - -4.84 
∆EPL - - - - - 1.87 0.95 1.94 1.92 
∆PMR - - - - - 3.01** 3.08*** 1.53 1.65 
Numb. of 
Obs.  
(countries) 
132 
(21) 
132 (21) 132 (21) 
118 
(19) 
118 (19) 
131 
(21) 
131 (21) 
117 
(19) 
117 
(19) 
Notes:  *** (**) (*) (°) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) (15%) level. Underlying standard 
errorsare heteroscedasticity-consistent (White). Each column contains the estimated coefficients on the set of 
institutional variables (multiplied by DURATION) when added to the regression equation reported in Table 4, 
column (4). We allow different coefficients in consolidation, expansion and neutral periods. We here report 
coefficients during consolidation. For a definition of all institutional variables, see Table 2. 
 
As to the other institutions, our results confirm that - all other things equal - left-wing governments 
(LEFT) may be more successful in bringing down public debt. Although not all estimated coefficients 
are statistically significant, it would seem from most regressions in Table 5 that these governments 
raise the effectiveness of given consolidation programmes. In this respect, we match with Ardagna 
(2004) suggesting that left-wing parties may be better able to convince key players (like unions) to 
accept the efforts and costs imposed by consolidation policies in return for improved long-run 
perspectives. Moreover, considering the even more negative and more significant coefficients in 
Table 6, left-wing governments may also adopt stronger programmes66.  
 
                                                        
66
 We tested similar effects for right-wing governments but here we found no significant result at all. 
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Table 6. Effect of institutions / institutional change on the public debt ratio during consolidation 
   periods when we do not control for fiscal policy 
  Estimated effect of institutions or institutional change on ΔGD per year of consolidation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPL 0.38 0.46 0.22 0.65 1.51 -0.15 -0.55 0.39 0.83 
UNION 0.01 0.05 - - - 0.06 0.09° 0.09° 0.05 
COOR -1.31* - -1.57** -1.13° -1.26* -1.04 -1.15° -0.43 -0.49 
PMR 0.76 0.50 0.81 0.85 0.62 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.11 
LEFT -3.17*** -3.18*** -3.66*** -2.98*** -1.59 - -3.00** -1.96 -0.76 
PSEAdm - - - -3.76** - - - -2.48* - 
PSEAvg - - - - -12.2*** - - - -9.33*** 
∆EPL - - - - - -1.62 -2.49° -1.09 -0.26 
∆PMR - - - - - 4.82*** 4.51*** 3.35** 2.29* 
Numb. of 
Obs.  
(countries) 
132 (21) 132 (21) 132 (21) 118 (19) 118 (19) 131 (21) 131 (21) 
117 
(19) 
117 (19) 
Notes: *** (**) (*) (°) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) (15%) level. Underlying standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent (White). Each column contains the estimated coefficients for the set of 
institutional variables (multiplied by DURATION) when included in a regression explaining ΔGD by means of 
only CAPBuINIT (times DURATION), BURDEN (times DURATION), DEVAL, the crisis dummies and country-
specific fixed effects (times DURATION). We allow different effects for the institutions in consolidation, 
expansion and neutral periods. We here report effects during consolidation.  
 
Last but not least, our regressions reveal strong evidence on the importance for successful 
fiscal consolidation of public sector efficiency (PSEAdm, PSEAvg). Table 5 supports the hypothesis that 
a given consolidation programme is more effective in bringing down public debt when it is adopted 
by a more efficient government apparatus. One explanation for this favourable effect may be that 
consolidation policies executed by efficient governments are more credible, and believed to be more 
durable. Private consumers’ and investors’ responses may then be more positive67. Finally, not only 
may the effectiveness of given policies rise when government efficiency is higher, the strengthening 
of effects that we observe in Table 6 adds to this that more efficient governments may also adopt 
better consolidation programmes. 
At several occasions above we argued that certain institutions, like a left-wing fiscal policy maker and 
an efficient government apparatus, may contribute to more effective consolidation policies, for 
example when it comes to size or composition. Table 7 summarizes the results of research into this 
hypothesis. In the first two equations, we regress the change in the CAPBu during a fiscal episode on 
a number of institutional variables and the fiscal position before the episode. The latter is measured 
by the underlying primary balance and by the public debt ratio in the last year before the episode 
(CAPBuINIT, GDINIT). The following four equations explain the change in government revenue 
(∆INCu) and the change in non-interest expenditures (∆NIEXPu) as functions of the same explanatory 
                                                        
67
 Note that a further extension of the estimated regression like in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 confirms this 
result, with estimated coefficients on PSEAdm*DURATION between -3.15 and -4.04. 
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variables. The last two equations explain the change in public investment (∆INV) during the episode. 
We regress this variable on the change in the CAPBu during the episode, and again a number of 
institutional variables. We pay separate attention to investment given its particular position as a 
category of expenditures that should not fall during consolidation. In all eight equations we control 
for country-specific fixed effects, and include the crisis dummies. When explaining ∆CAPBu, ∆INCu 
and ∆NIEXPu, we also control for the fact that a preceding devaluation may affect the need or the 
incentive to improve the CAPBu. There is no reason to expect any effect from DEVAL on the change 
in public investment once ∆CAPBu is controlled for. (When we test this, the data also confirm it). We 
report all estimated coefficients for the consolidation episodes68. As a rule, when institutions show 
up highly insignificant for a dependent variable (p-value >0.50), we drop them in the second 
regression for that variable. 
The results confirm that public sector efficiency matters for the characteristics of the consolidation 
programmes that governments adopt. More efficient governments succeed in cutting non-interest 
expenditures significantly more than other governments. This contributes to larger consolidation 
programmes, although the effect on ∆CAPBu is not very significant. The lack of a significant effect 
here may be related to the negative sign on PSEAvg that we see in the equations for ∆INCu. 
Successful consolidation by efficient governments is not due to the choice of higher taxes. If there is 
an effect on taxes, it is rather the opposite. As a final observation, we see no significant effect from 
public sector efficiency on the share of investment in consolidation packages. On the impact of 
ideology, our results in Table 7 reveal that left-wing policy makers tend to adopt smaller 
consolidation packages. Mainly, this seems to be due to difficulty or hesitation among left-wing 
policy makers to cut expenditures. On government revenue we see no significant effect. An 
important element here, however, is that left-wing policy makers pay significantly more attention to 
safeguarding public investment, which may also explain part of their success during consolidation. 
We observe this effect on investment in the utter right column, at least when union density is not 
extreme (not above 60 to 70%)69.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
68
 Estimated coefficients for the other episodes are available from the authors upon request. 
69
 When we do not include the interaction term LEFT x
 UNION, we also obtain a positive effect from LEFT on 
investment, but then this is not significant (see the first regression for ∆INV). On the other hand, if we neither include 
UNION in that first regression, the estimated coefficient on LEFT becomes significant (and equal to about 0.4). 
Positive correlation between LEFT and UNION may play a role here. All in all, our results favour the hypothesis 
that more (political or social) power from the left may be beneficial to public investment during fiscal 
consolidation. We tested for a role of this LEFT x
 UNION interaction term in our other regressions in Tables 5-7. 
It was never relevant.  
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Table 7. Effect of institutions on the size and composition of consolidation policies  
                             Dependent variable  
Explanatory variables ∆CAPBu ∆CAPBu ∆INCu ∆INCu ∆NIEXPu ∆NIEXPu ∆INV ∆INV  
CRISIS08 0.12 0.35 1.50** 1.57** 0.75 0.67 0.49** 0.28°  
CRISIS91sf -2.18*** -2.69*** 1.56 1.50 2.75 2.66 -0.39 -0.52  
DEVAL -0.19 -0.19 0.24 0.25 0.45*** 0.45*** - -  
Consolidation          
Constant -1.12 0.42 2.44 2.11 3.04 2.79 - -  
CAPBuINIT -0.58*** -0.64*** 0.28** 0.29** 0.72*** 0.72*** - -  
GDINIT 0.043* 0.043*** -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.092*** -0.089*** - -  
∆CAPBu - - - - - - -0.11* -0.13***  
PSEAvg 2.55 2.98° -3.11 -3.04 -5.88** -5.98** 0.29 -  
LEFT -1.29* -0.85 0.20 0.12 1.92** 1.81** 0.20 0.72**  
EPL 0.80 0.66 0.22 - -0.43 - 0.23 0.36*  
UNION 0.01 - -0.10* -0.11** -0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.03*  
COOR -0.27 - -1.11*** -1.16*** -0.56 -0.65° 0.04 -  
LEFT * UNION - - - - - - - -0.01°  
PMR -0.02 - 0.48 0.56** 0.18 - -0.23** -0.27***  
Expansion          
… - - - - - - - -  
Neutral          
… - - - - - - - -  
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.84 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.29 0.37  
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Number of obs. 
(countries) 
118 (19) 
118 (19) 118 (19) 118 (19) 118 (19) 118 (19) 118 
(19) 
 132 (21)  
 
Notes:  *** (**) (*)(°) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%)(15%) level. Underlying standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent (White). 
 
Table 7 reveals or confirms a number of other interesting regularities. We confirm that worse initial 
fiscal conditions (lower CAPBuINIT, higher GDINIT) typically trigger significantly larger consolidation 
programmes (see also Mierau et al., 2007). We also confirm that (larger) consolidation programmes 
generally include (larger) cuts of public investment (see e.g. de Haan et al., 1996). Public investment 
seems to suffer more also when product markets are highly regulated. If we can use PMR as a proxy 
for the power of special interest groups, an explanation may be that investment is the first victim 
when these interest groups all try to protect their share of government expenditures. Finally, we find 
that devaluations tend to be followed by more expansionary fiscal policies, increased expenditures in 
particular. 
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6.  Conclusion 
The sharp increase in public debt ratios since 2008 imposes the need for a significant fiscal 
consolidation and credible debt reduction strategies in almost all OECD countries.  
Many countries have gained experience with fiscal consolidation programmes in the past two 
or three decades. In this paper we focus on 21 OECD countries in 1981-2008. We define 132 fiscal 
episodes, including 40 consolidation periods. We contribute to the literature by studying directly the 
evolution of the ratio of public debt to GDP during, and up to two years after, these fiscal episodes. 
For the consolidation periods, the data reveal a wide range of outcomes, with the change in the 
public debt ratio varying between about -25 and +35 percentage points. Our aim is to explain these 
outcomes, and the enormous differences that one can observe. Only one study has focused directly 
on the evolution of the debt to GDP ratio before (see Heylen and Everaert, 2000). Another value of 
this paper is in the way we define fiscal episodes. We use data on the evolution of underlying 
cyclically adjusted primary balances, and as such avoid the bias that may be induced by one-off 
budgetary measures (see IMF, 2010a). Our main contribution may be in the new evidence that we 
obtain on the role of public sector efficiency and a number other institutional variables for the 
success of consolidation policies. The role of public sector efficiency has not yet been studied before 
in the context of fiscal consolidation. As to other institutions, we study the effects of labour and 
product market characteristics and reform, and the role of the political ideology of the government. 
Rising pressure on governments, especially in Europe, to reform labour and product markets, and a 
growing ideological divide, show the importance of the topic. However, the existing evidence in the 
literature on the effects of these institutions and of institutional reform during fiscal consolidation, is 
highly ambiguous (see e.g. Tagkalakis, 2009, and Alesina and Ardagna, 2012).  
 
Starting point of our analysis is the well-known composition hypothesis (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). 
Furthermore, we always control for the international macroeconomic environment, as reflected by 
international growth and interest rates, and for the possible contribution of a preceding devaluation 
to the evolution of the public debt ratio. Our main findings are as follows:  
On composition, we find that both permanent expenditure cuts and permanent tax increases 
contribute significantly to debt reduction in the longer run, but the effects of the former are 
stronger. The precise composition of expenditure cuts is very important. Our results prefer cuts in 
subsidies and (conditionally) the public sector wage bill. Cutting the public wage bill contributes to a 
reduction of the debt ratio, but only when public sector efficiency in administration is low. According 
to our results, downsizing an efficient public sector will not ‘work’. Social benefit cuts matter in the 
longer run, but they may not have much effect during the consolidation period. Finally, reducing 
expenditures by means of public investment cuts is highly counterproductive when the aim is to 
bring down the public debt ratio. Overall, our evidence is broadly in line with the composition 
hypothesis, except when it comes to the effect of changes in the public wage bill.  
Next to its influence on the effects of policies involving changes in government wage 
consumption, public sector efficiency affects the outcome of fiscal consolidation along two other 
channels. We find first that the effectiveness of given consolidation programmes to reduce the debt 
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ratio rises when governments are more efficient. Given consolidation policies may be more credible, 
and believed to be more durable, when they are executed by efficient public authorities. Second, our 
results show that more efficient governments may also realize better and (maybe) larger 
consolidation programmes. Efficient governments succeed in cutting expenditures significantly more 
than other governments.  
As to labour and product market institutions, we find that consolidation policies are 
significantly more successful when they are complemented by product market deregulation. Positive 
effects from the latter on competition, overall productivity and growth, may explain this. By contrast, 
we find little evidence for favourable effects from flexible labour markets, or complementary labour 
market reform. Parallel labour market deregulation may even raise the chances of failure for 
consolidation policies when firms find it easier to fire workers when demand for their product falls. A 
final result in this paper concerns the ideological orientation of the government. All other institutions 
equal, we find left-wing governments to be more successful in fiscal consolidation. It may be less 
difficult for them to convince key players (like unions) to accept the efforts and costs imposed by 
consolidation policies in return for improved long-run perspectives. Another explanation is that left-
wing governments pay more attention to safeguarding public investment during consolidation. 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of Equation (4) 
We assume a fiscal episode which lasts for two years, t and t+1. Derivation for longer periods is 
totally analogous. Dropping the CRISIS dummy, Equation (3b) for these two years is: 
                              (                   )                
                      
                                (                   )              
                  
 
To simplify further notation, we will specify BURDENi,t as  : 
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Summing both equations then implies: 
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Using GDi,t-1 as a proxy for GDi,t  at the RHS of this equation, we can rewrite this result as the two 
period specification for Equation (4): 
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We approximate GDi,t at the RHS by GDi,t-1 for econometric reasons, which is to avoid the correlation 
that one has between (                   ) and the error term . Basically, this approximation 
comes down to instrumenting GDi,t  by GDi,t-1 . 
,i t
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A more general specification for longer fiscal episodes will have DURATION instead of 2 in the 
equation. We use the same proxy GDi,t-1 for each GDi,t+z  at the RHS where z  0. 
The equation that we finally estimate will also include CRISIS dummies. Moreover, as we mention in 
the main text, to allow for possible lags in behavioural responses, we have extended in our 
regressions the period over which we compute the dependent variable GDi,T by two years.  
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Appendix 2: Data and data sources 
Almost all data that we use in this paper are publicly available from OECD sources and from the 
Database Political institutions (DPI). Most OECD data have been taken from the Statistical 
Compendium, Economic Outlook, N° 88. We downloaded these data in January 2011. For the political 
variables we use the DPI version of December 2010. Details are described below. For a number of 
countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary) data may not be available for the whole period 
1980-2008. We give details in the data appendix to our companion working paper (Heylen et al., 
2011).  
 
Fiscal Policy 
Gross government debt in percent of GDP (GD):  
Source: OECD (series GGFLQ and GDP). Data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland and Portugal 
have been taken from AMECO.   
 
Underlying cyclically adjusted government primary balance in percent of potential GDP (CAPBu)  
Source: OECD (series NLGXQU).  
 
Cyclically adjusted government primary balance in percent of potential GDP (CAPB) 
Source: OECD (series NLGXQA). 
 
One-off measures in percent potential GDP (ONEOFF) 
Calculation: CAPB-CAPBu 
 
Underlying cyclically adjusted current government revenues in percent of potential GDP (INCu) 
Source: OECD (series YRGTQU).  
 
Underlying cyclically adjusted government non-interest expenditures in percent of potential GDP 
(NIEXPu).  
Source: OECD (series YPGTXQ).  
 
Cyclically adjusted taxes on business in percent of potential GDP (TAXB) 
Source: OECD (series TYBA and GDPTR). 
Cyclically adjusted indirect taxes in percent of potential GDP (component of TAXT) 
Source: OECD (series TINDA and GDPTR).  
 
Cyclically adjusted direct taxes on households in percent of potential GDP (component of TAXT) 
Source: OECD (series TYHA and GDPTR).  
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Cyclically adjusted social security contribution received by general government in percent of 
potential GDP (component of TAXT) 
Source: OECD (series SSRG and GDPTR). 
 
Public sector wage consumption in percent potential GDP (WAGE) 
Source: OECD (series CGW and GDPTR).  
 
Government non-wage consumption in percent potential GDP (NONWAGE) 
Source: OECD (series CGNW and GDPTR).  
 
Government fixed capital formation in percent of potential GDP (INV) 
Source: OECD (series IGAA and GDPTR).  
 
Subsidies in percent potential GDP (SUBS)                                    
Source: OECD (series TSUB and GDPTR).  
 
Cyclically adjusted social expenditures in percent of potential GDP (SOCEXP) 
OECD provides no direct series for this variable. Following Heylen and Everaert (2000), we computed 
it as SOCEXP = NIEXP – WAGE – NONWAGE – SUBS - other current transfers - property income paid 
(except interest payments), where NIEXP is cyclically adjusted current primary disbursements. 
Underlying this approach is a double assumption. First, we assume that one-off current 
disbursements are negligible. Second, we assume that the variables at the right hand side of this 
equation are not affected by the cycle.  
 
Devaluation 
Definition: percentage of official nominal exchange rate devaluation in the year before the fiscal 
episode  (ts-1) 
Sources: Bofinger (2000, Table 2); Bank for International Settlements; national sources (e.g. Riksbank, 
Norges Bank). Data available upon request.  
 
International macroeconomic context 
International nominal short term interest rate in percent (INTEREST) 
Definition: see our note to Table 2.  
Source: OECD (series IRS) 
 
International nominal GDP growth rate in percent (GROWTH) 
Definition: see our note to Table 2. 
Source: OECD (series GDP) 
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Institutions 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
Definition: OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation. We use 
the overall EPL strictness indicator (time series, version 1). 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004; see also Online OECD Employment Database. 
Data shortages and adjustments: see Berger and Heylen (2011) who also use and extended this 
dataset.  
As indicator of institutional reform we compute the change in EPL (ΔEPL) as its level at the end of a 
fiscal episode minus its level two years before the episode. 
  
Trade union density rate (UNION) 
Definition: the share of workers affiliated to a trade union, in %. 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004; see also Online OECD Employment Database.  
 
Coordination of Wage Bargaining (COOR) 
Definition: Index from 1 to 5 for the degree of intentional harmonization in the wage setting process, 
for the degree to which "minor players" deliberately follow along with what the "major players" 
decide. The coding for the index is based on structural characteristics of the wage bargaining process. 
Source: Kenworthy (2001). 
Data shortages and adjustments: see Berger and Heylen (2011) who also use (and extended) this 
dataset.  
 
Product market regulation (PMR) 
Definition: OECD summary indicator of regulatory impediments to product market competition in 
seven non-manufacturing industries (telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and 
road freight). 
Source: Conway et al. (2006); see also OECD.Stat, Public Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation 
(REGREF dataset). 
The data from Conway et al. are available only until 2003. We extrapolated them relying on more 
recent product market regulation data from OECD.stat for 2003 and 2008.  
As indicator of institutional reform we compute the change in PMR (ΔPMR) as its level at the end of a 
fiscal episode minus its level in the last year before the episode. 
 
Party orientation with respect to economic Policy (LEFT) 
Definition: Dummy variable for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or 
left-wing.  
Source: Database political institutions, 2010 (series EXECRLC) 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5 
   165 
Public sector efficiency (PSEAdm, PSEAvg)   
Source: Angelopoulos et al. (2008). The authors provide period averages for PSEAdm and PSEAvg 
(among other variables) for 1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95 and 1995-2000. For most countries 
observations are available for three or four of these periods. For a few countries (Czech Republic, 
Italy, Poland, Spain) data availability is more limited. When a fiscal episode falls nicely within one of 
these periods (e.g. a consolidation episode in 1982-84), we take the PSE values relating to that period 
(1980-85). When a fiscal episode overlaps two periods, but the overlap in the second period is less 
than three years (e.g. 1983-87) we take the PSE values relating to first of these periods (1980-85). 
When the overlap is at least three years (e.g. 1983-88) we take the average of the PSE data for both 
periods. In case PSE data for the period concerned are missing, we take the available data for the 
adjacent period as a proxy. We never take PSE data where the gap with the fiscal episode is more 
than five years.   
 
Note on the construction of the PSE dataset. 
Angelopoulos et al. (2008) construct a measure of public sector efficiency in various countries and 
time periods by calculating an output-to-input ratio. The methodology compares the performance of 
government in certain areas of economic activity to the associated expenditure that the government 
allocates to achieve this particular performance. The PSE index thus compares a measure of Public 
Sector Performance (PSP) and a measure of the associated Public Sector Expenditure (PEX) for each 
country in each policy area and each time period. PSE is then constructed as the ratio of PSP to PEX. 
We refer to the Appendix in Angelopoulos et al. (2008) for more details on the construction of PSP 
and PSE indexes in each policy area. 
As the PSP and PEX measures are expressed in different units of measurement, they first have to be 
made comparable across countries. For this, the authors follow Afonso et al. (2005, 2006) by 
expressing each country’s PSP and PEX relative to the average PSP and PEX of all countries in each 
period. In other words, each country’s PSP and PEX are expressed as percentages of the respective 
average (normalized to be 1), and in turn the PSE is obtained as the ratio of these relative PSPs and 
PEXs. As such, PSE is an index that measures the efficiency of a country’s government relative to 
governments in other countries in each period in a particular policy area. The larger the value, the 
more efficient the country’s government is.  
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Abstract 
We study the effects of fiscal consolidation in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping 
generations. We analyze the effectiveness of reducing public employment as a means for debt 
reduction in order to assess whether public employment cuts raise the effectiveness of consolidation 
programmes. We further compare these results to those of other consolidation instruments, such as 
taxes on labor or consumption or other government expenditures. Our contribution to the 
theoretical consolidation literature is threefold. (i) We assume individuals with finite lives, who have 
either high or low innate ability. This assumption is important for an appropriate analysis of 
distributional issues between current and future generations, and between individuals with high and 
low earning capacity. (ii) Individual decisions of time allocation between work, leisure and education 
are fully endogenous in our model. So is growth. (iii) We pay special attention to realistically 
modeling the public sector, in particular public employment and output. Our model contains various 
channels through which public employment may improve the economy’s supply potential.  
As to our main finding, our simulation results nuance the view that public employment cuts are 
efficient consolidation tools, definitely in the prevalence of significant labor reallocation costs. 
Second, although we confirm that expenditure based consolidation is better than labor or capital tax 
based consolidation, evidence for expansionary output effects after spending cuts is very limited. We 
do generally not observe them when we consider GDP and include the value added produced by 
public employees. Our results for welfare bring even more nuance. When aggregated over all 
generations that are alive at the time consolidation is started, almost all consolidation strategies 
bring about net negative welfare effects. Only the youngest and future generations experience 
positive welfare effects. Interestingly, the positive effects for these generations are smaller under 
spending based adjustments in the area of education, investment, and overall public employment, 
than under tax based adjustments.  
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1. Introduction and motivation 
The drastic increase of public debt since 2008 and additional pressure on government budgets from 
rising health and pension costs due to ageing, pose a major challenge to policy makers in most OECD 
countries. Given the negative effects of high public debt on future potential growth and welfare, the 
need for effective fiscal adjustment strategies is beyond discussion.  
 Since the seminal work by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Perotti (1995), a huge 
empirical literature has studied the effects of fiscal consolidation. The focus is mostly on real output 
and growth effects as these are crucial for the success of consolidation. One hypothesis that has 
received particular attention is that spending based fiscal consolidation hurts growth less than tax 
based consolidations. If the government mainly tackles social spending and public employment and 
the public wage bill, some even expect expansionary output effects, also in the short run (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). According to these authors, public wage bill cuts should 
therefore have a prominent role in consolidation programmes. Others however are more pessimistic. 
Perotti (2011) expects short-run output losses after spending cuts. Heylen and Everaert (2000), 
Tagkalakis (2009) and Larch and Turrini (2011) do not find that fiscal consolidation is more successful 
when it mainly relies on government wage bill cuts. More recently, Heylen et al. (2013) do find this, 
but only when public sector efficiency is low. The discussion has become particularly lively in the 
most recent years, as shown for example by the many contributions to the debate initiated by 
Corsetti (2012). Strong positions are being taken varying from ‘austerity will increase confidence and 
encourage recovery’ to ‘austerity kills’ (Krugman and Layard, 2012).  
 
Table 1 Government wage bill and goods expenditures (in % of GDP, average for 11 European 
countries, 1995-2007) 
 Education Investment Consumption Total 
Goods expenditures 1,48 2,17 8,32 11,96 
Wage expenditures 3,62 1,77 6,89 12,27 
% Wages 71 45 45 51 
Note: Average data for 11 European countries, 1995-2007: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. To classify government expenditures, we have 
followed the functional approach of the OECD (code: COFOG). For education, we take function “Education 
(090)” while for investment we add up “Economic Affairs (040)” and “Public order and safety (030)”. The 
remaining functions are classified under consumption expenditures. In every category, we classify “Final 
consumption expenditure (P3CG)” and ‘Gross fixed capital formation (P51CG)’ under ‘Goods expenditures’ and 
‘Total compensation of employees paid by the government (code: D1CG)’ under ‘Wage expenditures’. 
 
Next to its (persisting) inconclusiveness, one may observe two other limitations in the existing 
empirical literature on the contribution of public wage bill cuts to successful fiscal consolidation. A 
first one is that public employment is generally taken as one homogenous category, whereas in 
reality this is not the case (see Table 1, where one can roughly distinguish three public subsectors: 
education, investment and public consumption). A second and major issue is that the empirical 
literature says nothing about the welfare effects of (different) programmes of fiscal consolidation. 
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Yet, given that public support is key to their success, it is important to know these welfare effects. 
Future generations are most likely to reap the benefits from fiscal adjustments. But what about 
current generations of different age and skill? 
 
Given the above-mentioned limitations of empirical studies, we take a different road in this project. 
We propose a general equilibrium analysis where we also take into account the reality of different 
public subsectors. More precisely, our aim is to study the effects of fiscal consolidation within a 
theoretical overlapping generations model with 30 generations. By explicitly modeling the behavior 
of all relevant actors and their interaction on different markets in the short and the long-run, a well-
structured and disciplined analysis of the economic and welfare implications of fiscal consolidation 
becomes possible. Our analysis will allow an assessment of the macroeconomic impact of reducing 
public employment as a means of debt reduction and thus allows to assess the claim that public 
employment cuts raise the effectiveness of consolidation programmes. Moreover, it will also allow to 
compare these results to those of using other consolidation instruments, such as other government 
expenditures or taxes on labor or consumption. Our analysis will not be limited to the implications 
for employment, private output and GDP, however. We will also study welfare effects on both 
current and future generations of individuals with different innate ability.  
 
We are not the first to study the effects of fiscal consolidation in a theoretical model.  Earlier work in 
this area has been done by among others Cournède and Gonand (2006), Forni et al. (2010) and 
Clinton et al. (2011). Building on our experience in Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013) and Buyse et 
al. (2012, 2013), our setup is richer and more realistic than is the case in these existing studies. The 
value added of what we want to do in this paper is threefold.  
(i) We assume individuals with finite lives, who have either high or low innate ability. This 
assumption is important for an appropriate analysis of distributional issues between current and 
future generations, and between individuals with high or low earning capacity. Existing theoretical 
work has largely ignored distributional consequences. We mention Jensen and Rutherford (2002) as 
an important exception. These authors find that “inter- rather than intra-generational equity is most 
likely to pose the greatest obstacle to fiscal consolidation”.  
 (ii) When young, individuals allocate time to education, work or leisure. At older ages, 
individuals only work or have leisure. The labor-leisure choice is endogenous in our model. So is 
education. This approach is crucial to get a model with both endogenous employment by age and 
endogenous productivity and growth. Given the major importance of the evolution of employment 
and growth for the effectiveness of fiscal consolidation, it is important to model these carefully. 
Again, many existing studies do not model the education decision and/or assume exogenous growth 
(see for instance Cournède and Gonand, 2006, Forni et al., 2010 and Clinton et al., 2011). Fernandez-
Huertas Moraga and Vidal (2010) do model endogenous growth coming from human capital 
formation through parental education and educational spending. Their model, however, does not 
have endogenous labor supply. Yakita (2008) and Agénor and Yilmaz (2011) also model an economy 
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with endogenous growth, coming from private and public capital accumulation, but they also 
disregard the labor-leisure choice and the endogeneity of labor supply.  
(iii) We pay special attention to realistically modeling the public sector, in particular public 
employment and output. The reason for doing this is obvious from the data in Table 1. Despite the 
importance of public wage expenditures, very few studies have explicitly modeled public 
employment in a general equilibrium context, especially in the context of debt reduction. As 
exceptions, we mention Ardagna (2007), Finn (1998) and Pappa (2009). More recently, Afonso and 
Gomes (2008) and Gomes (2011) distinguish private and public employment in a model with search 
and matching frictions. In this project, we take the facts illustrated in Table 1 into account when we 
model public production in an investment sector, an education sector and a public consumption 
goods sector. In every sector, output is the result of goods bought on the market and production by 
public employees. The output of public employees may affect the private production function (via 
public capital), human capital formation (via education) and private utility (via public consumption 
goods, and aggregate output in general).   
 
Although the modeling of a detailed public sector of production and employment is novel, there are 
still some important simplifications that deserve attention in future research. For instance, the 
government in our model does not optimally choose its inputs to efficiently produce the desired 
output, i.e. the input shares are exogenously pinned down. As a result, the relative share of high 
versus low-skilled workers in all public sectors is identical and not optimally chosen. Moreover, the 
output in each sector is not chosen in an optimal way. Furthermore, the production function in all 
public sectors is identical and simplified. Finally, all public workers receive the same wage (per unit of 
effective labor), although their economic contribution is different. 
We stress that if the implicit assumption of an inefficient government were to generate 
artificial efficiency-improvements from downsizing the public sector, implementing a strong 
theoretic foundation for the public sector would be of prime importance. However, the results 
presented in this chapter tell a different story. That is, even though we have assumed an inefficient 
government, we do not find support that downsizing the public sector leads to unambiguous 
efficiency improvements, quite on the contrary. Intuitively, although the public sector does not 
exhibit efficient behavior, its production does result in added value for the general economy 
(through utility gains, more human capital accumulation or public capital). Despite the simplifications 
we have made in this chapter, we believe that the contribution of this study is still very significant, 
not at least in the way that it brings to the attention the modeling of public employment and 
production in theoretical macro-models. 
 
We calibrate our model to a European benchmark and simulate nine different scenarios of 
temporary fiscal consolidation, relying on tax increases or expenditures cuts, to bring down the 
public debt ratio by 40%-points. Given an average public debt ratio in the euro area of about 100% 
today, this would be the required effort to return to a debt ratio of 60%. A special focus will be on 
overall cuts in the number of public employees or employment cuts in some public sectors. These 
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cuts may entail labor reallocation costs, about which we will also have to make assumptions (like a 
short-run period of unemployment). Our simulations are performed under perfect foresight in a non-
stochastic setting. Throughout our study, we abstract from considerations related to a lack of 
credibility of fiscal policy, individual uncertainty or optimal Ramsey policy. We focus mainly on the 
effects on private output, GDP and the welfare of current and future generations of different 
abilities.  
Our main findings are as follows. As to output effects, we confirm that expenditure based 
consolidation is less harmful than labor or capital tax based consolidation (at least when spending 
cuts do not concern public investment). Consolidation via consumption tax increases may slightly 
hurt the economy in the short-run, but is generally one of the more efficient policies in the long run. 
Evidence for truly expansionary output effects after spending cuts, however, is very limited. 
Moreover, we do not observe them when we consider GDP and include the value added produced by 
public employees. Cutting public employment is not expansionary in the short and medium run. It 
may be expansionary in the longer run, if public employment is reduced in public consumption goods 
production.  
When it comes to welfare effects, we observe much bigger differences between different age 
groups than between different ability types of the same age. Here we confirm Jensen and 
Rutherford’s (2002) conclusion that intergenerational heterogeneity is the most important obstacle 
to fiscal tightening. Our results for welfare bring even more nuance on the possibility of expansionary 
fiscal consolidation. When aggregated over all generations that are alive at the time consolidation is 
started, only one or two out of nine consolidation strategies bring about net positive welfare effects. 
We still observe, however, that spending based adjustments (except investment cuts) are better, i.e. 
they induce smaller losses for the aggregate of current generations. However, things are different for 
the youngest and future generations. For these generations, welfare effects from consolidation are 
positive rather than negative. Most interestingly, these positive effects are smaller under spending 
based adjustments in the area of education, investment, and overall public employment, than under 
tax based adjustments. Robustness tests by changing key assumptions of our model never imply 
changes of these conclusions, quite on the contrary.   
 
In the remainder of this paper, we set out our model in Section 2 and calibrate it on actual data in 
Section 3. Section 4 explains our simulation strategy. In Section 5 we study the economic impact of 
alternative fiscal consolidation scenarios. We perform several robustness checks in Section 6. Section 
7 concludes.  
 
2. The model 
We model an overlapping generations economy with endogenous employment and growth. The OLG 
‘finite life’ framework implies that our model is non-Ricardian. Underlying the endogeneity of 
employment and growth is a rich specification of individuals’ time allocation to either labor or leisure 
or (for individuals with high ability) education and human capital formation. Furthermore, we 
explicitly model public employment and production in three distinct public ‘sectors’: infrastructure, 
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education, and public consumption goods. We know of no paper in the fiscal consolidation literature 
with a similar realistic setup. In most of the paper we assume a closed economy such that the 
interest rate is endogenously determined. However, we relax this assumption in Section 6 and look 
at the small open economy (SOE) case. In the remainder of this section, we discuss demographics, 
household decisions, public and private production including the production of human capital, and 
the government budget. 
 
2.1 Demographics  
Population dynamics are kept as simple as possible. An individual lives for 30 periods, each 
representing two years in reality. At any period of time a new generation enters the model at the age 
of 19 and lives until the age of 78. As we do not intend to analyze the impact of demographic change, 
we set the rate of population growth to zero. Every generation consists of two types of individuals. 
Some have low ability, others have high ability. Heterogeneity relates to the innate ability to 
assimilate existing human capital as well as the ability to engage in tertiary education. We denote 
these groups as      . We normalize the size of every generation to 2 and assume that both 
ability groups are of equal size 1. Concerning notation, we use the following convention throughout 
this paper. Individual variables have a superscript (t) referring to the period of birth and two 
subscripts: the first one (j) is the age of the individual, the second one refers to the skill group (s) that 
the individual belongs to1.  Aggregate variables have a subscript referring to the period in which they 
are considered.  
 
2.2 Households  
Household preferences are represented by the following time-separable utility function: 
 
   ∑      (    
      
        
 )                (1) 
 
where     
  and     
  are respectively consumption and leisure of an individual of generation t 
belonging to age group   and skill group s.   
 
 is the period-t utility-enhancing public consumption 
good.   is the discount factor.  
 
Instantaneous utility is represented by the following functional form: 
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Preferences are logarithmic in private and public consumption and iso-elastic in leisure. Many 
authors also introduce utility-enhancing public spending separable from private consumption. While 
                                                        
1
 Variables per generation are then defined as the sum of both ability groups. 
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Baxter and King (1993) do not specify a functional form, Park and Philippopoulos (2004) and Dhont 
and Heylen (2009) also adopt a logarithmic specification on the public good. The intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption, both private and public, is 1. The intertemporal elasticity to 
substitute leisure is    . Furthermore,   expresses the relative value of public versus private 
consumption;   specifies the relative value of leisure versus consumption. Note that   may be 
different in each period of life (see also Buyse et al., 2013). None of these preference parameters 
differ between ability types.  
 
In each period of active life, an individual has an endowment of one unit of time. High-ability 
individuals allocate this time to working ( )2, tertiary education ( ) or leisure ( ). Time devoted to 
education represents human capital investment. For reasons explained later (see Section 3), we only 
allow schooling in the first 8 periods of life i.e. between the age of 19 and 34. Low-ability individuals 
only work or have leisure. Time constraints are represented in equations (3)-(5). We further 
distinguish the actual age of retirement from the age of pension eligibility. Although the statutory 
retirement age is 65 (that is from period   = 24 onwards), individuals may optimally choose to work 
up to (and including) the age of 68 (  = 1 to 25). They may also opt to retire sooner (this is, in the 
period when working hours fall to zero). 
      
      
       
    for  =1:8 and where     
               (age 19-34) (3) 
      
      
    for  =9:25                                  (age 35-68)  (4) 
      
   for  =26:30       (age 69-78) (5)
 
 
An individual born at time   chooses consumption, total hours worked and time investment in 
tertiary education to maximize Equation (1), subject to Equations (3)-(5) and the constraints 
described in (6)-(8). 
 
For j = 1:23 
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For j = 24:25 
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For j = 26:30 
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where we denote by     
  the end-of-period asset holdings of an individual of age group   and skill 
type s born at time  . The model assumes that individuals start from zero wealth and also die with 
                                                        
2
 Our model includes both private and public employment. As we make clear in later sections, the individual is 
indifferent between working in either sector. 
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zero wealth (i.e.         ). Furthermore,     
  is the human capital of the individual of age group 
j and skill group s born at t. As to aggregate variables,    is the real interest rate on financial assets at 
time k and  
  the real wage per efficiency unit of labor of skill type s at that time.       and   are 
respectively the effective tax rates on consumption expenditures and labor income and the net non-
employment benefit replacement rate. The tax on labor income    is the sum of two components: a 
labor tax    and a social contribution tax   . Additionally, at time k, households receive lump-sum 
transfers    from the government and profits    from firms.    is an exogenous parameter linking 
productivity to age. It is constant over generations. While we use human capital to describe     , we 
will refer to        as productive efficiency. In every possible period of activity (j = 1 to 25) an 
individual of generation t and skill type s works     
  hours and earns a net wage      
       
     
 (  
  ). Non-employment benefits, which are only received during the first 23 periods of life (i.e. before 
the statutory retirement age), are defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a full-time worker 
and are given by        
       
 (    ) (see Buyse et al., 2013).  
  
In Equations (7) and (8),    represents the per-period pension benefit received by an individual after 
the official retirement age. We explicitly account for a pensions-earnings link present in pension 
systems of many European countries (see e.g. OECD, 2011 and Buyse et al., 2013). Net pension 
benefits are a function of lifetime after-tax labor earnings as shown in Equations (9a-b).       is the 
pension accrual rate on net income earned at age  .  
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            for  =26:30  (9b) 
 
where net wages are revalued in line with average economy-wide wage growth  . Thanks to this 
revaluation, the net pension is adjusted to increases in the overall standard of living between the 
time that workers build their pension entitlements and the time that they receive the pension. This 
follows practice in many OECD countries (OECD, 2005; Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006). 
 
2.3 Public sector output 
A substantial fraction of workers are employed in the public sector. A major novelty in our model is 
that we explicitly take this fact into account. In line with Table 1, it is our assumption that the 
government provides three kinds of ‘useful’ goods: (i) investment goods    such as infrastructure (e.g. 
bridges and roads), (ii) education goods    like school buildings and other education equipment, 
books and teachers’ lectures, and (iii) utility-enhancing consumption goods   
 
 such as recreation 
facilities and public administration. One part of these goods is bought on the market (respectively 
  
    
  and   
 ), while the other part is produced by public employees. Equations (10)-(12) describe 
the supply of these goods, with the underlying production functions.     
 
 and     
 
 represent 
respectively total effective public labor of high and low-ability individuals. We define these variables 
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in section 2.7. The pool of public workers is allocated to the three sectors:      and      are the 
fractions of the public employees of a certain skill-type employed in the investment and the 
education sector. It follows that the fraction of public employees of a certain skill type that produce 
consumption goods is            . We now define the output of effective labor in each sector as a 
CES aggregate where   is the substitution elasticity and    is the factor share of high-ability workers 
in output.3  
 
    [  (       
 )
  
 
  (    ) (        
 )
  
 
 ]
 
   
   
 
         (10) 
    [  (       
 )
  
 
  (    ) (        
 )
  
 
 ]
 
   
   
          (11) 
  
   [  ((         )    
 
)
  
 
  (    ) ((           )    
 
)
  
 
 ]
 
   
   
          (12) 
 
Finally,  is a TFP-parameter capturing the efficiency with which public sector employees produce a 
specific output. All workers are paid the competitive wage determined in the private sector (cfr. 
infra). As in Ardagna (2001) and Forni et al. (2010), an individual is indifferent between working in 
the private or the public sector.  
 
2.4 Private production 
Private firms act competitively on output and input markets and maximize profits. All firms are 
identical. Total private output is given by the production function in Equation (13). It exhibits 
constant returns in three productive factors: physical capital  
 
, private effective labor  
  and 
public capital  
 
. As in Futagami et al. (1990), the stock of public capital acts as a public good and 
augments the productivity of private inputs. This framework differs from the original setting in Barro 
(1990) in that not the flow of public expenditures, but the stock of public infrastructure influences 
private production.   measures the elasticity of public capital in the production of private goods. 
Private effective labor in Equation (13) is represented by the same constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) function as in the public sector4. 
 
                                                        
3 
Turnovsky and Pintea (2006) assume that public production requires the use of both labor and capital as 
inputs. The authors model a public firm that produces a given amount of public investment goods at minimum 
cost. As such, they impose a certain   (in % of GDP) in line with real data on public investment-to-GDP. As 
public investment (and the two other public outputs) is endogenous in our model, and as we use a simpler 
production function, we introduce the parameter   which will be calibrated in Section 3. 
4
 Many studies incorporating public expenditures (flow) or capital (stock) into the production function assume 
constant returns to scale in the private inputs (e.g. Ardagna, 2001, 2007). We require constant returns in all 
inputs in order to generate a Balanced Growth Path. As such, in our model, public capital is a public input of the 
unpaid-factor variant (Feehan and Batina, 2007, Agénor, 2008). 
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and where  
 
 follows from savings decisions in the private sector. The public capital stock  
 
 is 
constructed in the government sector according to the following accumulation rule: 
 
    
    
         
           (14) 
 
where    is the public capital depreciation rate. Competitive behavior implies in Equation (15) that 
firms carry physical capital to the point where its after-tax marginal product net of depreciation 
equals the real interest rate.5 Physical capital depreciates at rate   . Similarly, Equation (16) states 
that for both ability levels, the wage per unit of effective labor is determined by its marginal product. 
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It should be stressed that the non-standard production factor, public capital, has no market price. 
Indeed, the cost of public infrastructure is paid by the government. As such, the rent generated by 
this factor is not assigned to either of the two other, private, factors, leading to positive profits    in 
Equation (17). In our model, these profits are distributed equally to all households ( =1:30 and 
 =L,H). 
 
      
  and     
  
  
.  (17) 
 
2.5 Human Capital Technology 
The human capital of an individual of ability type   evolves according to Equations (18)-(20). Equation 
(18) states that, when they enter the model at the age of 19, young workers inherit a fraction    of 
the aggregate human capital of the active population in the period before their entrance (    
 ). This 
externality à la Azariadis and Drazen (1990) will generate in Equation (19) a first difference between 
low-ability and high-ability workers. The former may experience more difficulty to learn and 
accumulate knowledge at primary and secondary school, which explains why they enter our model 
with a smaller fraction of existing human capital. In their first eight periods of active life, high-ability 
individuals may increase their human capital through tertiary education. It is our assumption in 
                                                        
5
 Note that our model does not include a tax on private capital earnings. Instead, we assume that firms pay a 
tax on capital returns. 
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Equation (20) that    
  rises in privately invested education time (   
 ) and, following among others 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), publicly provided education goods (  ). In previous work we have 
shown that introducing productive government expenditures as an input in the human capital 
production function helps in explaining the cross-country variation in tertiary education and growth 
rates in OECD countries (Buyse et al., 2013). It is also consistent with empirical evidence showing a 
positive correlation in developed countries between public education expenditures on the one hand 
and growth and human capital on the other (Heylen and Pozzi, 2007; Blankenau et al., 2007). We 
differ from previous studies by explicitly modeling the production of public education goods    (cf. 
supra). 
For reasons that we explain in Section 3, we do not allow high-ability individuals to spend time in 
education after the age of 34. Hence high-ability workers’ human capital remains constant from this 
age onwards (  = 9). Since low-ability individuals do not engage in tertiary education at all, this result 
holds for them in Equation (20”) from the age of 19 onwards (  = 1). Note however that a constant 
human capital does not exclude variation in productive efficiency due to the (exogenous) age-
productivity link   . The latter can be thought of as reflecting learning-by-doing. It generates the 
usually observed hump-shaped age-earnings profile.    
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         with       (19) 
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                                      (20’) 
      
      
                                       (20”) 
 
The specification and parameterization of the human capital production function (20) is often a 
problem in numerical endogenous growth models. In contrast to goods production functions, there is 
not much empirical evidence and no consensus about the determinants of human capital growth, 
nor about the underlying functional form and parameter values (Bouzahzah et al, 2002, Arcalean and 
Schiopu, 2010). The literature shows a variety of functions, typically including one or two of the 
following inputs: individual time allocated to education, private expenditures on education by 
individuals themselves or by their parents, and government expenditures on education (e.g. Lucas, 
1988; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, 1998; Docquier and Michel, 1999; Bouzahzah et al., 2002; 
Fougère et al., 2009; Arcalean and Schiopu, 2010). In case of two inputs, the adopted functional form 
is very often Cobb-Douglas (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, 1998; Docquier and Michel, 1999; 
Blankenau and Simpson, 2004; Annabi et al., 2011). We follow the latter approach and assume a 
Cobb-Douglas function as in Equation (21).  
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where  is an efficiency parameter, σ represents the elasticity of human capital with respect to the 
education effort and   is the elasticity with respect to available public education goods.  
 
2.6 Government budget and public debt 
For an adequate analysis of realistic fiscal consolidation scenarios, it is important to specify a rich and 
realistic fiscal block. The government in our model raises taxes on labor income, capital income and 
consumption. It buys education goods   , non-wage consumption goods   , and investment goods 
   on the market. Moreover, it also pays public wages, benefits related to non-employment   , 
and lump sum transfers  . It may also issue debt. We denote public debt at the beginning of period   
as  , while     is public debt at the end of this period (the beginning of period    ). Equation 
(22) describes the general government budget constraint. It states that the change in government 
debt is equal to the primary deficit plus interest expenditures. 
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Following among others Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009), we assume that the 
government claims given fractions   ,    and    of GDP for expenditures on education goods, non-
wage consumption and investment goods. As to employment, we assume that the government 
decides on the fraction    of the total supply of hours worked that it wishes to employ in the public 
sector (see e.g. Ardagna, 2001 and 2007; Cavallo, 2005; and Forni et al., 2010) and on its allocation to 
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the three public subsectors. We denote total effective labor (per ability level) in the public sector at 
time t as    
 
. As we have mentioned before, work in the public sector is paid the same real wage  
  
as in the private sector. 6  Individuals are hence indifferent between the two sectors. Non-
employment benefits (   ) are an unconditional source of income support related to inactivity. 
Although it may seem strange to have such transfers in a model without involuntary unemployment, 
one can of course analyse their employment and growth effects as a theoretical benchmark case (see 
also Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2008, 2009). Moreover, there is also clear practical 
relevance. Unconditional or quasi unconditional benefits to structurally non-employed people are a 
fact of life in many European countries. Finally, the government pays the same lump sum transfer     
to all individuals living at time  .  
 
The pension  system is not embedded in the government budget. Pension benefits are paid on a pay-
as-you-go basis and financed by contributions from working individuals. We assume a balanced 
system in which the uniform contribution rate    endogenously adapts to satisfy the budget 
constraint in Eq. (23).  
 
∑ ∑       
         ∑ ∑     
       
       
       
    
  
       (23) 
 
2.7 Model Closure 
Equation (24) describes labor market equilibrium. Total employed effective labor of skill group   is 
equal to aggregate effective labor supply over all individuals of all active age groups of that skill type. 
Hours worked are multiplied by productive efficiency. We formalize our assumption that the 
government hires away a fraction    of total labor supply in Equations (25) and (25’). This results in 
an expression for the effective labor employed privately (    
 
) and publicly (    
 
)  
 
     ∑     
         
       
  
     (24) 
 
(    
     )
 
       
            j=1:25 and       such that     
         (25) 
 
(    
     )
 
 (    )     
           j=1:25 and        such that     
  (    )     (25’) 
 
Given our definition of    and    in Section 2.3, we can express the fractions of all employees at 
work in the public investment, education and consumption goods sectors as respectively       , 
       and (           )  . 
 
                                                        
6
 We acknowledge that public sector wages may differ from private sector wages. However, this difference may 
be small after all. Ardagna (2007) shows for a benchmark of 10 European countries that in 1991-95 public 
sector wages were only 4.59% higher than private sector wages.  
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The law of motion describing the evolution of the private capital stock is described in Equation (26) 
where    are private investments in period   and    is the private capital depreciation rate.   
 
    
  (    )  
       (26) 
 
In a closed economy, government bonds and firms’ physical capital are perfect substitutes in the 
portfolios of households. Therefore, capital market equilibrium satisfies:  
 
∑ ∑       
   
    
        (27) 
 
We define     in equation (28). As our model includes public employment, we follow common 
practice in national accounts and include public wage expenditures in the definition.  
 
          
    
    
       
     
    
     
   (28)     
 
Finally, the model is closed with the introduction of a fiscal policy rule to assure that the no-Ponzi 
game condition holds. We assume that the government uses a single instrument to keep debt in line 
with the target. At this point, we do not make any specification about this rule. Here, we just note 
that one requires such a rule for closure of our model. In section 4, we will elaborate on this. 
 
3. Parameterization and replication of macro facts 
In this section we first discuss the parameterization of our model. While some of the parameters are 
commonly used in the literature, many are calibrated to replicate important data for the average of 
11 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom) in the period 1995-2007. At the end of the section we confront 
our model’s predictions with key macro facts. 
 
3.1 Parameterization 
The values that we adopt for the preference and common technology parameters are standard in the 
literature. For the discount factor  , we impose 0.96, which is equivalent to a rate of time preference 
equal to 2 % per year (see e.g. Barro, 1990). The value of  , i.e. the reciprocal of the intertemporal 
elasticity to substitute leisure, is 2. Estimates for this parameter used in the literature, lie somewhere 
between 1 and 10. Micro studies often reveal very low elasticities (i.e. high  ). However, given our 
macro focus, these studies may not be the most relevant ones. Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) show 
that micro and macro elasticities may be unrelated. Rogerson (2007) also adopts a macro framework. 
He puts forward a reasonable range for   from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, p. 12).  
As to technology, we assume for private physical capital a share coefficient  of 0.3 and a 
depreciation rate of 7.5% per year. For the share of the public inputs in private production , we 
assume a value of 0.15. This value is fully in line with what we observe in the literature. We also find 
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it in Agénor (2011), Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Bose et al. (2007, Table 3). Canning (1999) 
estimates an elasticity of output per worker with respect to infrastructure (as measured by the 
number of telephone lines) equal to on average 0.14 for his full sample, and close to 0.26 for higher-
income countries. Cerra et al. (2008) also use 0.15 for the elasticity of non-traded output with 
respect to government spending in their simulations. Turnovsky and Pintea (2006) adopt a slightly 
higher value of 0.20 whereas Baier and Glomm (2001), Rioja and Glomm (2003) and Chen (2003, 
2007) use a slightly lower value of 0.1. Finally, Hulten (1996) estimated a value of 0.11. The public 
capital depreciation rate is assumed to be 4% per year. We set the elasticity of substitution between 
low and high-ability workers at 1.441. This is the estimated value of Heckman et al.  (1998a). Finally, 
we calibrate the input parameter    such that the predicted initial wage differential between low 
and high-income earners       
    ⁄  is equal to 66% (i.e. the average relative wage in our set of 
countries in 2005/2007, see OECD, Education at a Glance 2009, p. 144-145 Table 7.1A).  
Following Lucas (1990) we put the elasticity of human capital production with respect to education 
time   equal to 0.8. This value is again in the middle of existing studies. It coincides with the value 
used by Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), is slightly higher than the one used by Lau (2000) and Fougère 
et al. (2009) but slightly lower than the estimate of Heckman et al. (1998b). The value of the elasticity 
of human capital production with respect to publicly provided education goods   is much more 
debatable. The available evidence in the literature concerns estimates for the elasticity with respect 
to public education spending rather than publicly provided education goods, which is mainly our 
theoretical concept. These available estimates range from 0 (Coleman et al., 1996) to 0.12 (Card and 
Krueger, 1992) or even higher (Blankenau et al., 2007). Blankenau and Simpson (2004) use a value of 
0.10 while Fougère et al. (2009) and Annabi et al. (2011) adopt 0.18. Given the uncertainty 
surrounding this parameter and the lack of empirical evidence on the relationship between public 
education spending and public education goods, we choose a moderate value of 0.12 for   in order 
to avoid overestimating the effects of public education expenditures on human capital and growth. 
Sensitivity analysis to which we refer later reveals that our main results are robust to limited changes 
in   (see footnote 8 below). 
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Table 2    
Model parameterization 
 
The human capital inheritance parameter of high-ability individuals    is calibrated to match an 
average European real per capita growth rate of 1.96% per year over the same period 1995-2007. 
Van de Kerckhove and Heylen (2011) state that OECD PISA-scores for low-ability individuals (17th 
percentile) are approximately 67% of PISA-scores for high-ability individuals (83th percentile). We 
follow their approach and take this value as a measure of the relative innate ability of low-ability 
workers in our model (i.e.  ). The efficiency parameter  in the human capital accumulation function 
is calibrated to match average European tertiary education rates over the period 1995-2006. Data 
are only available for the age group 20-34. This value is 16.97% and is taken from Heylen and Van de 
Kerckhove (2013). The age group 20-34 exactly matches the first 8 periods in our model (  = 1 to 8). 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Preference parameters   
Discount factor   0.96 
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in leisure     0.5 
Leisure preference    See text 
Preference for public goods   0.11 
Technological parameters   
Physical capital elasticity in output   0.30 
Public capital elasticity in output   0.15 
Input share of high-ability workers    0.63 
Elasticity of substitution between high and low-ability workers   1.441 
Efficiency parameter in the public production function   0.45 
Private capital depreciation rate per year (in %)    7.5 
Public capital depreciation rate per year (in %)    4 
Human capital technology   
Efficiency parameter   14.84 
Elasticity with respect to time input   0.8 
Elasticity with respect to public spending on education   0.12 
Share of human capital inheritance of high-ability individuals (in %)    6.24 
Innate ability of low-ability individuals vis-à-vis high-ability workers (in %)   67 
Government policy parameters   
Expenditure on education goods (in % of GDP)    1.48 
Expenditure on government consumption goods (in % of GDP)    8.32 
Expenditure on public investment goods (in % of GDP)    2.17 
Capital tax rate (in %)    21.71 
Consumption tax rate (in %)    14.96 
Labor tax rate (high-ability individuals, in %)   
  53.20 
Labor tax rate (low-ability individuals, in %)   
  50.71 
Non-employment benefit replacement rate (high-ability individuals, in %)    45.14 
Non-employment benefit replacement rate (low-ability individuals, in %)    65.73 
Pension accrual rate (in %)      2.39 
Fraction of government employment (in %)      20.27 
Share of public employees in investment sector    0.14 
Share of public employees in education sector    0.30 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio (in %)     70.36 
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Therefore, we have imposed zero education after the age of 34 (  = 9). Extensive analysis on this 
point, i.e. allowing for education after this age, reveals that the results reported in the next sections 
are robust to this assumption. Finally, the preference for leisure parameters    are determined such 
that our model correctly predicts average employment rates in hours by age in Europe (average over 
all skill types). For the age-productivity profile, we follow among others Miles (1999) and Cournède 
and Gonand (2006) in assuming the following function of the age:  (   )      (        
          ), resulting in an inverted U-shaped pattern.7 Finally, we set the relative preference for 
public goods   at the average leisure preference observed in our model. As such, we follow 
Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009). In our model, this implies  =0.11. To check the 
sensitivity of our results with respect to this parameter, we will use alternative values (higher: 0.25, 
and lower: 0). Note that Turnovsky (2000) imposes a value of 0.30. Park and Philippopoulos (2004) 
choose 0.25, Dhont and Heylen (2009) 0.26. 
 
The parameters of the government accounts are based on the average data of 11 European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United 
Kingdom) in the period 1995-2007. Most of the data come from our previous study (Buyse et al., 
2013) and from Van de Kerckhove and Heylen (2013). Note that, following the latter study, we allow 
for different tax rates and non-employment benefit rates for low and high-ability workers. As there is 
no detailed data available, the fraction of government employment in total employment is set equal 
for both ability types (     ) and calibrated to match the observed average ratio of public wage 
expenditures to GDP of 12.27% in this group of countries and period (see Table 1). What follows is a 
predicted employment (in hours) share in the public sector equal to about 20% of total employment 
(in hours). We can only compare this figure with data on public sector employment as a share of the 
labor force. For instance, Ardagna (2007) shows a value of 18.7% for a benchmark of 10 European 
countries over the period 1991-1995. The fractions    and    of public employees employed in 
respectively the investment and education sector are calibrated using data on relative public wage 
expenditures in these categories (see Table 1). Again we assume that these shares are equal for both 
ability types. Consequently, we find that       =3%,       =6% and (           )  =11%, 
representing the share of all workers that are employed in the respective public good sectors. Finally, 
the efficiency/normalization parameter  is calibrated such that public production in investment 
goods is equal in size to public wage expenditures in the investment sector (i.e. 1.77% of GDP in the 
countries and time period under consideration; see Table 1). This also implies that total production in 
the public education sector is equal to total public wage expenditures in this sector (=3.62% of GDP, 
see Table 1) and similar for the public consumption sector. We further assume a pension accrual rate 
of 2.39% per period, which translates into a net income-related pension replacement rate of 59.8% 
observed in Europe. Finally, we set lump sum transfers in the initial steady state such that the initial 
                                                        
7
 We would like to emphasize that our model is not sensitive at all to the specific efficiency pattern imposed, 
due to the fact that leisure preference parameters    are also assumed to be age-specific. Both parameter sets 
together make sure our model correctly predicts observed age-specific employment rates. 
Chapter  6 
 
 186 
debt-to-GDP ratio            is equal to 70.36%, the average value of the 11 European countries 
in the period 1995-2007.  
 
3.2 Model predictions 
Table 3 shows the predictions of our model concerning some important macro aggregates. All figures 
are in line with actual data for developed countries. The private physical capital-output ratio is 2.25; 
the private consumption-to-GDP ratio is about 58%. We observe a private investment-to-GDP ratio of 
18.2%, which is in line with many developed countries’ private investment rates (Kamps, 2005). 
Finally, our model predicts a real interest rate of about 4.67% per year. As the debt-to-GDP ratio in 
the benchmark economy is approximately 70%, interest payments come down to 3.22% of GDP per 
year.  
 
Table 3   Steady-state value of main variables in the baseline model. 
Variable 
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 Real interest rate 
Value 2.25 0.576 0.182 0.0467 
 
Figure 1 includes our model’s predictions for the life-cycle time profile of low and high-ability 
individuals. A first restriction underlying this figure is that the average of the fractions of time worked 
by high and low-ability individuals in a certain age group matches the true data for that age group 
(see also Appendix A, Table A.1). The underlying data per ability group are unrestricted. As can be 
seen, our model realistically predicts that low-ability individuals allocate more time to work when 
young than high-ability individuals. However, the latter work more during most of their active life 
and also retire later. A second restriction concerns education. We calibrated our model to match an 
average education rate over the first 8 periods of life of 16.97% of available time. Predictions are as 
one would expect. Young high-ability individuals spend on average a significantly higher fraction of 
time to education at the age of 20 than later in life. We observe 69% in the first period. As the 
individual ages, this fraction decreases gradually to reach only 10% at the age of 33 and 34, and then 
drops to zero. 
 
Figure 1    
Household life-cycle time profile (fraction of time by age and ability group). 
             
0,0
0,5
1,0
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4. Simulation strategy 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the influence of different fiscal consolidation policies on real 
macro variables like output and employment, and how all this affects the welfare of current and 
future generations. We define fiscal consolidation as a set of policies that reduce public debt from 
the initial level by 40% of GDP. In this section, we explain our simulation strategy.  
 
When simulating fiscal consolidation in general equilibrium models, one should be aware that the 
instrument or combination of instruments used to realize primary surpluses, need not be the same 
as the instrument(s) to which the ex-post budgetary savings are allocated. For the purpose of this 
paper, and in order to allow clear comparisons between different policies, we choose to conduct 
experiments that differ only in the type of instrument used for consolidation, and not in the use of the 
ex-post savings. More precisely, we execute our simulations as follows.  
 
(1) The government introduces at time     a temporary tax increase or expenditure decrease 
in order to bring back its debt level to 30% of GDP, i.e. a reduction by 40% of GDP. 
(2) The ex-ante effort of each fiscal austerity measure is 2% of GDP. Hence, instead of imposing 
an exogenous debt path or a pre-specified fiscal rule, we keep the speed of adjustment of 
public debt to its target endogenous and only impose the size of the adjustment (in ex-ante 
terms). Given that a certain amount of budgetary effort is set forth, we believe that this set-
up corresponds more closely to real policy-making. Moreover, as all plans are assumed to be 
of equal ex-ante size, we can make straightforward comparisons of the effects of different 
debt reduction strategies on output, welfare etc. 
(3) Initially, i.e. at the time of introducing the consolidation programme, we do not impose any 
fiscal rule. Hence we allow the reversed snowball to take full effect. At the time the gap 
between the actual debt ratio and its new target value is small enough (we say smaller than 
5% of GDP), the instrument used for consolidation returns to its pre-consolidation value. 
From then onwards, we adjust lump-sum transfers to ensure stable debt dynamics in the 
long run, i.e. to ensure that debt is brought further in line with the new debt target.  
 
Let us now look at this fiscal rule in more detail. Remember that we determine lump sum transfers in 
the initial steady state such that the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is constant. We keep these transfers 
constant at their value for all periods during the adjustment until the gap between the actual debt-
to-GDP ratio and its target falls below 5% of GDP. At that moment, the instrument used for fiscal 
consolidation returns to its initial value and lump-sum transfers are adjusted to ensure that the no-
Ponzi game condition holds. More specifically, we make the simple assumption in Equation (29) that 
lump-sum transfers change in order to close half of the remaining (and small) gap between actual 
and targeted debt. As a result of Equation (29), the surplus resulting from a lower debt level is in 
every simulation recycled through an increase in lump-sum transfers. 
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Fiscal rule:       is such that (      
 )  
    
 
 
             
              (29) 
 
where we set   = 30% of GDP. 
 
Two remarks are important here. First, the simulation results reported in the next sections are robust 
to changes in the exact timing when the fiscal rule in (29) takes effect, i.e. they are robust to 
choosing a slightly lower or higher threshold value. Second, due to the perfect foresight nature of our 
model, the specific allocation of budgetary savings after fiscal consolidation has short-run behavioral 
implications. As such, choosing a different surplus allocation will imply different economic dynamics. 
We have chosen to allocate the budgetary savings to lump-sum transfers as they are the most 
neutral fiscal instrument. Note, however, that we could have complicated the rule in Equation (29) to 
include other budget items (some other expenditure category or tax rate) or a combination of 
several fiscal instruments. This would, however, only change the way in which budgetary savings are 
allocated in the long-run, and not how the initial primary surpluses are generated. Although these 
alternative assumptions do influence the quantitative nature of our transitional results due to the 
forward-looking character of the model, the qualitative nature (i.e. the relative effect of one scenario 
compared to another) remains unchanged. Simulation results in which budgetary savings are 
recycled through decreasing taxes or increases in other expenditures are available upon request. 
 
5. Effects of fiscal consolidation 
Using the simulation methodology described above, we implement nine distinct policies, each 
resorting to a different unique instrument for consolidation. Table 4 summarizes for each policy the 
required change in the budget instrument in order to achieve an expected ex-ante change of 2% of 
GDP in the associated revenue or expenditure category. For instance, to achieve an ex-ante increase 
of 2% of GDP in consumption tax revenues, it is required to increase the consumption tax rate by 
3.5%-points. An equal-size increase in labor tax revenues would require a rise in the labor tax rate by 
3.3%-points 8 . We are especially interested in four policies related to public employment. 
Consolidation through ‘public employment’ is simulated through a reduction in  . It thus concerns an 
overall cut in the number of public employees. In all three public sectors (investment, education and 
consumption goods) the same fraction of employees is laid off. An ex-ante reduction of public wage 
expenditures by 2% of GDP is according to Table 4 achieved when public employment is reduced by 
2.8% of the labor force, i.e. a reduction from 20.3% of the labor force to 17.5%. In the final three 
scenarios (public investment expenditures, public education expenditures and public consumption 
expenditures), it is our assumption that consolidation occurs partly through a reduction in the 
number of public employees and partly through a reduction in goods expenditures (resp.        and 
  ). As can be seen in Table 1, in the investment sector, 45% of public expenditures are wages. 
Consequently, the 2% consolidation programme is imposed for 45% through a reduction in public 
                                                        
8
 Note that, although our model has different labor tax rates and non-employment benefit rates for low and 
high-ability individuals, we assume that consolidation falls equally on both groups. 
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employment in this sector while the remaining 55% will be achieved through a reduction in 
investment goods bought on the market. We proceed similarly for consolidation through public 
education and public consumption expenditures. Given these required changes in Table 4, we 
perform our simulations as described in the previous section. 
 
Table 4   
Required change in policy variable(s) to achieve a 2% of GDP ex-ante change in the corresponding 
revenue/expenditure category. 
Consolidation scenario Change in instrument (%-points) 
Lump-sum transfers/tax    -2.0 
Consumption tax rate     +3.5 
Capital tax rate     +12.8 
Labor tax rate    
     
  +3.3 
Non-employment benefit replacement rate         -10.7 
Public employment a     -2.8 
Public investment expenditures a     
 (      ) 
-1.1 
-1.5 
Public education expenditures a     
 (      ) 
-0.6 
-2.4 
Public consumption expenditures a     
 (      ) 
-1.1 
-3.3 
Note: 
a
 changes in employment are imposed for both high-ability and low-ability workers;           . 
  
5.1 Debt evolution 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio in these nine scenarios. We report the 
evolution of time on the horizontal axis where 1 period represents 2 years in reality. We observe, as 
expected, a gradual decline in public debt in all scenarios. With the exception of two, all strategies 
reach the new debt target of 30% in about 8 or 9 periods. The exceptions are fiscal consolidation 
implemented by reducing public employment (which takes at least 1 period longer) and 
consolidation by means of cutting non-employment benefits (which proceeds much faster and 
reaches the new target in 6 periods). If speed of consolidation were the only criterion for policy 
makers, governments should resort especially to a reduction in non-employment benefits. Cutting 
public employment would then be the least advisable strategy.  
 
5.2 Private output and GDP 
Given the same ex-ante policy size, the different debt dynamics observed in Figure 2 can be 
explained by different short run economic dynamics in response to each of the policy changes. We 
show in Figures 3 and 4 the evolution of private output and GDP relative to the unchanged policy 
benchmark.  Moreover, we report in Table 5 cumulative GDP effects (in % compared to the 
benchmark) over alternative time horizons. For most policies, the evolution of private output and 
GDP is identical. However, as public wage expenditures enter directly into the definition of GDP (see 
Equation (28)), those consolidation programmes that resort (partly) to reductions in public 
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employment are characterized by a different evolution of private output and GDP. This is the case for 
the final four strategies in Table 4. Only for those do we report the GDP level evolution in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 2    
Evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio in different fiscal consolidation scenarios. 
 
 
First inspection of our results in Figure 3 confirms the positive expectations formulated by many 
researchers about expenditure based fiscal adjustments, as well as the negative ones about tax 
based adjustments (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995; von Hagen et al., 2002; Schaltegger and Feld, 
2009; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). All but one consolidation strategies that reduce public 
expenditures imply an expansion of private output. This expansion is the strongest when non-
employment benefits are reduced. Lower benefits raise the relative gain from work, which explains 
the strong increase in labor supply and hours worked underlying the rise in output (see Figure B.1 in 
Appendix B). The exception concerns public investment cuts. Observing negative output effects here 
– at least from the second period onward – is also fully in line with the literature. By contrast, when 
consolidation relies on tax increases, private output falls during at least five periods (or ten years). 
The output loss is particularly strong and long-lasting in the cases of labor tax increases and capital 
tax increases. It is apparent that the main factor driving this result for labor taxes is the drop in labor 
supply and hours worked (see also Figure B.1 in Appendix B). Capital tax increases mainly undermine 
investment in physical capital. They also affect hours worked to the extent that a reduction in 
physical capital implies lower real wages and labor supply.  
 
An interesting observation is the rise in private output when the expenditure cut concerns a 
reduction in the overall number of public employees. Given our assumption of a perfectly 
competitive labor market, those employees who are laid off by the government are immediately 
hired by private firms (i.e. within 1 period of 2 years). Hence, there is an immediate crowding-in 
effect on private employment with an instantaneous positive impact on private output. This is also 
true for the three other simulations which rely partly on a reduction in public employment. Although 
our assumption might be somewhat strong, it is probable that governments will not be able to 
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reduce their employment base without some guarantees that their employees will soon find another 
job. Unions may otherwise strongly act against it. Overall, we find a net positive private output effect 
in the first ten periods after reducing the overall number of public employees. However, with the 
above in mind, this positive effect should be regarded as an upper bound for this private output 
effect. If we assume that the redundant employees move more gradually to the private sector, 
private output will decline on impact. We do this in Section 6.4 where we impose a labor reallocation 
cost. More specifically, we assume that employees who are laid off by the government, remain 
unemployed during a period of 2 years, after which they move to the private sector. 
The effects of a reduction in public education expenditures are also interesting. Here as well, 
the immediate result is a significant rise in private output. Although lower education expenditures 
discourage education (and encourage work) among the youngest generations, aggregate labor 
supply remains practically unaffected (see Figure B.1). Again, however, public employees previously 
employed in public education shift to the private sector. So private effective labor increases. 
Unfortunately, the resulting fall in tertiary education (not reported) implies a temporary decline in 
the growth of knowledge, which negatively affects private output and GDP over longer horizons. 
After the consolidation period, i.e. when education expenditures return to their pre-consolidation 
level, private output in Figure 3 indeed ends up below the benchmark. The economy’s stock of 
human capital is significantly lower. 
 
A more nuanced picture on the effects of expenditure based fiscal consolidation emerges in Figure 4, 
where the focus is on GDP  If we also take into account public employees’ value-added, we no longer 
observe an expansion after consolidation strategies that include public employment cuts, at least not 
during the first eight periods. It is clear from our results and our summary in Table 5 that the case 
can still be made that spending based fiscal adjustments cause smaller recessions than labor and 
capital tax based adjustments, but it becomes hard to make a case for expansionary spending cuts. It 
is only when output effects after 20 periods are included in the computation that we observe a 
positive cumulative result for consumption expenditure cuts. At the revenue side, note that 
consolidation via an increase of consumption taxes puts much less negative pressure on the 
economy than via labor or capital taxes. Although there is still an initial loss of GDP during a 
consumption tax based consolidation, over a 20 or 30 period horizon cumulative net effects are 
positive.  
 
Our baseline model also emphasizes the importance of public investment for the economy’s supply 
potential. Fiscal tightening resorting only to reductions in public investment leads to the biggest 
losses in GDP in Figure 4 and Table 5. Over any horizon cumulative GDP effects are very negative. 
These results confirm the importance of public investment in general and during consolidation times 
in particular (see also Baxter and King, 1993 and Heylen et al., 2011). 
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Figure 3   
Evolution of the level of private output in different consolidation scenarios (index: benchmark=1). 
 
 
Figure 4  
Evolution of the level of GDP in different consolidation scenarios (index: benchmark=1). 
 
Note: In the other consolidation scenarios the evolution of real GDP matches the one of private output in 
Figure 3.  
 
 
5.3 Welfare effects 
In Figure 5 and Table 6 we report the welfare effects of the nine programmes of fiscal tightening that 
we focus on. In almost all existing (mainly empirical) work on fiscal consolidation an evaluation of 
welfare effects is missing. A rare exception is Jensen and Rutherford (2002). The issue is double. First, 
there is an important intergenerational issue. While the burden of fiscal consolidation falls especially 
on current generations, it will be future generations that reap most of the benefits of improvements 
in the government balance. Second, as acknowledged by e.g. Jensen and Rutherford (2002), there is 
also a possible intragenerational issue. Given for instance different income profiles over life, it is 
possible that some individuals suffer more from consolidation than others. Our model allows to 
assess whether this is true for individuals with different abilities to study. The upper part of Figure 5 
shows welfare effects for high-ability individuals, the lower part for low-ability individuals. More 
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precisely, we report on the vertical axis the welfare effect on individuals of the generation born k 
periods after the start of the policy reform, where k is indicated on the horizontal axis. So, the data at 
k=0 for example concern the newborns in the period the policy is initiated. The data at k=-29 concern 
the oldest generations, those who were born 29 periods ago. All data for k>0 relate to future 
generations. Our welfare measure is the (constant) percentage change in benchmark consumption in 
each period of remaining life that individuals should get to attain the same lifetime utility as after the 
policy shock (see also King and Rebelo, 1990). To compute this percentage change, we keep 
individuals’ hours worked and the public good at the benchmark.  
 
 
Table 5  
Cumulative real GDP effect over alternative time horizons (compared to benchmark, in %, negative 
numbers indicate GDP losses). 
 
Time horizon 1:5 1:10 1:20 1:30 
Lump-sum transfers -0,5 -0,1 1,9 3,8 
Consumption tax -2,5 -2,3 1,0 3,4 
Capital tax -7,5 -11,3 -10,1 -7,7 
Labor tax -7,3 -11,4 -8,9 -5,7 
Non-employment benefits 9,3 13,3 17,3 20,1 
Public employment -3,1 -5,1 -5,1 -3,5 
Public investment -7,7 -19,0 -32,7 -33,1 
Public education -0,1 0,5 -0,1 -0,1 
Public consumption -3.4 -3.2 0.2 2.9 
Note: We report the presented discounted value of real GDP effects. As discount rate we use the benchmark 
real interest rate of 4.67% per year.  
 
When it comes to intra-cohort welfare effects of fiscal consolidation, a quick glance at Figure 5 is 
enough to see that the effects are very similar for low and high-ability individuals within the same 
generation.  In general, high-ability individuals seem slightly better (or less worse) off than low-ability 
individuals, except in the case of labor tax increases, but all in all there is very little difference. We 
may conclude that intra-generational equity is not likely to pose the greatest obstacle to fiscal 
tightening. In this sense we confirm Jensen and Rutherford (2002), even if their model was much 
smaller than ours.   
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Figure 5 Welfare effects of different fiscal consolidation policies (expressed as % of benchmark 
consumption) 
 
(A) high-ability individuals 
                           
(B) low-ability individuals 
                          
Note: The vertical axis indicates the welfare effect for individuals belonging to the generation born k periods 
after the start of the fiscal consolidation. The horizontal axis indicates k. Negative numbers for k point at 
generations born before the consolidation starts. 
 
Welfare differences are much bigger between generations. To analyze these, we integrate the 
welfare effects induced by each policy reform into a single aggregate summary measure in Table 6. 
For each individual, we first compute the present discounted value of the total consumption change 
over life that is required in the benchmark to make him/her equally well-of as under the policy. The 
basis of our computation are the data that we report in Figure 5. But now we also take into account 
differences in the length of remaining life. For newborn individuals the data in Figure 5 apply to 30 
periods, whereas for the oldest generations they apply to only one remaining period. Next, we 
impose that all those who lose under the new policy are compensated by the winners. Our summary 
measure is the present discounted value of the net aggregate consumption gain of all winners after 
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having compensated the losers, in percent of initial GDP. We do this for different generations of 
individuals. The first column in Table 6 includes those generations of both ability groups which are 
retired at the moment of the start of the consolidation programme (i.e. between ages 65 and 78). 
The second column considers individuals between ages 35 and 64 (the active non-studying 
population). The third column considers individuals of age 19 to 34. The sum of the first three 
columns gives us the aggregate consumption gain for all generations alive when the consolidation 
programme is introduced. We show these in column 4. Finally, the last column computes aggregate 
welfare effects for 10 future generations. Note that our welfare measure for policies that imply a 
change in public consumption is very much influenced by our value of   (the relative preference for 
public consumption goods). We have therefore performed our analysis also with lower and higher 
values of this parameter. 
 
Welfare analysis imposes even more nuance on our earlier findings about the possibility of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation. When aggregated over all generations that are alive at the time 
consolidation is started, only two consolidation strategies bring about net positive welfare effects. In 
line with our earlier findings for output, we observe again the most positive outcome after a 
reduction of non-employment benefits. The second strategy with positive consequences for the 
aggregate welfare of all living generations runs via a reduction of public consumption. For these 
positive effects to show up, however, it is required that the relative value of public consumption   is 
low. Conclusions here crucially depend on the utility-enhancing nature of the produced consumption 
goods. All other strategies imply lower aggregate welfare for the generations that live when 
consolidation is started. Even if most of the evidence points at welfare losses for these generations, 
note that the case can still be made that these losses are smaller under spending based than under 
tax based fiscal adjustments. The only exception again concerns cuts in public investment.  
 
 
Table 6  Aggregate welfare effect after compensating welfare transfers (expressed as a % of initial 
GDP) 
Included generations t-29:t-23 t-22:t-8 t-7:t t-29:t t+1:t+10 
Lump-sum transfers -4.2 -8.8 0.6 -12.4 8.2 
Consumption tax -5.4 -11.4 1.7 -15.1 9.9 
Capital tax -4.4 -12.9 3.3 -14.1 9.8 
Labor tax -2.2 -9.8 -2.7 -14.7 10.4 
Non-employment benefits 2.9 2.1 3.8 8.8 13.0 
Public employment -0.2 -4.6 -0.7 -5.5 6.6 
Public investment expenditures -1.6 -23.2 -11.3 -36.1 -4.4 
Public education expenditures 1.1 -5.4 -2.8 -7.1 3.3 
Public consumption expenditures ( =0.11) -2.4 -2.5 4.3 -0.6 11.7 
Public consumption expenditures ( =0) 0.1 4.9 7.0 12.0 12.2 
Public consumption expenditures ( =0.25) -5.6 -12.0 0.9 -16.7 11.2 
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Things change significantly when we focus on the youngest living generations in column 3 
and on future generations in column 5. For these generations most welfare effects are positive. But 
now it is much less obvious to prefer expenditure based consolidations. Consolidation by means of 
temporary public employment reductions or by cuts in public investment or public education 
expenditures create smaller welfare gains (larger losses) for young and future generations than most 
tax based consolidations. A key element here is that these expenditure cuts in some way affect 
physical or human capital formation in the economy. The opposite applies to public consumption 
cuts. Future generations will prefer these from a welfare perspective above all other strategies. We 
test the robustness of all these results in the next section. 
 
6. Robustness tests 
In this section, we first check if the results that we obtained above survive if we independently kill 
two channels present in the model: the interest rate channel and the education channel. Second, we 
perform an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the public production part of the model. 
More specifically, we analyze the sensitivity of our results to a change in the output elasticity of 
public capital    a change in the efficiency parameter in the production of public goods   and a 
change in the way we introduce public capital as an input (stock or flow) in the private production 
function9. We focus exclusively on the evolution of     and welfare. 
 
6.1 Open vs. closed economy: allowing for international mobility of physical capital. 
The model presented above assumes a closed economy. In such a set-up, public debt has a direct 
crowding-out effect in the domestic capital market. Here we modify this assumption and allow for 
perfect international mobility of physical capital. It implies that the equilibrium interest rate   in our 
economy is no longer obtained from Equations (15) and (27). Instead, it is determined by the 
exogenous world real interest rate   
   in Equation (27’): 
     
    (27’) 
 
In our simulations we set   
  equal to its level in the benchmark economy, i.e. 4.67% per year. Private 
capital will flow into the economy according to Equation (15) when its net marginal product after 
taxes exceeds this exogenous interest rate level (   will then rise), and vice versa.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9
 We have also analyzed the sensitivity of our results to changes in the value of  , the elasticity of human 
capital accumulation to changes in public education expenditures. Effects were very small. Only for the 
consolidation policy resorting to decreases in public education expenditures did this lead to slight changes in 
the results (available upon request).  
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Table 7   
Effects of fiscal consolidation assuming an exogenous and constant interest rate (small open 
economy)  
 
Cumulative GDP effect 
compared to benchmark, 
in %, time horizon: 
Aggregate welfare effect after compensating 
welfare transfers (in % of initial GDP) 
Included generations 
 1:5 1:30 t-29:t-23 t-22:t-8 t-7:t t-29:t t+1:t+10 
Lump-sum transfers 0.9 1.1 -3.8 -10.0 -1.7 -15.4 2.3 
Consumption tax -0.4 -2.0 -4.6 -13.1 -3.3 -21.1 1.3 
Capital tax -17.4 -25.6 -3.7 -11.3 -4.8 -19.7 3.4 
Labor tax -9.9 -7.2 -3.4 -11.9 -4.0 -19.2 7.7 
Non-empl. benefits 15.2 19.4 3.5 -0.5 0.4 3.4 5.6 
Public employment 0.9 -5.7 0.4 -6.6 -4.4 -10.5 -0.8 
Public investment -4.6 -42.6 -0.3 -23.8 -17.0 -41.1 -12.1 
Public education 5.9 -4.6 2.1 -7.9 -7.7 -13.5 -6.7 
Public consumption 
(µ=0.11) 
-0.3 -1.1 -1.7 -4.3 -0.1 -6.0 3.9 
 
We have simulated all nine fiscal consolidation scenarios again under the assumption of a small open 
economy with exogenous and constant real interest rate. In Table 7 we report the results for GDP 
and welfare, following the setup that we adopted before in Tables 5 and 6. We observe three 
changes compared to our baseline simulations in these earlier tables. First, assuming an open 
economy with perfect capital mobility somewhat restores the sharp contrast in short-run output 
effects between contractionary tax based adjustments and the possibility of expansionary spending 
based adjustments (except public investment cuts). Short-run output effects from capital tax and 
labor tax increases are much more negative in Table 7 than in Table 5. Both policies reduce the net 
return to investment in physical capital, which causes capital outflow10. Unlike in a closed economy, 
there is no offsetting fall in the interest rate. Spending cuts however bring about more positive short-
run output effects. The increase in labor supply when non-employment benefits or education 
expenditures are reduced, or the reallocation of labor to the private sector when the government is 
downsized, raise the marginal productivity of physical capital in that sector and the return to 
investment. In this case capital flows in, and there is no offsetting interest rate increase. Second, in a 
small open economy cumulative long-run output effects over 30 periods are more negative (less 
positive) in all consolidation scenarios including those that are spending based. If there was a bias in 
our results for output in the previous sections, it will certainly not have been a negative one. The 
reason is again the exogenous interest rate. Unlike closed economies, a small open economy cannot 
benefit from a lower interest rate and its positive effects on tertiary education, human capital 
accumulation, and private investment in physical capital11. The third important change concerns 
                                                        
10
 In the case of higher labor taxes, hours worked will fall, which affects physical capital’s gross marginal 
product. 
11
 We could alternatively have assumed that there exists a link between fiscal sustainability and sovereign risk 
such that the domestic interest rate is equal to the world interest rate plus a risk premium depending on the 
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welfare. If we first focus on aggregate welfare effects for all current generations, we observe that 
these are generally much worse than in Table 6. The main reason is weaker output. There is only one 
remaining policy (non-employment benefit cuts) with expansionary consequences for welfare, and 
even here the positive effect has been reduced by more than half. If we look at specific generations, 
the hypothesis of expansionary welfare effects has to be rejected now also for the youngest of the 
current generations. Even nearby future generations may be worse off, especially so in some of the 
expenditure based consolidations. In this respect, the results in Table 7 confirm our earlier findings. 
What is better for output need not be better for welfare.   
 
6.2 Exogenous education. 
In our baseline simulations, all consolidation programmes (except the one relying on a reduction in 
public education expenditures) induce a rise in tertiary education rates both during the transition 
and in the long-run. The fall in interest rates is a major explanation. As tertiary education is both an 
important substitute for employment and an important driver of economic growth, taking it into 
account in the analysis of fiscal consolidation (or fiscal policy in general) is clearly important to obtain 
realistic simulation effects. We have made a similar argument in an earlier paper showing the crucial 
importance of considering education when analyzing the macroeconomic effects of pension reform 
(Buyse et al., 2013). As a second extension, we therefore analyze in this section how our results 
change when we follow practice in most of the literature and shut down the education channel. We 
report cumulative GDP-effects over horizons of 5 and 30 periods, and welfare effects, in Table 8.  
 
Table 8  
Effects of fiscal consolidation assuming exogenous investment in tertiary education.  
 
Cumulative GDP effect 
compared to benchmark, 
in %, time horizon: 
Aggregate welfare effect after compensating welfare 
transfers (in % of initial GDP) 
Included generations 
 1:5 1:30 t-29:t-23 t-22:t-8 t-7:t t-29:t t+1:t+10 
Lump-sum transfers 1.0 5.7 -3.9 -10.8 -2.6 -17.3 3.5 
Consumption tax -0.2 5.6 -4.9 -14.5 -2.7 -22.1 4.1 
Capital tax -3.8 -3.7 -3.6 -16.7 -1.3 -21.6 3.4 
Labor tax -3.7 -2.9 -1.3 -14.7 -9.1 -25.1 2.7 
Non-empl. benefits 12.0 22.1 3.6 -1.7 -1.0 0.9 6.7 
Public employment -1.9 -1.5 0.1 -6.3 -4.3 -10.5 1.6 
Public investment -6.0 -31.1 -1.1 -25.9 -15.8 -42.9 -10.2 
Public education -1.3 1.0 0.9 -3.4 -3.1 -5.6 1.3 
Public consumption -0.8 5.2 -1.8 -6.1 -0.5 -8.3 5.1 
 
 
Comparing the results in Table 8 to those in Table 5, it seems clear that GDP effects may be biased 
upwards when the education channel is disregarded. This holds also for shorter time-horizons. In our 
                                                                                                                                                                             
level of government debt. This would reconstitute the link between government debt and the domestic 
interest rate. We expect results to be somewhere between those of the closed and the open economy. 
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baseline simulations, individuals react to all policies (except a reduction in public education) by 
increasing time invested in education. While this is positive for growth and human capital in the long-
run, it also implies an initial drop in effective labor supply. As such, the initial drop in GDP is smaller 
when education is exogenous and it takes less time for output to recover. Despite this short-run 
output bonus, however, our observation of generally negative short-run output effects in Table 5 
does not disappear in Table 8. As to welfare effects, however, disregarding the education channel in 
Table 8 would seem to imply a negative bias. One reason is that individuals are now constrained in 
the sense that they are not able to optimally choose time investment in education.  
 
6.3 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we analyze the sensitivity of our results to a change in the output elasticity of public 
capital    a change in the way we introduce public capital as an input (stock or flow) in the private 
production function, and a change in the efficiency parameter in the production of public goods   
 
6.3.1 Elasticity of output with respect to public capital ( ) 
The assumption that all public capital enters as an input for private production is important in our 
model. It implies that reducing public investment affects output not only directly, but also indirectly 
via its influence on the marginal productivity of both private physical capital and human capital. In 
this section we investigate the robustness of our results to this assumption. A first issue is to have a 
correct estimate for the elasticity of private production with respect to public inputs  . A sensitivity 
analysis is required. We focus exclusively on the GDP-effects from two consolidation programmes: 
public employment and public investment reductions. Effects for all other scenarios are hardly 
affected by the choice of  . Figure 7 shows the results. In Appendix C we report welfare effects.  
 
Whatever the value that we impose for  , our earlier conclusion that short-run GDP effects are 
negative after a public employment or a public investment cut survives. The higher  , the larger is 
the loss of GDP on impact, and the more persistent is this loss12. Ardagna (2001, 2007) obtained 
similar findings. As a second extension, we replace Equation (13) by (13’). In Equation (13’) we adopt 
the Barro (1990) framework such that the flow of public investment   , rather than the stock of 
public capital  
 
, enters the production function: 
 
   (  
 
)
 
(  )
 (  
 
)
     
           (13’) 
 
                                                        
12
 Simulations for private output under alternative values of   also confirm our earlier findings (see Figure 3). 
Short-term effects from cutting public employment are generally positive over a horizon of 5 periods, even 
with values of   around 0.20. By contrast, the effects of cutting public investment on private output are 
generally negative over a horizon of 5 years, except when   is close to zero. 
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Under this assumption, and given our baseline estimate for   (=0.15), we find a much more negative 
impact on GDP from a reduction in the number of public employees, even when we allow for direct 
crowding-in of employees into the private sector as present in our model. Moreover, the total GDP 
loss during times of fiscal austerity is now the largest of all possible strategies (compare Figures 4 and 
7). Effects on welfare in Appendix C are consistent with the observed GDP evolution. The higher the 
value of  , the higher (lower) the aggregate welfare losses (gains) from fiscal consolidation. This 
holds for all generations under consideration. Under the Barro framework, welfare losses from both 
reductions in public employment and public investment expenditures are unprecedented. We 
conclude that it was not due to the particular choice of   that we found no expansionary output and 
welfare effects after public employment or investment cuts in Tables 5 and 6 (at least for all current 
generations). 
 
Figure 7   
Evolution of the level of GDP under alternative values of   and under the Barro (1990) framework 
(index: benchmark=1) 
 
(a) Public employment            (b)  public investment expenditures 
 
 
6.3.2 Efficiency of government production ( ) 
Finally, we have checked the sensitivity of our results with respect to the value for the efficiency 
parameter in the production of public goods   We report the results for the cumulative GDP effect 
and the welfare effects in Table 9 below. We focus exclusively on a reduction in public employment. 
We find that reducing public employment leads to more optimistic GDP effects when government 
efficiency is lower. However, this is only true for long enough time horizons. The initial effect 
consistently remains negative. Concerning welfare, results are more clear: when government 
efficiency is lower, reducing public employment considerably improves welfare even in the short run.  
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Table 9  
Effect of reducing public employment on cumulative GDP and welfare. 
   1:5 1:10 1:20 1:30  
Cumulative GDP effect (in % 
compared to initial 
benchmark) 
baseline -3.1 -5.1 -5.1 -3.5  
50% Lower -3.1 -4.7 -3.8 -1.9  
Zero -3.4 -4.4 -1.1 1.7  
  t-29:t-23 t-22:t-8 t-7:t t-29:t t+1:t+10 
Aggregate welfare effect 
after compensating welfare 
transfers (in % of initial GDP) 
baseline -0.2 -4.6 -0.7 -5.5 6.6 
50% Lower 0.2 -1.6 1.1 -0.4 8.2 
Zero 0.9 5.6 5.8 12.3 12.5 
 
6.4  Labor reallocation cost 
In this section we leave the assumption of a perfect labor market when the government lays off 
employees and assume the existence of a labor reallocation cost. More specifically, it is our 
assumption that individuals who are laid off by the government are not directly employed in the 
private sector. Instead, they remain inactive for exactly one period (i.e. 2 years in reality). After this 
period, they find a job in a private firm.  Figure 8 focusses on the evolution of private output under 
the above assumption. The dashed lines show the impact under our baseline assumption of perfect 
labor markets (as observed in Figure 3). The solid lines show the impact under an imperfect labor 
market. As expected, due to a temporary employment loss, we now find that the initial output effect 
is negative and much worse than documented above. As a result, GDP and welfare effects will also be 
more negative. The latter is documented in Table 10 which shows that especially current generations 
will suffer significantly more under stronger reallocation costs. These results nuance even more the 
possible existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation for these expenditure-based 
policies. 
 
Figure 8  
Evolution of private output in case of an imperfect labor market (index: benchmark=1) 
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Table 10 
Aggregate welfare effect after compensating welfare transfers when labor markets are (im)perfect 
(in % of initial GDP) 
 Perfect labor market Imperfect labor market 
 t-29:t t+1:t+10 t-29:t t+1:t+10 
Public employment -5.5 6.6 -7.4 6.1 
Public investment -36.1 -4.4 -37.1 -4.6 
Public education -7.1 3.3 -8.7 3.0 
Public consumption -0.6 11.7 -1.7 11.5 
 
7. Conclusion 
Macroeconomists disagree heavily on the output effects of fiscal consolidation, and on related 
determinants of the effectiveness of consolidation to bring down the public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Different datasets, different methodologies, and sometimes ideologically inspired considerations, are 
employed to fight an empirical battle. The debate has become particularly lively since the financial 
crisis of 2008-09.  
 
In this paper we study the effects of fiscal consolidation within a rich theoretical dynamic general 
equilibrium model of a perfectly competitive economy. The main characteristics of our model are the 
following. (i) We specify overlapping generations of individuals with either high or low innate ability. 
(ii) Low-ability individuals allocate their time to either work or leisure. High-ability individuals also 
allocate time to education and human capital accumulation. These allocation decisions are fully 
endogenous in our model. (iii) We can study effects of consolidation not only on private output and 
GDP, but also on the welfare of current and future generations of high and low-ability individuals. (iv) 
Whereas most theoretical macro models reduce the role of the government at the expenditure side 
to purchasing goods and paying transfers, we pay particular attention to also modeling public 
employment and production. Given the empirical discussion on the role of public wage bill cuts for 
the success of fiscal consolidation, this was important to do. We realistically distinguish public 
employees in the production of investment goods, in education, and in the production of useful 
public consumption goods. As such, public sector output contributes to the construction of public 
capital and the accumulation of human capital, which both raise private sector output and 
productivity, and to the provision of direct utility. We test the robustness of our results for the way in 
which we introduce public capital as an input (stock or flow) in the private production function, for 
the output elasticity imposed and for frictions in the labor market. (v) We basically assume a closed 
economy where the real interest rate is fully endogenous. As a robustness test we alternatively 
assume a small open economy where the interest rate is constant at the world level. We know of no 
paper in the theoretical fiscal consolidation literature with a setup as rich as ours in (i)-(iv). 
 
We use our model to simulate nine scenarios intended to reduce public debt by 40% of GDP. Given 
current levels of public debt in many OECD countries close to 100% (on average in the euro area) or 
even above 100% (in the US and the UK) a targeted reduction by 40%-points cannot be called an 
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exaggeration. These scenarios include both tax based consolidations and expenditure based 
consolidations. Among the former we consider increases of labor taxes, capital taxes and 
consumption taxes. Among the latter we include reductions of non-employment benefits, public 
employment, public investment, and expenditures on goods in the different public subsectors. We 
run these simulations under perfect foresight in a non-stochastic setting. The use of a rigorous 
theoretical model has the advantage that it yields a well-structured analysis and picture of the 
economic implications of fiscal consolidation, and that the sensitivity of results to the assumptions 
made can easily be analyzed. 
  
The empirical literature has focused on a few key hypotheses. A strong one is that tax based fiscal 
consolidation is contractionary, whereas spending based adjustment induces expansionary output 
effects, also in the short-run. Expansionary effects would most likely occur when social transfers or 
public employment and the public wage bill are diminished. A weaker hypothesis is that the output 
effects of spending based consolidations are better (less negative) than those of tax based 
consolidations.  
Our simulations of output effects generally confirm the weaker hypothesis. Expenditure 
based consolidation is better than labor or capital tax based consolidation (at least when spending 
cuts do not concern public investment). This conclusion applies to both the short-run and the long-
run. Consolidation via consumption tax increases also hurt the economy in the short-run, but is 
generally one of the more efficient policies in the longer run. Confirmation of the stronger 
hypothesis, however, is much more difficult to find. Truly expansionary output effects after spending 
cuts can only be observed for private output. We generally do not observe them when we consider 
GDP and include the value added produced by public employees. Cutting public employment is not 
expansionary for GDP in the short and medium run. It may be expansionary for GDP in the longer 
run, but only if public employment is reduced in public consumption goods production.  
When it comes to welfare effects, we observe much bigger differences between different age 
groups than between different ability types of the same age. Here we confirm Jensen and 
Rutherford’s (2002) conclusion that intergenerational heterogeneity is the most important obstacle 
for fiscal tightening. Our results for welfare bring even more nuance on the possibility of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation. When aggregated over all generations that are alive at the time 
consolidation is started, the net welfare effect of all strategies to reduce the public debt ratio by 
40%-points is negative, except one: a reduction of non-employment benefits. Consolidation via a 
reduction of public consumption may also be expansionary for welfare, but only when the relative 
utility value of public consumption goods is very low. As to the weaker hypothesis, we still observe 
that spending based adjustments (except investment cuts) are better than tax based ones, i.e. they 
induce smaller losses for the aggregate of current generations. However, things are different when 
we focus on the youngest and future generations. For these generations, welfare effects from 
consolidation are positive rather than negative. Most interestingly, these positive effects are smaller 
under spending based adjustments in the area of education, investment, and overall public 
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employment, than under tax based adjustments. Robustness tests by changing key assumptions of 
our model never imply changes of these conclusions, quite on the contrary.   
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Appendix A 
Table A.1 
Employment rates in hours by age, 1995-2007, in % 
Age    Age    
19-20 29.44% 45-46 64.07% 
21-22 37.44% 47-48 63.26% 
23-24 45.61% 49-50 61.40% 
25-26 53.85% 51-52 59.54% 
27-28 60.36% 53-54 54.75% 
29-30 61.73% 55-56 48.98% 
31-32 63.09% 57-58 42.33% 
33-34 63.77% 59-60 33.02% 
35-36 64.24% 61-62 23.72% 
37-38 64.61% 63-64 16.44% 
39-40 64.73% 65-66 9.83% 
41-42 64.84% 67-68 4.87% 
43-44 64.53%   
Source: OECD.Stat – authors’ calculations. Average employment rates in hours over all skill groups in 11 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, UK). 
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Appendix B 
Figure B.1 
Aggregate employment evolution after different fiscal consolidation scenarios. 
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Appendix C 
Table C.1 
Aggregate welfare effect after compensating welfare transfers (expressed as % of initial GDP) 
Sensitivity to the output elasticity to public capital 
Included generations   t-29:t-23 t-22:t-8 t-7:t t-29:t  t+1:t+10 
Public employment 0 -0.5 -3.3 0.8 -3.0 8 
 0.5 -0.4 -3.6 0.3 -3.7 7.8 
 0.1 -0.3 -4.0 -0.2 -4.5 7 
 0.15 -0.2 -4.6 -0.7 -5.5 6.6 
 0.2 -0.1 -5.2 -1.3 -6.6 6 
 Barro -1.6 -8.9 -2.3 -12.8 7 
Public investment expenditures 0 -0.3 3.5 6.6 9.8 12 
 0.5 -0.7 -4.6 1.1 -4.2 7.6 
 0.10 -1.1 -13.8 -5.1 -20.0 1.5 
 0.15 -1.6 -23.2 -11.3 -36.1 -4.4 
 0.20 -2.2 -32.8 -17.7 -52.7 -10.4 
 Barro -14.3 -69.3 -32.5 -116.1 -8.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
